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The discipline of bioethics is insufficient and ineffective in addressing the 
persistent issues of racism and racial inequalities in healthcare. A minority of bioethicists 
are indeed attentive to issues such as implicit bias, structural racism, power inequalities, 
and the social determinants of health. Yet, these efforts do not consider the colonial-racial 
discourse—that racism is an instrument of eurochristian colonialism, and bioethics is a 
product of that same colonial worldview. Exposing mainstream bioethicists to the work 
of anti-colonial scholars and activists would provide bioethicists a framework through 
which they would be better equipped to address issues of race through: 1) a deeper 
understanding of their complicity with colonialism, and 2) the importance of anti-colonial 
methods and approaches to ethical decision-making in healthcare. 
Three contemporary bioethics cases involving issues of race are examined 
including Jahi McMath and the diagnosis of brain death, the Havasupai diabetes research 
protocol, and the treatment of Latinx undocumented immigrants with end-stage renal 
disease. These cases serve as the focal point for 1) the extrication of eurochristian 
colonial themes within three foundational bioethics texts, and 2) the application of the 




analyses and outcomes. I conclude that the combination of a robust self-examination of 
the discipline’s eurochristian worldview and the prioritization of a range of anti-colonial 
perspectives would serve bioethics more fully in the imagining of a racially conscious 
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CHAPTER 1: BEHIND THE MASK OF MORALITY: (e)UROCHRISTIAN 
BIOETHICS AND THE COLONIAL-RACIAL DISCOURSE 
A health care ethics conference was held in Denver, Colorado in 2018 focusing 
on marginalized patients and communities called “Expanding the Frame of Bioethics.” 
When evaluating participant feedback after the conference, several comments stood out. 
In response to a particular talk about Latinx ethics, one participant wrote “As a person of 
color I felt he was speaking my truth. I feel his presentation was necessary.” Another 
participant wrote “I was quite offended for myself and other ‘white’ medical 
professionals.” How does one make sense of such disparate reactions? In the face of real 
racial disparities and discriminatory treatment in health care, why are bioethicists and 
health care professionals, of all people, insulted by the naming of racial issues? Many 
bioethicists and health care providers consider the Tuskegee syphilis research trials as the 
signature bioethics race case. Yes, the trials were grotesque, a past case of extreme 
abhorrence. Unfortunately, the current disparities that are affecting real flesh and blood 
and are a continuation of the same paradigm that allowed Tuskegee to happen. We are 
not post-racial. 
Do ethics committees truly stand as representations of the diverse communities 
within the U.S.? Is race adequately accounted for in the analysis of all ethics discourses, 




health care, or expensive life-saving technologies? Is the bioethics of difference of 
multiple divergent (and often marginalized) communities given priority along with the 
bioethics of technology? Do eurochristian scholars risk belonging in a professional (or 
personal) peer group to stand with racial and ethnic “others” in the face of overt racism or 
subtle discrimination? Do ethics students read and learn from scholars of color with equal 
weight to their white counterparts? Do ethics students represent a variety of social 
locations? Robin Kimmerer, a Native American ecologist and author, writes “The stories 
we choose to shape our behaviors have adaptive consequences2.” In looking at underlying 
worldviews and how they shape our world, she notes that Indigenous people see 
strawberries as a gift from the earth, as entities belonging only to themselves, and with 
which humans are in symbiotic relationship. She contrasts this to the non-Indigenous 
approach of viewing strawberries as a commodity to be manipulated and sold, with no 
underlying relationship of gratitude or reciprocity. The values we hold have 
consequences on our environment, our attitudes, and our communities. The stories that 
shape our worlds run deep, often go unquestioned, and have myriad and interconnected 
consequences. The goal of this dissertation is to illuminate the underlying eurochristian 
narrative based on eurochristian “stories” that shapes bioethics and its values, the same 
story that also sells chemically treated strawberries to produce profit. The aim is not to 
admonish all aspects of eurochristian thought, nor to romanticize alternative worldviews. 
But whether Christian or secular, liberal or conservative, bioethicists are often unaware of 
                                                            
2 Robin Wall Kimmerer, Braiding Sweetgrass, First paperback edition. ed. (Minneapolis, Minnesota: 




their entrenchment in a worldview that continues to have harmful implications for people 
of color. Louis Althusser asks, how many teachers, 
“(the majority), do not even begin to suspect the “work” the system 
(which is bigger than them and crushes them) forces them to do, or 
worse, put all their heart and ingenuity into performing it with the 
most advanced awareness (the famous new methods!). So little do 
they suspect it that their own devotion contributes to the 
maintenance and nourishment of this ideological representation of 
the School, which makes the School today as “natural,” 
indispensable-useful and even beneficial for our contemporaries as 
the Church was natural, indispensable, and generous for our 
ancestors a few centuries ago.”3 
Like Althusser’s teachers, bioethicists in practice, research, and education are similarly 
embedded in the eurochristian worldview and the history of colonialism. 
In 2007 in an article written by Olivette Burton called “Why Bioethics cannot 
figure out what to do with race,” she wrote, “Bioethics cannot figure out what to do with 
race until it understands the historical, cultural, and religious basis for current race 
relations.” This is where my argument lies…of the involvement of modern bioethics in 
the continued inequalities of people and communities of color in the United States. Using 
race-oriented frameworks are not enough. Anti-colonial studies are, as I will argue, 
required to frame the “why” of racism, and to provide a framework through which we, as 
bioethicists, can understand more profoundly their complicity with colonialism and begin 
to grasp the importance of anti-colonial methods and approaches to morality in health 
care. Bioethics is a diverse discipline of practitioners, scopes, and methods. Yet, the 
discipline of bioethics shares the same origins and draws from (even while critiquing) the 
                                                            





foundational bioethics theories. Some bioethicists are indeed attentive to issues such as 
implicit bias, structural racism, power inequalities, and the social determinants of health. 
Yet, part of the argument set forth here is that bioethics as a discipline is not sufficiently 
familiar with the complexity of colonialism, with race as only one, albeit critical, 
dimension. An anti-colonial lens can reframe the way bioethicists understand issues of 
human dignity and equality. But some of the resolutions inherent in anti-colonial methods 
may not feel satisfactory or fulfilling to the bioethicist, as this approach demands the 
recognition that often no place exists for the eurochristian at the anti-colonial table. As 
illustrated by Native American ecologist in the earlier quote, if bioethics continues to tell 
its story through a eurochristian lens, it will continue to bear colonial-racial fruit. Put 
succinctly, racial disparity is an instrument of eurochristian colonialism, and bioethics is 
a product of that same colonial worldview. 
In this dissertation I will argue that the discipline of bioethics’ relative 
ineffectiveness in addressing race stems from its own blind complicity with eurochristian 
worldview. My contribution to the discourse is overall to provide an argument for an 
anti-colonial approach to bioethics by engaging students and practitioners in this same 
kind of critical analysis for the purpose of addressing issues of race through: 1) the 
rendering of an anti-colonial analysis using the categories of ontological assumptions, 
moral epistemology, and socioeconomic factors on three influential texts by eurochristian 
bioethics scholars Tristram Engelhardt, Peter Singer, Tom Beauchamp, and James 




works of anti-colonial scholars such as Miguel De La Torre, Sylvia Wynter, and Leanne 
Betasamosake Simpson. 
Theory and Methodology 
The methodology for this dissertation is not only anti-colonial, but post-
eurochristian. In other words, while largely deconstructive and critical, it will offer up 
alternative ontologies and epistemologies that rival eurochristian worldview, entertaining 
the possibilities of novel futures. In the identification of elements of the colonial-racial 
discourse this project aims to refocus on marginalized worldviews while “reducing to 
size” universalized Western fictions.4 Anti-colonialism as defined by Dei and Lordan is a 
“resistance to white supremacy and Eurocentric cultural organization…” that “looks for 
possibilities of resisting and transforming cultural systems of oppression and domination, 
or imposed ways of knowing, being, and living.”5 For this dissertation an anti-colonial 
methodology can be represented in two parts: 
1) a radical resistance to oppressive eurochristian epistemologies including not only 
the dominant epistemological and ontological concerns of postcolonialism, but also 
the political and economic imperialism of capitalism, democracy, politics of 
recognition, and state security. 
2) a centering of those who have been marginalized by eurochristian colonial 
oppression. The views of anti-colonial scholars and marginalized communities are 
                                                            
4 As Mignolo and Walsh point out, “Western thought and Western civilization are in most/all of us, but this 
does not mean a blind acceptance, nor does it mean a surrendering to North Atlantic fictions.” ibid., 2. 
5 George J. Sefa Dei and Meredith Lordan, Anti-Colonial Theory and Decolonial Praxis (New York: Peter 




central for holding a mirror up to the dominant “center”, as well as to provide 
powerful counter-narratives and alternative praxes. Patients and scholars of color 
are the subjects, not the objects, of moral and ethical discourse. 
An anti-colonial methodology situates eurochristian institutions such as 
bioethics within a larger historical, social, and political context, and contests many of the 
current eurochristian methodologies of bioethics, particularly those underlying 
mainstream theological, philosophical, legal, and qualitative methods common to the 
discipline. This anti-colonial methodology is applied in chapters four through six. The 
task of each of these chapters is to: 1) define one bioethicist’s thinking using three 
categories: ontological assumptions, moral epistemology, and sociopolitical factors; 2) 
define one anti-colonial scholar’s thinking similarly; and 3) reflect on a particular 
bioethics case involving issues of race from both the bioethicist’s and anti-colonial 
scholar’s perspective. This analysis brings into view the relative position of a 
eurochristian worldview amid several competing perspectives, at once calling into 
question its universal nature. Through anti-colonial analysis this project demonstrates the 
continued harms of the eurochristian worldview held by bioethicists for racialized 
persons, while providing anti-colonial paradigms that would better address issues of 
racism and oppression in the cases discussed. What is uncovered is the multiplicity of 
anti-colonial viewpoints from scholars from various social locations, not a “new” 
universal framework for bioethics. Anti-colonial scholars are similar in the sharing of 
oppression, struggle, and survival with their communities, but have all experienced 




eurochristian ethics is sought; rather, various anti-colonial views are illustrated. The anti-
colonial scholar chosen for each chapter is not meant to represent an entire race or group 
of people. Each scholar is positioned in their own habitus and amid a multitude of 
varying factors. For instance, Miguel De La Torre, a Cuban-American Baptist who grew 
up practicing both Santeria and Catholicism will have a different Latinx perspective than 
Gloria Anzaldua, who was a queer Chicana poet, writer, and feminist theorist who grew 
up in Texas and started life as a field worker.6 In the critiques of this dissertation I have 
chosen one scholar for each chapter to provide an anti-colonial analysis of bioethics 
based on the time and space limits of writing a dissertation. The purpose of choosing one 
scholar is to illustrate one anti-colonial approach, not “the” anti-colonial approach. 
This is not a philosophical argument of the type often used in bioethics, and will 
not engage in the merits and weaknesses in the opposition’s arguments within the 
mainstream dialogue of bioethics. The arguments herein do not intend to sweepingly 
invalidate the particular usefulness and aspirational qualities of the examined approaches 
within bioethics discourse. Instead, this paper situates bioethics in a much more 
expansive context and aims to unearth the implications of several bioethics approaches 
specifically on issues of race. The focus solely on race is narrow and leaves out the 
dynamics of intersectionality, which is a limitation to the depth of the analysis. 
                                                            
6 The Gloria E. Anzaldua Foundation. “About Gloria”. https://geanzaldua.weebly.com/about-gloria.html. 




Three Frames: Structural, Political, Experiential Discourse 
The methodology of this dissertation is interdisciplinary, with discourse on 
three levels: structural, praxis-oriented, and experiential. First, it subjects the discipline of 
bioethics to Foucauldian concepts of knowledge and power in order to illuminate the 
contextual positionality of bioethics. Second, it proposes anti-colonial praxis for 
addressing the issues of race in bioethics practice and education through the critique of 
bioethics and the centering of scholars of color. And finally, it prioritizes the experiential 
knowledge of persons of color who have been marginalized by bioethics through case 
studies. 
First, I apply to the truths, rules, and rituals performed by bioethicists the 
Foucauldian idea that truth is socially constructed and is a product of power.7 I provide a 
broader Foucauldian genealogy of bioethics which, “when viewed from the right distance 
and with the right vision, there is a profound visibility to everything.”8 This is the 500-
year long-view of colonialism. The knowledges contained within the discipline of 
bioethics are, from a Foucauldian lens, simply interpretations, one truth among many 
possibilities. The social sciences, for Foucault, are dubious in their standing as a true 
“science”. Cultural practices, “determine what will count as an object of serious 
investigation,” and thereby constructs a certain reality.9 From a constructivist view, the 
                                                            
7 This deconstruction, like for Foucault, is not an end in itself and is not nihilistic, but seeks to undermine 
only the social constructions that pose danger within the systems within which bioethics operates. 
8 Hubert L. Dreyfus, Michel Foucault Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, ed. Paul Rabinow, Michel 
Foucault (Hoboken: Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2014), 107. 




stories we learn and live by shape our worldviews. Constructivism as used in this 
dissertation does not require a non-existence of universally shared truths. But it shifts the 
focus away from the search for universal truths and focuses on ways bioethics might 
engage irreconcilable differences that lead to racism and oppression. In tracing the 
history of bioethics and race, the pattern of eurochristian colonial thinking is pervasive in 
the works of philosophers and theologians from which bioethics has arisen. Using a 
Foucauldian genealogy, a continuity is identified from these 17th-19th century thinkers to 
three contemporary bioethicists. This “history of the present” of race and bioethics 
represents a discernable trend. 
Second, the critique of bioethics leads to the invocation of a radical framework 
for the practice and scholarship of bioethics that transcends the cultural wars between the 
dominant liberal Christian, secular, and the Christian conservative camps of bioethics. 
The proposed framework is anti-colonialism, which is a “resistance to white supremacy 
and Eurocentric cultural organization…” that “looks for possibilities of resisting and 
transforming cultural systems of oppression and domination, or imposed ways of 
knowing, being, and living.”10 Anti-colonialism is a political praxis, adept at responding 
to the material consequences of the continued colonialism and global imperialism, and an 
approach that makes whiteness visible. True to anti-colonial praxis, it is a centering of 
non-eurochristian communities, and a decentering of whiteness. Hence, the anti-colonial 
approach of this dissertation is the centering of scholars of color in the bioethics 
discourse. If there is a place for the “dominant/colonizer/oppressor in the anti-colonial 
                                                            




struggle,” which some argue there is not, it is because “it provides [them] with an avenue 
for asking and insisting upon accountability and addressing responsibilities.”11 
And third, the case studies in this dissertation focus on the reclaiming of 
traditions, stories, histories, knowledge, and experiences of the racialized and oppressed. 
This methodology comes from an amalgam of several concepts: liberation theology’s 
“preferential option of the poor”, feminist standpoint theory’s epistemological privileging 
of knowledge and experiences of the marginalized, and the decentering of 
whiteness/centering of persons of color discourses from critical race theory.12 For this 
dissertation, the point of view of the marginalized, the three case studies, are pieced 
together from various sources such as news reports, interviews, legal reports, and 
scholarly accounts. Ideally the case studies would also include engagement with those 
who were directly affected by the actions of bioethics and the healthcare system, which 
was not practical within the scope this dissertation. 
Context: Pragmatic Heuristic or Critical Anti-Colonialism 
Two frameworks for approaching issues of race, poverty, and marginalization 
are the pragmatic heuristic and the critical anti-colonial analysis. The position I take in 
this project prioritizes the anti-colonial analysis. Many scholars and activists work within 
and from the standpoint of the heuristic of liberalism and modernity. This standpoint 
                                                            
11 Marlon Simmons and George Dei, “Reframing Anti-Colonial Theory for the Diasporic Context,” 
Postcolonial directions in education 1, no. 1 (2012). 
12 For more on these concepts see: GutieÌrrez, Gustavo. A theology of liberation: History, politics, and 
salvation. Orbis Books, 1973; Harding, Sandra G., ed. The feminist standpoint theory reader: Intellectual 
and political controversies. Psychology Press, 2004; and Wiegman, Robyn. The Political Consciouness: 




provides solutions to inequality and race that are intended to alleviate immediate 
suffering and provide basic material needs. This pragmatic heuristic often falls under the 
names of justice, charity, and the social determinants of health. Urgent needs such as 
housing, safe neighborhoods, access to healthy foods, and good medical care are such 
examples, and are helpful to a point. But these are solutions to problems that maintain the 
boundaries of the system as a whole. Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang’s work identifies 
these pragmatic approaches as “settler moves to innocence”, evasions of 
incommensurable differences while attempting to “reconcile settler guilt and complicity, 
and rescue settler futurity”.13 They continue, 
“the absorption of decolonization by settler social justice 
frameworks [a pragmatic heuristic] is one way the settler, disturbed 
by her own settler status, tries to escape or contain the unbearable 
searchlight of complicity, of having harmed others just by being 
one’s self.”14 
What these pragmatic solutions fail to address is the liberation of persons from the master 
discourse of colonialism, within which lies the root causes of inequalities and suffering. 
A deeper radical anti-colonial analysis is required for the liberation of persons and 
communities who suffer under the weight of centuries of racism, exploitation, and 
oppression. The pragmatic approach continues to uphold oppressive structures while 
ignoring the complicity of the practitioners of economic, political, and epistemological 
imperialism. 
                                                            
13 Eve and Yang Tuck, K. Wayne, “Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor,” Decolonization: Indigeneity, 
Education & Society 1, no. 1 (2012): 1. 




In contrast to a pragmatic heuristic approach, critical anti-colonialism is a 
radical resistance to anything that continues to feed white supremacy, even those things 
of modernity such as ideas of social justice, social determinants of health, and cultural 
humility that, on the face of it, appear well-intentioned. To return to Tuck and Yang, they 
identify the process of decolonization of the settler-state as nothing short of giving back 
all of the land that was stolen from the Indigenous nations.15 Anything short of this “turns 
decolonization into an empty signifier to be filled by any track towards liberation.”16 
Decolonizing “is not converting Indigenous politics to a Western doctrine of liberation; it 
is not a philanthropic process of ‘helping the at-risk and alleviating suffering; it is not a 
generic term for the struggle against oppressive conditions and outcomes.”17 In other 
words, decolonization is not social justice. 
Yet, those who choose to work only within a pure anti-colonial approach might 
be accused of over-romanticizing certain ethnic groups and past lifeways and discounting 
the breadth within which both beneficial and destructive epistemological, economic, and 
political arrangements are shared. Many people, including people of color, use the 
pragmatic heuristic; in effect they have become part-eurochristian. How does one 
perceive the tension between the assaults of colonialism with what has now transformed 
the globe with nations and peoples who continue to modernize, want access to helpful 
                                                            
15 Tuck and Yang use decolonization as their framework, while I am arguing for an anti-colonial bioethics. 
The differences between decolonial and anti-colonial work are described more in detail in a future chapter. 
But for these purposes, they share a critical approach to Western liberal heuristics. 
16 Tuck, “Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor,” 7. 




medicines, invest on the global market, and privatize their countries’ economies? Robin 
Kimmerer, in addressing the problems of the 21st century asks, “How do we recognize 
what we should reclaim and what is dangerous refuse? What is truly medicine for the 
living earth and what is a drug of deception?” Anti-colonialism is not atavistic. Aimé 
Césaire negated the claim that anyone can return to an unadulterated pristine cultural 
past. Instead, “the great historical tragedy of Africa has been not so much that it was too 
late in making contact with the rest of the world, as the manner in which that contact was 
brought about…”18 For Miguel de Unamuno “the choice was not between 
Europeanization or barbarism, technology or ignorance, modernity or the medievalism.”19 
Leanne Betasamosake Simpson writes that “Indigenous peoples…can choose to use the 
conventions of the academy to critique the system of settler colonialism and advance 
Indigenous liberation,” and I believe this is valuable work. We can also choose to 
continue to produce knowledge and theory in opposition to the academy as resistance, 
resurgence, and sustenance through our own systems of knowledge, and I believe this is 
also vital work.20 So, while a tension exists between the goods and evils of modernity, 
this is not a project about saving the modern. My focus is on the critical anti-colonial 
analysis over and above the pragmatic heuristic. This project leans heavily towards 
radical liberation from structural oppression, while not discounting the need for the 
                                                            
18 Aimé Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism, ed. Robin D. G. Kelley, Poetics of Anticolonialism (New 
York: New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000), 45. 
19 De La Torre, M. Ajiaco Christianity: Toward an exilic Cuban ethic of reconciliation. ProQuest 
Dissertations Publishing, 1999, 243. 
20 Leanne Betasamosake Simpson, As We Have Always Done: Indigenous Freedom through Radical 




pragmatic work of alleviating the immediate pain and suffering of bodies and minds 
while moving ever-toward an anti-colonial resistance and centering of non-eurochristian 
people. This dissertation is not a “how-to” guide for bioethicists, but a deep questioning 
of the epistemologies we take for granted in bioethics that affect people and communities 
of color. For bioethicists, the anti-colonial analysis will appear radical to mainstream 
practices. An anti-colonial approach to bioethics will take time, imagination, and a 
radical shift in perspective. There is a need to override the grand narratives of bioethics 
with a multiplicity of subaltern narratives in order to understand historical dynamics and 
relationships, and to think about how the subaltern narratives are woven together.21 
Reflecting on David Scott, the way forward might be in “fidelity to the present”, in 
“imagining new futures of the uncertain presents we live in…”22 
A Few Methodological Concerns 
The first methodological clarification concerns the nature of both bioethics and 
racial categories as homogeneous entities. Bioethics is an expanding discipline. The 
methods of the discipline are diverse, and include empirical, historical, philosophical, 
theological, legal, casuistic, ethnographic, and economic approaches.23 While primarily 
functioning in educational and consultant roles in hospital settings and in educating 
health care practitioners, bioethicists also have a role in informing and writing public 
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policy, and more recently in consulting and educating on issues in population health. 
Bioethicists also theorize from multiple frames, including more contemporary approaches 
such as virtue ethics, common morality, feminist, and relational schemes. The scope of 
this project is focused on several foundational texts in bioethics whose origins rest 
squarely within a eurochristian framework and continue to saturate the intellectual 
discipline. So, while the implication is that the discipline is growing and evolving, the 
term “bioethics” will be used throughout this project to indicate the essential, pervasive, 
and shared foundations of the discipline. 
Essentializing racial categories presents a second methodological issue. This 
issue will be addressed borrowing from Glenn Coulthard’s “essentialism challenge” in 
Red Skins, White Masks.24 When speaking about Native Americans, African Americans, 
and Latinx, the essentialist problem suggests these categories can be used to ascribe 
certain (often undesirable) traits as fixed and immutable to quite diverse populations. The 
concept of “cultural pluralism” also naively maintains “cultural straightjackets” of 
categories of otherwise diverse groups of people who may or may not share similar 
values.25 Yet, as Coulthard explains, an anti-essentialist stance, one that places culture 
under the auspices of social construction, postmodernism, and hybridity, can also work 
against persons of color. In contrast, anti-essentialism, especially in the context of a 
democracy, can disallow groups to claim a collective identity for political expediency. As 
Coulthard summarizes, what is most important is whether the essentializing “naturalizes 
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resistance” or “naturalizes oppression.” Therefore, in using the categories Native 
American, African American, and Latinx, these groupings intend to be useful only in 
highlighting the colonial-racial oppressions associated with these categories, and not to 
stereotype diverse communities and individuals. 
At the same time, essentialism is used as a stand-in for authenticity. The danger 
in essentializing is that it can bring about judgements regarding who truly belongs to a 
group; who can claim to be “pure”. Linda Tuhiwai Smith reminds us that 
“at the heart of such a view of authenticity is a belief that 
Indigenous cultures cannot change, cannot recreate themselves and 
still claim to be Indigenous. Nor can they be complicated, 
internally diverse or contradictory. Only the West has that 
privilege.”26 
Essentialism, used by Western academics, is a political word referring often to liberation 
and human rights. Yet, as Smith argues, essentialism within an Indigenous worldview is 
something altogether different; it is the sharing of life with everything in the universe, an 
“essence” of being of the world and the universe.27 The use of the terms Latinx, Black, 
and Indigenous in this dissertation is used always with the understanding that these terms 
identify a shared resistance of white supremacy despite the vast differences within such 
groups. 
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This dissertation is in part an excavation of the discipline of bioethics, and 
concomitantly a challenge to this author’s own assumptions, biases, and worldviews. A 
commitment to the process of decolonizing one’s mind is a lifelong pursuit and is never 
complete—there is no “arriving” at some utopian decolonized state. The positionality of 
this author in this dissertation involves risk, both as a white person talking with and about 
persons of color, and for critiquing one’s own discipline of study and practice, bioethics. 
Where I critique bioethics, I am also critiquing myself. My goal is to center and prioritize 
anti-colonial authors and their works, as well as those patients, families, and loved ones 
who have been marginalized by bioethics and the healthcare system. The work that I 
cannot do that is fundamental to both anti-colonial and decolonizing projects is the 
ongoing work of resurgence, re-existence, reimagining, and transcending required for 
those who own inherited non-colonial knowledges and worldviews. Decolonization is a 
form survival, resistance, and refusal by those who have been colonized. So, while I have 
experienced colonization from a gendered perspective, I have no experience with the 
deeper intersectional oppression that both people of color and non-heteronormative 
people have experienced. Instead, I prioritize the works of those continuously emerging 
decolonial discourses and employ them to displace and dialogue with eurochristian-
dominant discourses, particularly in the discipline of bioethics. This interdisciplinary 




morality is reimagined through what Sylvia Wynter calls cognitive openings toward 
homo humanitas, the Human that comes after Man.28 
Chapter Summaries 
Chapter Two, Bioethics, Race, and Colonialism: A Genealogy lays out the 
structural position of race and bioethics from a Foucauldian perspective of knowledge as 
power. The genealogy begins with the problem of racism and racial inequality in 
healthcare, and the deficiency of bioethics in addressing these issues. A scholarly review 
describes the current state of the literature in bioethics and race, and bioethics and 
colonialism. Following the literature review, a short history defines bioethics as having 
roots in philosophy and theology. In this vein, I examine moral philosophers Immanuel 
Kant and John Stuart Mill, and Christian social ethicists Walter Rauschenbusch, Reinhold 
Niebuhr, and Joseph Fletcher to identify early trends in eurochristian colonial-racial 
thinking. These scholars were chosen for their influence in their respective disciplines, 
and as predecessors of bioethics. We can look back now and clearly see racism, Western 
exceptionalism, imperial conquest, and moral proselytizing underlying some of the most 
influential theologians and philosophers of their time, those who imparted the ideas of 
human dignity, preference utility, conscience, charity, and social order. These 
incongruities preface the kind of scrutiny under which bioethics should continue to locate 
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itself, and which this dissertation will explore in regards to three foundational bioethicists 
and their influential texts. 
In Chapter Three, The eurochristian Colonial Discourse: Religion, 
Enlightenment, and Race, first I define the eurochristian worldview, colonialism, and 
imperialism in both Christian and secular forms. Second, I give attention to the colonial-
racial discourse which contextualizes the fundamental and deeply entrenched relationship 
between colonialism and race. These first two sections provide an historical backdrop and 
serve to contextualize the basis for an anti-colonial methodology, to expand the reader’s 
understanding of the colonial trajectory and its violence. Third, I describe why I chose an 
anti-colonial, over postcolonial and decolonizing, frameworks. And finally, I outline the 
categories of analysis through which I will examine each case in the following three 
chapters. These elements of critique are three: ontological assumptions, moral 
epistemology, and socio-political factors. In comparing these categories between 
eurochristian and anti-colonial scholars, the depth of the differences stand out in relief. 
Chapter Four, A White God versus a Latinx Jesus, begins with the case of 6,500 
undocumented immigrants in the United States, the majority who are Latinx, who are 
suffering with end-stage renal disease but denied the standard of care in U.S. healthcare 
system. The Orthodox Christian bioethicist H. Tristram Engelhardt’s widely read books 
The Foundations of Bioethics and The Foundations of Christian Bioethics are 
categorically analyzed from an anti-colonial perspective and contrasted with Miguel De 
La Torre’s liberative anti-colonial approach. From this analysis it becomes clear that the 




theological, and philosophical positions continue the eurochristian colonial agenda and 
leave Latinx immigrants on the margins to choose between suffering or receiving charity 
within a white evangelical system. De La Torre’s Latinx ethics, on the other hand, meets 
these patients at the bedside, prioritizes their experiences and worldviews, and transfers 
the blame of their “undocumented” status onto the last centuries of U.S. political and 
economic domination of those south of the imaginary border. 
Chapter Five, Two Expressions of Life, Death, and Humanity, considers the 
case of Jahi McMath, a 13-year-old African American teenager who was diagnosed as 
brain dead after exsanguinating and sustaining a cardiac arrest post-tonsillectomy. The 
liberal preference utilitarian Peter Singer’s text Practical Ethics, with reference to his 
book Rethinking Life and Death frame the dynamics of the McMath case which revolved 
around definitions of death, humanness, and personhood. The works of Peter Singer 
reject the Christian ideas of human dignity for a humanist and secular approach, which 
are shared by many in healthcare. Singer can be extreme in how far the takes his analysis, 
but the underlying sentiments reflect the broader secular scientific medical culture. The 
works of anti-colonial scholar Sylvia Wynter challenges the narrative of progress, of 
defining humanity from a central position, and the idea of death as only biological, as 
opposed to a social death. The context she provides around McMath and her family’s 
experiences identify the secular liberal bioethical relegation of McMath to near death 
both biologically and socially without fully considering the humanity and ontological 




In Chapter Six, The Protection of Human Research Subjects is Still Colonial, I 
explore the 2010 court case surrounding the Havasupai Nation’s involvement in an 
Arizona State University research protocol, the Diabetes Project. While the multiple 
ethical breaches and the harms caused by the research protocol and its handling were 
condemned by bioethics experts as a whole, I argue bioethics research regulations do not 
go far enough for those on the margins. One of the most widely cited bioethics textbooks, 
Principles of Bioethics, by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, mentions this case 
under the subtitle “group harm”. This is not untrue, but from the anti-colonial perspective 
of Leanne Betasamosake Simpson, the standpoints of Beauchamp and Childress are still 
engrossed in the projects of universals, of liberal multiculturalism and inclusivity, in 
Western economic and state subjectivities, and in the continued development of white 
bioethics scholarly narratives. Simpson will prove to shine a light on the incompatibility 
of Indigenous thinking with even the most well-meaning eurochristians. 
The conclusion, Chapter Seven, Bioethics Interrupted summarizes the main 
points of each chapter, reviews the contributions of this work, provides recommendations 






CHAPTER 2: BIOETHICS, RACE, AND COLONIALISM: A GENEALOGY 
This genealogy of race and bioethics is a Foucauldian one, a history of the 
present, which asks “how did we get here?” This chapter first defines the problem of race 
and bioethics based on relevant literature. Second, it identifies the Foucauldian rituals of 
power within bioethics and reviews the literature relevant to race and colonialism. And 
finally, it outlines the 50 to 60-year history of bioethics and its congruency with 
eurochristian ways of knowing synonymous with particular kinds of power. I use 
Foucault here because his concept of genealogy is helpful, but I use his work with 
caution. While Foucault challenges systems of power in the West, and in particular in 
France, he is not anti-colonial. Alexander Weheliye is helpful in demonstrating this point 
in his book Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist 
Theories of the Human.29 According to Weheliye, Foucault centers racism within the 
European center by “monumentalizing” the Nazi Holocaust as the “full reach of 
biopower” while ignoring the colonies and any forms of racism “ailleurs” (elsewhere).30 
This approach fails to acknowledge the Holocaust as just another enactment of 
colonialism and genocide alongside those enacted on Indigenous, African, and other 
racialized bodies outside Europe. In doing so, Foucault fails to understand the history and 
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meaning of concepts such as colonialism and race for his characterization of biopower, 
using the words uncritically.31 According to Weheliye, Foucault’s idea of racism is the 
“inevitable clash of unacquainted civilizations” after a period of an “internally cohesive” 
France based on those arriving from “elsewhere”—the alien races of ethnic racism, 
somehow separate from biopolitical racism.32 Race, for Foucault, is a “fixed category 
rather than as the biopolitical apparatus it actually is.”33 So while Foucault is helpful in 
this paper for outlining a genealogy of bioethics, his works cannot speak to the colonial-
racial discourse within bioethics, the foremost goal of this dissertation. 
Elements of a Foucauldian Genealogy 
Before settling into a genealogy of bioethics, it is crucial to define the purpose 
of a genealogy. First, genealogy is the analysis of power and knowledge. For both 
Foucault and Frederich Nietzsche, history is the “endless repeated play for 
dominations”.34 The dominant structures at a point-in-time discharges its power through 
what Foucault calls “meticulous rituals of power”, which are rules inscribed in law and 
moral code which seek to preserve the dominant power structure.35 And rules can be bent 
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clash of dominations.”36 Truth, for Nietzsche, is the “ceaseless and nasty clashing of 
wills.”37 While Nietzsche attributed the takeover of dominant forces as perpetuated by 
human will, Foucault saw the play for dominance as lying in some interstitial space 
within social structures. Whether dominant discourses are primarily willed by persons, or 
wholly operate in the interstices in technologies of power, is a matter of philosophical 
debate. Perhaps it is a combination of both individual and structural forms that contribute 
to the continuing clash of dominations.38 In any case, it is the dominant power that 
dictates what counts as knowledge and truth. According to Foucault, 
“…truth isn’t outside power, or lacking of power… each society 
has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth; that is, the 
types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the 
mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true 
from false statements, the means by which is sanctioned; the 
techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of 
truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts 
as true...”39 
In other words, for Foucault, what we take for the truth - our knowledge base, 
moral precepts, and professional expertise - are all a formation of power; knowledge is 
power. Knowledge is not truth – it is interpretation. For Foucault, the adage “speak truth 
to power” would be absurd, because power defines truth in order to maintain domination. 
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Whether a universal truth exists outside of power is a problem that will continue to be 
debated into the future; and I will not take a formal side. But this dissertation assumes 
that at least some “truths” are relative and driven by the ontologies and epistemologies of 
a dominant power. 
Second, a Foucauldian style genealogy “writes the history of the present”. In 
other words, it identifies a modern problem, historically traces central components of the 
cause of the problem, and asks “How did we get here?”40 Genealogy is not the discovery 
of a past parallel of a present concept, nor finding that the past necessarily led to the 
present condition. To the contrary, genealogy is an archeology of historical moments, of 
shifts in discourse, and the evolution of ideas, which serve to illustrate the randomness 
and banality in how history unfolds. Yet, when discourses and histories are viewed from a 
distance, patterns can be discerned and alternate ways of understanding modern 
problems are revealed. When one is able to take a bird’s-eye view of a moment in time in 
the context of history, the patterns of eurochristian thought can be seen to follow certain 
trends; but not trends that are moving human kind toward some great progress. For 
Foucault, genealogy seeks to dispel the linear trajectory of the evolution of a thing 
through history, which possesses neither some “pristine” origin, nor salvation or a great 
descent. There is no telos or purpose; there is no deep dark meaning or truth underlying 
human life. For Foucault, “the task of the genealogist is to destroy the primacy of origins, 
                                                            




of unchanging truths”, and of the ideas of development and progress.41 Meaning and truth 
are all a matter of interpretation, which make philosophy irrelevant.42 
Third, these dominating technologies of power, how power is grasped and 
maintained, is not merely conceptual or theoretical, but has actual effects on the bodies 
and minds of people. Bodies are caught up in the structures and actions of power, and 
alternately, power is localized in the body. As can be seen in many of Foucault’s works, 
it is through technologies of power that social institutions function to imprint their 
influence onto the bodies of the prisoner, the mentally ill, the sick patient, and the 
homosexual. Later in this dissertation, this inscription of bioethics on the bodies of 
people will be laid out more explicitly. What is left out of histories written by the 
“winners” is the history of and violence enacted upon the oppressed. And once a new 
power is in place, despite the intent, violence continues to be enacted upon the oppressed 
through meticulous rituals of power. For Nietzsche, “guilt, conscience, and duty had their 
threshold emergence in the right to secure obligations; and their inception, like that of 
any major event on earth, was saturated in blood.”43 The violence to bodies of color has 
historically accompanied eurochristian dominance and continues to do so today. 
As in Foucauldian genealogical form, a problem will be identified in bioethics, 
eurochristian bioethical rituals of power will be identified, and the discourse between 
bioethics and race will be traced to help elucidate “how we got here.” 
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What is the Problem? 
The primary problem with which this dissertation is concerned is the continued 
poor health, early death, and unequal treatment of non-whites in health care in the United 
States.44 The problem can be expanded through several commonly asked modern 
questions: Why do inequalities still exist in medicine? Why do racialized groups such as 
Native Americans and African Americans statistically have higher rates of diabetes, heart 
disease, traumatic injury and alcoholism?45 Why, if we as bioethicists and healthcare 
providers adamantly deny any racist tendencies, do people of color consistently report 
discrimination and are empirically treated differently than their white peers?46 And 
especially, why, if bioethics and the medical professions espouse the ethical language of 
equality, human dignity, and conscience, are these bodily and psychological violences not 
thoroughly addressed? This is clearly a complex issue that has a multitude of proximal 
and distal causes. Yet, this genealogy will begin to explore the potential implications of 
one of those causes, the eurochristian colonial worldview of Western bioethics. In 
problematizing bioethics through an analysis of power and knowledge, this chapter aims 
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to reveal that bioethics’ moral and ethical discourse continues to allow violence, in spite 
of itself. 
Medicine and Race 
The history of racism and inequality in healthcare is no secret. In the 18th and 
19th centuries, many physicians served as a cog in the wheel of colonization, complicit in 
the perpetuation of the concept of race. Morality and medicine were closely linked, as 
missionaries were expected to be trained as physicians, especially with “the advent of 
germ theory and antiseptics, anesthesia, and early vaccines.”47 Christian missionaries 
filled the roles of saving souls and sanitizing bodies. Imperial hygiene, the early public 
health approach, targeted the “uncivilized and unclean” practices of non-white subjects 
within colonized boundaries who were believed to threaten the health of settlers and the 
colonial military. Hubert Lyautey, a French colonial administrator, wrote in 1933 that 
“the physician, if he understands his role, is the most effective of our agents of 
penetration and pacification.”48 
During this same period in the United States, Marion Sims, the founder of 
modern gynecology, performed painful vaginal surgeries on enslaved black females 
without pain control. He also performed experiments on black infants by “cutting open 
enslaved children’s scalps and [attempting] to pry their skull bones into new positions 
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using a cobbler’s tool” to try to find a cure for tetany. 49 Most of the children died. In the 
infamous Tuskegee Study in Macon County, Alabama, from 1932 to 1972 approximately 
400 black men with syphilis were observed by physicians and staff of the US Public 
Health Service while the disease ravaged their bodies and minds, all the while 
misleadingly being told they were receiving treatment.50 At various times throughout the 
20th century and as late as the 1970s, hundreds of thousands of African American, Puerto 
Rican, Native American, and Latina-American women were exploited in the testing of 
various forms of birth control and were sterilized against their will.51 And most recently, 
the Henrietta Lacks story accounted for a poor black woman who was treated for cancer 
in the 1950s. Researchers and physicians have established a multi-billion-dollar industry 
with the tumor cells removed from her body, while neither Lacks or her family ever 
received any financial compensation. These are the benchmark stories bioethics tells 
when race is addressed by the discipline. Otherwise, a general disregard exists within 
bioethics on issues of race, often relegating racism to “rare” and ghastly human atrocities 
that mostly occurred in the past. 
Yet, this trajectory of racism and inequality in healthcare continues today. In 
2002, the Institute of Medicine’s Committee on Understanding and Eliminating Racial 
and Ethnic Disparities in Healthcare published their findings. Racial and ethnic 
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disparities at both the individual and systems levels “were found across a wide range of 
disease areas and clinical services….and in virtually all clinical settings” including 
preventative services, pain relief, 
“cardiac care, cancer screening and treatment, diabetes 
management, end stage renal disease, treatment of HIV infection, 
pediatric care, maternal and child health, mental health, 
rehabilitative and nursing home services, and many surgical 
procedures.”52 
In 2013, an article by Joe Feagin and Zinobia Bennefield examined systemic racism 
within the U.S. from historical and contemporary perspectives, citing through an 
extensive literature search the differential treatments of racialized persons, the implicit 
bias of individual practitioners, and the extensive racial framing of the healthcare 
system.53 
In 2018, the University of Wisconsin’s County Health Rankings and Roadmaps 
reported continued and growing gaps in health outcomes based on factors such as 
unemployment, lower high school graduation rates, and fewer transportation options. 
These gaps “disproportionately affect people of color – especially children and youth.” 
Their findings suggest a “clear connection between place, race, and health.” In the state 
of Colorado, for example, the County Health Rankings report indicated that American 
Indians/Alaskan Natives are less healthy than those living in the bottom ranked county, 
and blacks are most similar in health to those living in the least healthy quartile of 
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counties, while Hispanics and whites are most similar in health to those living in the 
middle 50% of counties. 
Some of the most severe inequalities can be found in the health of Native 
Americans. Life expectancies of Native Americans in South Dakota and Montana are 10-
12 years shorter than their white counterparts.54 The rates of diabetes, lack of prenatal 
care, adolescent female suicide, traumatic accidents, chronic liver disease, death from 
Hepatitis B and C are all roughly three times the rate of Caucasian counterparts in the 
U.S.55 It is also a fact that Indigenous people globally suffer the worst poverty and health. 
According to The Indigenous World 2006 International Working Group on Indigenous 
Affairs, “Indigenous peoples remain on the margins of society: they are poorer, less 
educated, die at a younger age, are much more likely to commit suicide, and are generally 
in worse health than the rest of the population.” For instance, according to the World 
Health Organization, infant mortality 
“among Indigenous children in Panama is over three times higher 
than that of the overall population. In Rwandan Twa households, 
the prevalence of poor sanitation and lack of safe, potable water 
were respectively seven-times and two-times higher than for the 
national population.”56 
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Bioethics and Race: In the Literature 
The secondary problem, and the one addressed by this dissertation is the 
theoretical and methodological inadequacy of bioethics in addressing racism and racial 
disparity in healthcare. In 2016 John Hoberman published an article in the Hastings 
Center Report called “Why Bioethics has a Race Problem.” In this article, Hoberman 
quotes Gregory Kaebnick, who wrote in a 2001 Hastings Center Report article, 
“Bioethics” should turn its attention to “easily overlooked, relatively little-talked-about 
societal topics” such as race.57 According to a literature search done by Hoberman, he 
found that following the Kaebnick plea, only eight pieces were published in the Hastings 
Center Report on African-Americans over the next 15 years. In the American Journal of 
Bioethics only six articles on race were written; in Literature and Medicine two articles; 
and in the Journal of the Medical Humanities, only two on African American health, and 
two on nursing in Africa.58 In Hoberman’s article he also quotes Howard Brody who 
observed in 2009, “I am aware of little bioethics literature on the topic of health 
disparities,” and that bioethicists were likely to find the ethical issues relevant to health 
disparities “shallow and uninteresting” and “better left to others to discuss”.59 It is not 
that voices from within the discipline of bioethics have not made calls for social justice. 
Bioethics scholars Carol Levine, Lisa Parker, Francoise Baylis, Laurie Zoloth, Leigh 
Turner, and Catherine Myser propose approaching issues of justice and equality in the 
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form of historical critique, activism, feminism, Levinasian hospitality, global health, and 
white normativity.60 The problem is that the bioethics scholars who deal directly with the 
subject of racial disparities are a minority within the discipline; and a review of the scant 
literature on bioethics and racism uncovers an undeveloped and ambivalent narrative 
among bioethics scholars as to whether and how bioethics should address racial 
inequality. 
The American Society of Bioethics and Humanities, the most prominent 
national bioethics professional organization, distributed its second edition of “Improving 
Competencies in Clinical Ethics Consultation: An Education Guide” in 2015. The 
readings for the section “Recognition of Context and Negotiation of Differences” is the 
closest ASBH comes to examining issues of race. The anonymous author of the one-page 
introduction points out the us/them dichotomy and the fact that “we” are also part of an 
“imagined norm”, one that is “White, English-speaking, middle-class, healthy.”61 The 
author mentions the need for cultural self-reflection, the recognition of unequal access to 
healthcare, and the need to “build trust between socially disadvantaged or marginalized 
patients and the healthcare system.”62 The reading materials for educating oneself center 
the conversation around the concept of culture, and were published between 1970-1999. 
Key phrases include “engaging cross-cultural variation,” “cross-cultural dialogue,” 
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“culture and religion”, “transcultural diversity”, “cultural diversity and the search for 
ethical universals”, and so on. The dialogue here is mainly around the 
universalism/relativism debate, but does not effectively address the socio-political issues 
of race in the United States as a basis for prejudice, discrimination, and oppression. The 
concept of culture softens and downplays the gross inequalities of racialized members of 
society. 
In 2016 The American Journal of Bioethics dedicated a volume to race. The 
leading article was by Marion Danis, Yolonda Wilson, Amina White: “Bioethics and 
Race: Bioethicists Can and Should Contribute to Addressing Racism.”63 In the article the 
authors helpfully lay out a list of ways bioethicists can combat racism: in scholarship, 
consultation, teaching, policy, research, outreach, and training. Responses came from 
Kayhan Parsi, Lisa Fuller, John Stone, and Anita Ho among others covering issues such 
as whiteness, power, implicit bias, and structural racism. Camisha Russell also published 
an article in 2016 titled “Questions of Race in Bioethics: Deceit, Disregard, Disparity, 
and the Work of Decentering” in which she argues through feminist standpoint theory64 
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for social justice through structural competency and cultural humility.65 In 2018 Yolanda 
Wilson wrote a piece titled “Jahi McMath, Race, and Bioethics” in which she highlights 
the racial implications of this benchmark case of brain death.66 And in 2018 Denise 
Dudzinski wrote a blog entry on bioethics.net titled “White Privilege and Playing It 
Safe”, calling for white bioethicists to engage more robustly with systemic racism.67 
What are the Rituals of Power? 
Rituals of Power, the “rules inscribed in law and moral code,” are the rituals of 
the day-to-day practices and influences of bioethicists that are embedded in plays for 
domination. I argue that the eurochristian colonial discourse contains the rules that 
maintain racism in medicine. Bioethics is caught up in both the historical disputes 
between secularism and Christendom in society, as well as the internal polemics between 
philosophical and theological, liberal and conservative.68 Bioethics is positioned at the 
site of a culture war. The dominant approach to bioethics is liberal and secular and 
considers itself to be “objective” and inclusive, although criticized by conservative 
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Christians for being exclusive and wrapped in its own moral and political agendas. 
Alternatively, neoconservative Christian bioethicists are, as Alto Charo writes, 
“suspicious of technological advance, opposed to moral relativism and moral pluralism, 
determined to identify moral absolutes” to convert into public policy to the exclusion of 
other views.69 Secular and Christian liberals alike critique conservative Christianity for its 
history of genocide and oppression (including the Inquisition, Crusades, Doctrine of 
Discovery, and Manifest Destiny), while liberals are blamed for genocides in the name of 
anti-Christianity and pro-workers (including the French Revolution, Socialist prison 
camps, and the Cambodian genocide). Amid the biopolitical culture wars, both sides 
continue to assert their own versions of morality in a dominant eurochristian world. Fear 
exists on both sides...one of science and technology; the other of oppressive and 
overreaching government; and both are implicated in the continued oppression of people 
of color.70 Bioethics commonly deals with questions such as science vs. God, universality 
vs. relativity, autonomy vs. beneficence, is vs. ought. These binaries represent old 
eurochristian struggles for dominance within a modern medical context. As a bioethicist, 
I am less concerned with resolving these questions as I am in recognizing that these 
discourses all lie within the same realm of power over colonized and racialized others, 
whose bodies and lives hold the history of oppression through “the nervous system, 
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nutrition, digestion, and energies”71 The body is “molded by a great many distinct 
regimes; it is broken down by the rhythms of work, rest, and holidays; it is poisoned by 
food or values, through eating habits or moral laws; it constructs resistances.”72 The deep 
philosophical question of whether morality is about relativity or universality is 
inconsequential for those suffering of body and mind and requiring immediate relief. 
Neither Christian nor rational moral persuasion will change power and 
privilege. All combinations of liberal and conservative, secular and Christian have more 
in common than they think, when viewed from an anti-colonial perspective. Despite their 
polarities, all are partners in the ongoing colonial projects of capitalism, progress, 
salvation, and the racialization and marginalization of people of color. Despite these 
seeming divergences internal to bioethics, these plays for domination continue to 
maintain the power of the eurochristian discourse as a whole. What is not within view in 
these disputes are the millions of people of color, of non-Christian religions, and of 
varying ethnicities who are marginalized no matter which side is in control. To 
complicate things, bioethics has become an international enterprise. A second 
globalization of eurochristian morality is happening with little attention to the colonial 
aspects of the dominant narrative. 
What are these “invisible” rituals of power in bioethics? Some of the rules are 
formal, legal, and procedural such as diagnosing brain death, performing decision-
making capacity assessments, following research protocols, and being obliged to treat 
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and stabilize any life or limb-threatening injuries. Other rules are informal such as 
deciding whether to treat an undocumented immigrant, refusing to prescribe birth control, 
participating in physician-assisted death, accepting Medicaid or indigent patients into 
one’s medical practice, and engaging in expensive research when many communities lack 
basic requisites such as housing and nutrition for good health. The heavy reliance on 
reason in bioethics comes at the expense of emotion, community, and ambiguity.73 An 
ethical theory must have flawless internal consistency, and patients must be rational in 
order to make decisions. Biotechnology is also a rule. Bioethicists are enamored with 
expensive high-profile technologies, those things that are inaccessible to a large number 
of people in the United States (and globally). The sexy sci-fi quality of popular topics 
include the ethics of human cloning, face transplants, robot personhood, and CRISPR 
gene editing. Not only are these the subjects with which many philosophical bioethicists 
are preoccupied, these are the subjects of interest to medical institutions and bioethics 
centers because of increased funding from biotechnology companies and increased grants 
to researchers.74 These technologies often promise to serve a few members of the 
population at great cost. And they further increase the gap between elite members of 
society and the marginalized. While many bioethicists would argue they are addressing 
the problems inherent in the use of specific biotechnologies, the fact remains that the 
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discipline is growing more dependent on the existence and growth of these technologies 
for their salaries, and the futuristic, but possible, technological advances that will likely 
not affect the majority of the population positively, such as genetic therapies, 
neuroenhancement, human cloning, and military biotechnology. And overall, the idea of 
“ethical management” has dominated the greater ideal of a broader social critique in 
bioethics.75 
Both formal and informal rules in bioethics are bound up within eurochristian 
discourse, and contain inherent oppressive knowledge and power, despite the seemingly 
normative and rational assumptions that naturally follow a certain worldview. In addition, 
bioethics, like medicine in general, is entrenched in a late-capitalist economic paradigm 
which further exacerbates the gaps in health and access to health in society, often along 
color lines, and always at the expense of the oppressed. Rituals are often formed at the 
philosophical, legal, and political levels, are informed by elites in society, and eventually 
trickle down to bedside bioethicists and community health spaces in the form of policies, 
procedures, and oft unquestioned truths. How can the culture and language we share as 
white eurochristian bioethicists be examined and radically revised? One of the arguments 
made in this dissertation is that eurochristian colonial discourse is the underlying etiology 
of racism, and similarly that viewing bioethics from the vantage point of colonialism 
provides a framework for uncovering the rituals of power that are invisible to the holders 
                                                            





of bioethical “knowledge” and painfully obvious to those marginalized by these same 
rituals of power. 
Bioethics and Colonialism 
A literature search in bioethics and colonialism turns up the sporadic article, 
and nothing that directly and deeply examines the discipline of bioethics in terms of the 
colonial discourse in the United States. Indeed, an anti-colonial discourse does not exist 
in bioethics in the U.S. Articles particular to both bioethics and colonialism are four, and 
generally address ethics from a non-U.S. perspective. Michael Weingarten, in his work 
with Yemenite and Ethiopian immigrants in Israel, challenges the “colonial moral 
hegemony of the Principlism approach” to bioethics by turning to a relational approach. 
Pablo Rodriguez del Pozo and José Smith describe the diverse disciplinary approaches of 
bioethics in Latin America as it struggles to move beyond the Spanish Catholic and 
human rights discourses.76 Ademola Fayemi and Macaulay Adeyelure explore a 
decolonizing trajectory for bioethics in sub-Saharan Africa based on existential needs 
rather than solely on “African” identity.77 And Catherine Myser, a U.S. scholar whose 
work focuses primarily on global bioethics, discusses the “normativity of whiteness” and 
suggests bioethicists decolonize their minds, but does not engage the complexity of 
decolonization.78 
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Several articles in the literature apply postcolonial theory to healthcare 
internationally, but not to bioethics, including the health of Indigenous populations in 
Brazil, medicalization of life in Pakistan, and HIV trials in Cambodia. 79 Several 
Canadian scholars have written articles on postcolonialism and the inequities of the 
health of Aboriginal people from a population perspective, with Cathy MacDonald and 
Audrey Steenbeek using a postcolonial feminist approach to uncover the historical root 
causes of health inequities in Canadian Aboriginal people’s lives, and Allana Beavis et. 
al. proposing a postcolonial approach to health care student education.80 K. McPhail-Bell 
et al. cite Australia’s colonialism as a need for “systematic ethical reflection to redress 
health promotion's general failure to reduce health inequalities experienced by 
Indigenous Australians”.81 In a 2008 publication, Christy Rentmeester employs 
postcolonial theory to the racial and ethnic equalities in mental health in the U.S., 
specifically drawing attention to the psychological effects of epistemic violence, 
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infiltrated consciousness, and historical and transgenerational trauma.82 And both Selina 
Mohammed and Tula Brannelly address colonialism in relation to health research.83 
And last, a few scholars have applied an historical approach to bioethics. 
Duncan Wilson argues that historians should collaborate with bioethics to contextualize 
the ahistorical analytical approaches of bioethics, as well as to 
“shift bioethics away from its focus on new and emerging 
technologies, which may not impact the day-to-day lives of 
patients, to a broader consideration of the role politics plays in 
shaping medical services.”84 
Robert Baker critiques bioethics for its historically heavy reliance on the Roman Catholic 
approach to moral decision-making.85 And Roger Cooter, in a clever and critical review 
of the 876-page Cambridge World History of Medical Ethics, cites the opportunistic 
nature of a gold-embossed volume of unreflective “history” dedicated to a discipline that 
is the pinnacle of epistemological colonizing.86 
In sum, although contemporary critiques of the discipline of bioethics 
encompass certain components of a colonial-racial discourse such as race, whiteness, and 
history, this dissertation will be the first robust anti-colonial analysis of bioethics using a 
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eurochristian worldview to frame the underlying colonial-racial discourse connecting 
present with past. This dissertation proposes an anti-colonial framework to agitate and 
extend the current approaches to the analysis of bioethics themes involving racial 
disparities. An anti-colonial approach to bioethics joins an emerging awareness that 
Western bioethics is no longer one universal voice, thereby continuing the shift of 
bioethics from a positivist to a constructionist frame, and opens the door to imagining a 
different future. 
The History of the Present: How Did We Get Here? 
A Short History of Bioethics 
Bioethics is defined as “the systematic study of the moral dimensions—
including moral vision, decisions, conduct and policies—of the life sciences and health 
care, employing a variety of ethical methodologies in an interdisciplinary setting.”87 The 
subset of bioethics, health care ethics,88 is a discipline of practice that arose in response to 
medical paternalism, technological innovations in medicine, egregiously harmful research 
protocols, and in the context of the civil rights movements. In current practice, the roles 
and authority of bioethics has become contested but generally aim at clarifying and 
guiding moral decision-making in health care, particularly decisions around issues such 
as reproduction, life-sustaining technology, genetic science, end-of-life, research, and 
access to healthcare in both health and policy arenas nationally and globally. Bioethicists 
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work in hospitals doing consultations at the bedside and with hospital administration 
where values conflicts and moral distress arise. They review research protocols on 
academic institutional review boards in order to safeguard human subjects. Bioethicists 
work in public health and public policy, examining social issues such as population 
health, gun control, medical participation in torture and the death penalty, and the broader 
implications of biotechnology for society. Some bioethicists are called to the public 
square as educators and activists. And increasingly, bioethicists are being hired by 
biotech industries. 
The discipline of bioethics did not exist during many of the atrocities occurring 
in the 18th through the mid-20th century, including the syphilis research studies at 
Tuskegee, the gynecological experiments of Marion Sims on black women, and the 
medical experimentation in Nazi concentration camps (not that a robust research ethics 
would have interrupted the latter). Ethical practice was driven by the virtues extolled and 
oaths taken by individual physicians and their professional organizations.89 In tracing the 
discourse of bioethics, there is no exact origin or endpoint. The term “bioethics” was 
coined roughly in 1971, purportedly simultaneously by Mr. R. Sargent Shriver and Dr. 
André Hellegers at Georgetown University, and Dr. Van Rensselaer Potter at the 
University of Wisconsin.90 Bioethics as a specific discipline emerged in the United States 
in the 1960s and 70s, coinciding with the post-Holocaust Nuremburg Trials and the US 
                                                            
89 Yet, the American Medical Association, the largest and most powerful medical association since 1847, 
apologized for the first time in 2008 for its systemic exclusion of black physicians, among other actions it 
took to marginalize black physicians and patients. 89 





Civil Rights Movement, at the time of drastic changes in medical science and amid 
historical medical atrocities.91 Early on, bioethics rejected the old-style paternalistic 
physician-driven morality in favor of patient rights and autonomy. In essence, when the 
long-standing discourses of theology, philosophy, and liberal humanism became exposed 
to the modern historical moments of life-saving medical technologies such as dialysis and 
ventilators, a dominant liberal and secular society, and a growing medical research 
agenda, bioethics was born. 
Bioethics: Roots in Theology and Philosophy 
The discipline of bioethics emerged in the 20th century in the United States. But 
as philosopher K. Danner Clouser said in the first edition of the Encyclopedia of 
Bioethics, “bioethics is not a new set of principles or maneuvers, but the same old ethics 
being applied to a particular realm of concern.”92 As Albert Jonsen has portrayed in The 
Birth of Bioethics, the discipline stands on a long history of both Western theology and 
philosophy.93 At different times in history both disciplines have been more or less in 
dialogue with each other, particularly until the 17th century. 
Specifically, the contemporary discipline of bioethics arises out of two 
academic traditions: social ethics and moral philosophy. Social ethics is the Christian 
movement starting in the 1880s with the social gospel, with a “social-ethical mission to 
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transform the structures of society in the direction of social justice.”94 Early bioethics was 
started by theologians who, in importing the social ethics tradition, were concerned with 
issues of human dignity and the sacredness of life in the face of a changing practice of 
medicine and medical technologies. The three “founders” of bioethics, as suggested by 
Albert Jonsen, ushered in various elements of social ethics, with Paul Ramsey coming 
from the Christian realist tradition in the spirit of Reinhold Niebuhr, Richard McCormick 
from the Catholic ethics tradition, and Joseph Fletcher, who ultimately rejected his 
Episcopalian affiliation for a secular utilitarian approach to ethics. 
Moral philosophy followed theology into the new discipline of bioethics, with 
an Enlightenment perspective rooted in rationality and empiricism, which, in the U.S., 
primarily centered around analytical rather than continental philosophy95. Analytical 
philosophy provided tools for the trade: systematic problem-solving, linguistic and 
conceptual analysis, and a discipline of the mind. Around the time of the Civil War, 
moral philosophy took a pre-eminent place in the U.S. at Harvard, Yale, and Princeton as 
a discipline in its own right, and yet was taught with reference to Scripture and Christian 
doctrine, in essence a “Christian ethics in thin disguise.”96 The presidents who taught the 
ethics courses were “custodians of certain truths necessary to the function of a civilized 
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society.”97 From Yale alone hailed many early and prominent bioethicists including Paul 
Ramsey, Joseph Fletcher, Daniel Callahan, Tom Beauchamp, James Childress, and 
Albert Jonsen. 
In the early 20th century, American pragmatism and a philosophy based on 
logical positivism and epistemology became a dominant discourse that rivaled theological 
ethics in the United States as well as the continental philosophies of existentialism, 
hermeneutics, and phenomenology found in Western Europe. The empirical and scientific 
nature of knowledge became important in both philosophy and the biological sciences, 
including medicine. From the colonial period onward, the unfolding of a succinct 
discourse can be traced which included industrialism, a profit-driven economy, a new 
American type of freedom and natural law, the focus on a civilized society built upon 
science and technology, and a sense of national exceptionalism.98 This discourse is the 
dominant eurochristian narrative, on which this dissertation will argue is also the 
narrative of bioethics. While in the last few centuries American scholars have contributed 
greatly to an approach to moral philosophy no longer strictly European, the essence of the 
worldview was firmly rooted in a history of European and Christian traditions and 
colonial enterprise harkening from early Spain, Portugal, and Great Britain. 
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If this discourse is traced into the realm of the 1960s and to bioethics, the 
eurochristian worldview continues uninterrupted in its predecessors. The first bioethicists 
were theologians, and included the likes of Joseph Fletcher, Richard McCormick, and 
Paul Ramsey. Joseph Fletcher was an Episcopal priest turned humanist. In Joseph 
Fletcher’s Situation Ethics can be found the utilitarian logic of Bentham and Mill, as well 
as strong advocacy for medical science and technology. Paul Ramsey, a Methodist 
Christian ethicist, was an emphatic deontologist as opposed to Fletcher; and often turned 
to scripture for moral truths. He wrote the book Patient as Person, extolling the primacy 
of the duty of physicians to their individual patients over duty to society. Richard 
McCormick, a Jesuit theologian, was a friendly colleague of Ramsey. They often debated 
on issues around the Ethics at the Edges of Life, also the title of Ramsey’s book, 
especially about when quality of life can be considered in withdrawing life sustaining 
treatments.99 These three theologians have been considered the early architects of 
bioethics. 
Following the theologians into the realm of medicine were American 
philosophers including Tom Beauchamp and Tristram Engelhardt. Philosopher Tom 
Beauchamp, along with James Childress, wrote The Principles of Bioethics, which has 
been one of the most accessible and widely used theories of ethical decision-making in 
health care. Engelhardt was a philosopher trained as a physician, but never practiced, and 
instead focused on the philosophy and history of medicine. Of these three philosophers, it 
is worth pointing out that Beauchamp also attended divinity school and studied religion, 
                                                            




Childress was a theologian, and Engelhardt rejected his Catholic upbringing to become a 
practicing Orthodox Christian. Yale Divinity School seemed to be one of the main origins 
for the founding and practice of bioethics, and is firmly rooted in Christian traditions. On 
the other side of the world Peter Singer studied at the University of Melbourne and 
University of Oxford between 1967-71, and later became the Ira W. DeCamp Professor 
of Bioethics at Princeton University, where he continues to be affiliated. 
The differences between contemporary bioethics theories and theorists are not 
trivial. Each has made important contributions for the discipline and the practice of 
bioethics, and in the treatment of patients and communities. But often missing from the 
scope of bioethics are the voices, ethics, and preferences of people who are non-white, 
Indigenous, and/or queer persons. Adjacent to what appears to be a culture of tolerance, 
pluralism, and multiculturalism are voices silenced by the dominance of eurochristian 
language, medical practices, and control. Bioethicists and health care workers are not 
always conscious of the discrimination experienced by Blacks within the health care 
system. But it is common and correlates with physician mistrust, suspicion about medical 
care, adherence behaviors, and decisional control preferences.100 Native Americans 
experience high incidences of diabetes, asthma, hypertension, mental illness, and 
alcoholism while receiving care “free” in a system that is underfunded and is unaligned 
with their own historical practices of health and healing, diets, and means of 
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livelihood.101 But often their health is attributed to bad behavior and poverty, or treated 
like a statistical project for public health. Latinx patients are “sent back” to a country 
where they have never lived and have no family to get chronic treatments such as 
dialysis. Women of color are disproportionately affected by strict rules around 
reproduction and abortion.102 Those operating from within a eurochristian worldview will 
rarely go far enough to understand and remedy the historical wrongs against those who 
have been racialized and oppressed. The worldview that allowed conquest, mass 
genocide, slavery, and violent civilizing of barbarians and savages did not vanish in thin 
air. The worldview that somehow blinded philosophers Immanuel Kant and John Stuart 
Mill to the full humanity of “Negros” and Indians, and allowed social ethicists Walter 
Rauschenbusch and Reinhold Niebuhr to believe in the exceptionalism of Christianity 
and America over racial and unfortunate others did not disappear.103 The worldview has 
only evolved. It is incumbent upon the discipline of bioethics to understand how the 
embeddedness within a eurochristian worldview continues to signal participation in 
racialization and colonialism. How might we be blind to our own complicity in 
oppression that our successors will look back on as we do with Kant, Mill, Niebuhr, 
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Rauschenbusch, and Fletcher? Bioethics is often expressed in terms of sanctity of life, 
human values, dignity, conscience, equity, autonomy, and the “good”. A definition of the 
good has run the course of duty, pleasure, absence of pain, flourishing, and virtuous 
character. What is different about the “good intent” of Christian theologians who wished 
to impress their form of Christian and American exceptionalism upon others, and the 
“good intent” today of bioethicists? Without a major awareness of the eurochristian 
worldview, one cannot expect to see power shift into the hands of those who are 
racialized, oppressed, and still colonized in the U.S. (if the desire is to address racism in 
healthcare). What is required of bioethics is an awareness of its own worldview, the 
relinquishing of both epistemological and political power, and the challenging of current 
narratives of the eurochristian worldview with alternative views from those on the 
margins. This will be the content of chapters 4-6. 
As has been noted, bioethics is buttressed upon the disciplines of theology and 
philosophy. Two highly influential philosophers whose work is ubiquitous in ethics are 
Immanuel Kant with his deontological theory of the categorical imperative, and John 
Stuart Mill, who (along with Jeremy Bentham), is known as one of the fathers of 
utilitarianism. These theorists are foundational to understanding the rational decision-
making methods used frequently in bioethics education, and frame the philosophical 
debate between making moral choices based on duties vs. consequences. These 
philosophers’ works are largely rooted in European Enlightenment, and both with 




philosophers reveals the racist and colonizing involvement of these “secular” precursors 
to bioethics. 
Three Christian social ethicists will also be examined in accord with their 
influences on moral thinking as a precursor to bioethics: Reinhold Niebuhr, Walter 
Rauschenbusch, and Joseph Fletcher. Niebuhr and Rauschenbusch, while not bioethicists, 
have been highly influential Christian scholars in the early thinking of social ethics, and 
serve as examples of Christian and U.S. exceptionalism, social gospel, and political order 
(at the expense of social justice) that I will demonstrate continue to underlie the works of 
some prominent bioethicists. Fletcher, on the other hand, is an early bioethics scholar 
who began as a liberal Episcopal theologian with a concern for justice, who represented 
the changing social climate of the civil rights era. He is an outlier in this group in that he 
left the theological realm for a more secular view later in his career. These five (white 
male) precursors to bioethics are all products of eurochristian thought. They share a 
similar worldview and thought trajectory, even if on different sides of the same coin. 
While they may disagree on first principles and final ends, these eurochristian thinkers all 
proselytize some set of exceptional moral values and notions of progress upon others 
who, in their estimation, lack rationality, humanity, agency, or civility. 
The Moral Philosophers 
Immanuel Kant is recognized as one of the greatest moral philosophers of the 
Enlightenment period. John Stuart Mill, in the 19th century, represents the paradigm of 
classical liberalism. Both were intellectuals who were highly influential not only in their 




students are exposed to both as required foundational knowledge. Kant’s categorical 
imperative is a moral theory based on the metaphysical good will acted on through 
individual choice of the moral agent. For students, Kant represents an approach to ethical 
decision-making that recognizes morality to be universal for all humans capable of 
rational thought. In comparison, students also learn utilitarian approaches to decision-
making, most often through the writings of John Stuart Mill. Instead of a duty or  
rule-based ethic, the utilitarian approach appeals to students whose moral instincts align 
with a societally-based liberal approach in which a calculation of the greater good is 
prioritized over a Kantian duty-based method. These two intellectuals are ingrained in the 
discipline of bioethics. In both their pedagogical presentation and their application to 
medical cases, these theories appear reasonable and noble. This chapter sets out to situate 
these theorists and their theories within the colonial-racial discourse, and in no 
insignificant way. What does it meant for the genealogy of bioethics that Kant has been 
considered the “inventor of race”, and Mill was a vociferous proponent of British 
imperialism? 
Treat (Some) Humans with Dignity: Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) 
“So you act that you use humanity, in your own person as well as 
in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never 
merely as a means.”104—Kant 
Immanuel Kant, an 18th century Prussian scholar, is a bedrock for moral 
philosophy and bioethics. Kant is ubiquitously recited in health care and bioethics classes 
and in bioethics scholarship as the moral philosopher who sought a metaphysical 
                                                            




universal morality known only through human rationality. Kant’s morality was secured in 
human goodwill, which lies in the individual choice of a human to fulfill one’s duty in 
respect for the laws of human morality. As the classic example of deontology, for Kant 
morality is not based on feelings, emotions, inclinations, or self-serving ends (or any end, 
for that matter). Morality is the compliance of rational human beings with three rules, 
which he names categorical imperatives. These three imperatives are 1) “I ought never to 
proceed except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a 
universal law”;105 2) “…act that you use humanity, in your own person as well as in the 
person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means;”106 and 
3) act “so that the idea of the will of every rational being [is] a universally legislating 
will.”107 
The duty-based morality of Kant has appealed to students and scholars of 
bioethics who resonate with the idea of having a set of moral rules to follow, such as 
those in the Hippocratic Oath (First do no harm) and the Ten Commandments (Thou shall 
not kill). The first imperative assures that actions taken by individuals accord with the 
good (and continued existence) of humanity. The second imperative, as written in the 
epigraph of this section is also appealing to students and health practitioners, which 
translates roughly to human dignity – always treat others as an end in themselves, never 
only as a means to an end. In other words, morality exists within the reasoning faculties 
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of individual humans a priori to human experience, is not concerned with consequences 
of these actions, and can be accessed through the categorical imperatives that hold 
universal scope. All rational humans rational humans are ends in themselves, should 
never be exploited, and have access to the universal laws through reason. At face value 
Kant’s moral philosophy sounds quite reasonable to those looking for a moral theory on 
which to base their practice. 
As highly regarded as Kant’s theories are in moral philosophy, many of his 
post-Enlightenment writings have contributed greatly to the conceptualization of race as a 
hierarchical category, to the dehumanization of people of color, and to the appointment of 
white Europeans as morally and physically superior. Concepts such as progress, human 
agency, and teleology strengthen these identity categories of race, and underwrite the 
eurochristian worldview. What follows is a brief discussion of the less well-known (but 
plentiful) writings of Kant, those that accomplish such a conceptualization. Kant’s views 
on morality are held in tension with his understanding that not all humans are rational, 
including many racialized groups. These theories are of major contribution to the 
racialization of people still today in bioethics and medicine, and of major source of the 
continuation of the differential treatment of those people. The contradictions in Kant’s 
theories highlight the ability for ethics scholars and their ideas to cause great harm. 
Kant’s moral philosophy is based on his anthropology and geography, which 
contain theories that propose a hierarchy of human moral and physical superiority.108 
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Contrary to what one might assume, Kant taught only 28 courses on moral philosophy, 
compared to 72 courses in anthropology or geography, which started in 1772.109 So not 
only is his moral philosophy based on his racial theories, his direct contribution to racism 
through his scholarship is substantial, even at a time in history where the moral 
justification of slavery was being challenged, as will be discussed next. Some of the 
works where these sentiments can be found include Anthropology from a Pragmatic 
Point of View, Physische Geographie, “Conjectural Beginning of Human History” 
(1785), “On the Varieties of the Different Races of Man” (1775), and “Bestimung des 
Begriffs einer Menschenrace” (1785).110 
For Kant, race was a part of the physical domain of geography, which classified 
physical characteristics of the externalities of places and people. Therefore, skin color, 
hair, and facial features were in the realm of geography. Anthropology was the study of 
the inner domain of humans, including rationality, agency, and morality. For Kant, those 
people closer to a “natural state” were closer to evil, and did not possess the gift of 
rationality or the ability to cultivate morality. In the same vein of contemporaries Carl 
Linnaeus and Friedrich Max Muller’s categorization of humans and human languages 
respectively, Kant develops a hierarchical lineage of human classification in which the 
European white brunette is the stem genus, that from which all other races originate, and 
because of their habitation in the most hospitable climate for the achievement of progress. 







the white European (males), which is a fixed concept. All races are static in their current 
levels of humanity. For him, only white Europeans have true worth; only in them does 
true human nature and morality reside. Other humans have “value”, but not inherent 
worth or dignity.111 
In his classification Kant notes: 
“In the hot countries the human being natures earlier in all ways 
but does not reach the perfection of the temperate zones. Humanity 
exists in its greatest perfection in the white race. The yellow 
Indians have a smaller amount of talent. The Negroes are lower 
and the lowest are a part of the American peoples.”112 
The essence of humanity, for Kant, is defined by the ability for man to perfect himself, to 
live according to goodwill and duty (the categorical imperatives). But this essence is only 
accessible to white Europeans. He theorizes that Native Americans are uneducable: 
“The race of the American cannot be educated. It has no 
motivating force, for it lacks affect and passion. They are not in 
live, thus they are also not afraid. They hardly speak, do not caress 
each other, care about nothing, and are lazy.”113 
About Blacks he writes, 
“The race of the Negroes, one could say, is completely the 
opposite of the Americans; thy are full of affect and passion, very 
lively, talkative, and vain. They can be educated but only as 
servants (slaves), that is they allow themselves to be trained. They 
have may motivating forces, are also sensitive, are afraid of blows 
and do much out of a sense of honor.” 
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In the late 18th century one can watch as the colonial-racial discourse becomes 
more entrenched at the hands of the most influential moral philosopher of his day. 
According to translator Helen O’Brien, “His reputation as a thinker was already made 
when events in France drove men to reconsider the justification of their political ideals, 
and it was but natural that many should look to him for guidance and advice.”114 For 
centuries Kant has been widely read and respected for his ideas on morality. To drive 
home the connection between moral language and colonial-racial violence, while Kant 
waxed on about the universal goodwill, the dignity of humans, and the categorical 
imperative, he was also giving precise advice on how to beat the flesh of “Negros” in 
order to train them into submission. In Physische Geographie Kant 
“advises us to use a split bamboo cane instead of a whip, so that 
the ‘negro’ will suffer a great deal of pains (because of the 
‘negro’s’ thick skin, he would not be racked with sufficient 
agonies through a whip), but without dying.”115 
Not only does Kant fail to see the repugnance of the use of slaves for European labor, he 
recommends a gruesome violence on the bodies of Africans to further show is disregard 
for the humanity of Africans. What explains this disconnect between moral high theory 
and the infliction of horrific pain on human beings? 
Benevolent Despotism: John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) 
“This firm foundation is that of the social feelings of mankind; the 
desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures, which is already a 
powerful principle in human nature, and happily one of those 
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which tend to become stronger, even without express inculcation, 
from the influences of advancing civilization.”116 
John Stuart Mill was a British moral and political theorist, philosopher, and 
administrator for the East India Company for 30 years. Mill, in responding to Kant-like 
duty-based theories, proposed a theory of morality based on 
“Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, [which] holds that 
actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, 
wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By 
happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain…”117 
Certain types of pleasure, for Mill, are superior, especially those of the mind over those 
of the flesh. And the pleasure of the utilitarian kind is not the “agent’s own happiness, but 
that of all concerned…. utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a 
disinterested and benevolent spectator.”118 The motivation of individuals to make 
decisions that benefit the “greatest number” is nurtured through education and 
habituation of one’s conscience “based in the desire to be in unity with our fellow 
creatures.”119 
Mill was a British social reformer who supported women’s rights in The 
Subjection of Women and liberal ideals in On Liberty. His liberalism can be detected in 
his faith in science and education, and his concern with political reform to protect people 
from poverty and bad laws. Mill also is a product of Enlightenment thinking in his belief 
in progress of civilizations through development and institutional reform. At first read, 
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like Kant, Mill seems to be a leader in ethical thinking, and a useful tool in bioethical 
decision-making. His work suggests that students and practitioners of ethics consider the 
consequences of their choices, and to consider what creates the most happiness for the 
greatest number of people. 
How can this moral theory be understood in the context of John Stuart Mill’s 
life as a high official within the British East Indian Company120, as a contributor and 
benefactor to British imperialism and exploitation of ethnic others? In this genealogy of 
bioethics, again we encounter moral language alongside the justification of the colonial-
racial discourse. Mill worked for the Company from 1823 until the Indian Mutiny 
(rebellion) of 1857. The Company started in 1600 as a trade company for items such as 
salt, tea, opium, cotton, and silk, becoming a monopoly by the 18th century. On Mill’s 
watch the Company ruled India with its own military, a military twice as large as the 
British military at the time. Mill’s attitude towards British imperialism in India has been 
referred to as a “benevolent despotism”, tolerant imperialism, and benign imperialism. 
Mill was opposed to a violent or brutal imperialism, and attempted to provide some 
freedoms for Indians through the concept of “empire of opinion”.121 This suggestion that 
Indians be given influence in social institutions was a pragmatic one, to keep Indians 
from subverting allegiance to the British.122 Although his treatment of Indians came from 
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liberal ideas and good intentions, for Mill Indians were still backwards and in need of the 
civilizing interventions and education of the British. . How can Mill be at once the 
embodiment of liberal values while simultaneously taking part in the imperialization of 
India? 
It is difficult to concern oneself with the deleterious effects of Mill’s liberal 
British writings because they are well-mannered and concerned with the plight of 
women, the poor, and the colonized. Mill’s ethics were socially liberal in his concern 
with the oppressed, but his life’s work in the Company also positions him within the 
realm of classical liberalism, similar to what we know today in the U.S. as libertarianism: 
free markets and minimal government interference. This contrast provides us with the 
opportunity to confront the insidious nature of Mill’s social and classical liberalism in the 
continued racialization and oppression of people. Imperialism and despotism are just that, 
despite whether they are practiced with benevolent intentions. Mill has managed to 
reconcile England’s imperialism in India, and simultaneously his work with the Company 
and his moral theory of utilitarianism. First, Mill, like Kant, believed in the superiority of 
the British, that they represented a greater form of civilization, progress, and morality in 
comparison to the backwards, barbarous, semi-barbarous and the savage, all language he 
used to describe Indians. He writes “Savages are always liars. They have not the faintest 
notion of truth as a virtue. ”123 While it is clear Mill is against the use of violence, he 
thinks it is the civilized societies’ duty to rule the uncivilized through moralizing and 
pedagogy. He thought that the Company was required to act as benevolent despot over 
                                                            




Indians since they were still unable to self-rule, and the Company was in a good position 
to represent their interests.124 Mill was supportive of British intervention in India and 
French intervention in Algeria. Some critics, such as Bikhu Parekh in his Decolonizing 
Liberalism, calls Mill “a ‘missionary’ for liberal ideologies.”125 Others including Mark 
Tunick have made a case against this interpretation of Mill, arguing that Mill was quite 
tolerant of “even some illiberal practices,” did not seek forced assimilation, and did not 
waive the “harm principle for the ‘not yet civilized’.”126 
More recently, scholars have looked at whether Mill compartmentalized his 
career in the Company from his metropolitan philosophizing; or whether there is some 
influence of his work in India on his moral philosophy. Lynn Zastoupil and other authors 
have painstakingly attempted to align Mill’s theoretical work with his official writings as 
an imperial administrator of the Company. Sandhya Shetty notes the lack of mention of 
Mill’s colonial work in his summative Autobiography. For Shetty this is indicative of not 
only a domestic/colonial split within Mill, but is also performative of the overall 
disconnect between liberal metropolis center and the colony, a “benign imperialism.”127 
Ilsup Ahn, in reading Mill “from the margins,” finds in his Utilitarianism that the 
“complex moral worth of an individual is largely reduced to the kinds of pleasures he 
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enjoys.”128 Reflecting on Mill’s statement “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied 
than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied,”129 Ahn notes 
that this utilitarian statement also implies those who enjoy more qualitative pleasures of 
the mind (read as British) are morally superior to those who are uncivilized, who prefer 
“more base” pleasures. It is an easier move from here to see how colonialism was 
justified by Mill, where the British were the white saviors of the less-civilized. 
A generation later we see Aimé Césaire defending non-European civilizations. 
“Every day that passes, every denial of justice, every beating by 
the police, every demand of the workers that is drowned in blood, 
every scandal that is hushed up, every punitive expedition, every 
police van, every gendarme and every militiaman, brings home to 
us the value of our old societies.”130 
And then, 
“the great historical tragedy of Africa has not been so much that it 
was too late in making contact with the rest of the world, as the 
manner in which that contact was brought about; that Europe 
began to “propagate” at a time when it had fallen into the hands of 
the most unscrupulous financiers and captains of industry…and 
that Europe is responsible before the human community for the 
highest heap of corpses in history.”131 
Franz Fanon in The Wretched of the Earth coming to the defense of Algeria and 
all colonized countries, says 
“For centuries Europe has brought the progress of other men to a 
halt and enslaved them for its own purposes and glory; for 
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centuries it has stifled virtually the whole of humanity in the name 
of so-called “spiritual adventure”….This Europe which never 
stopped talking of man, which never stopped proclaiming its sole 
concern was man, we now know the price of suffering humanity 
has paid for every one of its spiritual victories…When I look for 
man in European lifestyles and technology I see a constant denial 
of man, an avalanche of murders.”132 
Are these realities of the colonized the effects that Mill imagined from a benevolent 
imperialism? Was Mill ignorant, an idealist, or a defector of the Company’s ideology as a 
whole despite his 30 years with the Company? 
In essence, Mill had replaced the old regime of despotic imperialism with a 
kinder, gentler form of paternalism for the good of who he deemed to be barbarians, 
savages, and uncivilized. Mill is the liberal (both social and classical) precursor of the 
current trends seen in both bioethics and global development, that require the beneficent 
exceptionalism of America to save brown bodies from themselves for virtuous reasons 
and in the name of progress. 
Theology and the Social Gospel 
In addition to a robust dialogical trajectory of moral philosophy, bioethics 
enjoys the contributions of a christian worldview through the influences of Medieval 
Catholicism, Calvinist Protestantism, and social ethics, as well as the influence of 
contemporary christian Empire apologists, neoconservative Catholics, and atavistic 
christian sectarians. 
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Evangelizing Christian Exceptionalism: Rauschenbusch (1861-1918) 
Walter Rauschenbusch is often considered the spokesperson of the social gospel 
movement, the movement that ignited a third trajectory of christianity: namely christian 
social ethics. Rauschenbusch was a German Baptist pastor who traveled to Rochester 
New York to attend seminary school. While in Rochester he worked among the poor in 
the Hell’s Kitchen neighborhood, where he acquired a Christ-like love and sense of 
justice for the poor. Much of his experience flew in the face of the Protestant focus on 
apocalyptic individualistic salvation. Why must humanity wait for a future salvation 
when people are suffering in the world, and “the kingdom of God is always but coming”? 
And second, it is social and political structures that are evil, not man. Turning to a more 
organic and revolutionary vision of Jesus, he called for a christianization of societal 
structures. For Rauschenbusch, the church held a responsibility for serving the poor and 
challenging the oppressive structures of capitalism and unjust social policies through 
pacifism, collectivism, socialism, and internationalism. Rauschenbusch and his 
interlocutors in early social gospel ushered in transformative ideas of social justice, of 
praxis, and of structural violence. 
Considering context and with hindsight, Rauschenbusch also ushered in several 
ideas that have proven to be dismissive and harmful for marginalized peoples. Besides 
the usual criticisms that social gospel is idealistic and politically naïve, three major 
criticisms include his elaboration on the Darwinian justification of racial superiority, of 




During the 19th century Darwin’s theory of evolution as written in The Descent 
of Man was heavily drawn upon by social gospelers. John Fiske as Dorrien puts it, 
“helped the liberals save a role for God in the evolutionary process”, but also theorized 
Manifest Destiny which justified Anglo-Saxon superiority for the social gospel 
movement.133 Rauschenbusch fought for the mainly white male victims of 
industrialization and evil social structures, at the same time exhibiting an underlying 
thread of christian and Western superiority. In the slums of New York, he ministered to 
poor white German immigrants, not African Americans or other people of color. His 
belief in the moral superiority of certain races can be seen in his discussion on the 
celibacy of monks and nuns in the medieval period. For Rauschenbusch, this was the 
sterilization “of the best individuals” which “turned the laws of heredity against the moral 
progress of the race.”134 Elsewhere he essentializes the character of the poor as childlike, 
with a “dislike of regular work, physical incapability of sustained effort, misdirected love 
of adventure, gambling propensities, absence of energy, untrained will, careless of the 
happiness of others”.135 In some ways this is more reminiscent of a Marxian proletariat, 
the ignorant masses, than a genetic Darwinian argument. Still, Rauschenbusch seemed to 
recognize the sociocultural causes of certain inferior behaviors all the while attempting to 
fit his social gospel into the scientific paradigms of Darwinism. In later years he does 
discuss antebellum race relations, rejecting lynching and slavery, as well as the restriction 
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of immigration. He also criticized southern men for concluding blacks did not descend 
from Adam, in what appeared to be a justification of their continued exploitation of 
Blacks.136 In the meantime, his clear preference for a certain race can be read through 
Rauschenbusch as morally superior. 
In recent years academics have learned to contextualize and locate themselves 
in their writings, but for Rauschenbusch, he was sure that the christian truth was the 
Truth. The idea of universal moralization is prevalent in his liberal evangelical approach 
to social gospel. For Rauschenbusch, the universal state and universal religion were twins 
by birth (p. 96). The universal religion, christianity, would continue to partner with 
civilizations as they increased in size and reach. For early Christendom the religion 
served to moralize the nation. christianity was needed to tame the sexual indulgences of 
the Greeks and to pull all men into a morally perfect disposition and society. In the 19th 
century christianity should serve as a moral leavening in international structures. This 
“international and purely human religion” …”as we now know, was destined to fulfill 
this function.”137 
In addressing foreign missions, Rauschenbusch laments that trade and 
commerce have introduced other countries to the corruption on our own soil. He claims 
that the “moral prestige of christian civilization ought to be the most valuable stock in 
trade for the foreign representatives of christianity.” He believes that the “foreign mission 
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work of the modern Church is one of the most splendid expressions of the Christ-spirit in 
history…”138 This christian exceptionalism undergirds American exceptionalism and 
justifies imperialistic tendencies of both. In fact, while Rauschenbusch was writing in 
support of pacifism and against militarism and capitalism, the Spanish-American War 
had taken place in 1898, without mention by Rauschenbusch, in which many colonized 
and marginalized people were being killed in the name of American colonialism. But 
Rauschenbusch in fact celebrated the war as a defeat of Spanish Catholicism in favor of 
his brand of christianity and American exceptionalism. The implication of America in the 
continued oppression, exploitation, and deaths of people in the Philippines, Guam, Cuba, 
and Puerto Rico seemed to be lost on Rauschenbusch. 
In the end, it may be difficult to perform a utilitarian calculation as to the 
overall impact of Rauschenbusch’s ethics on the marginalized. While he was a gadfly to 
the conservative Protestants and of the political economic structures of his day, one must 
also consider his social location. He is still writing from a position of privilege about 
groups of people he does not know, in a specific time in history. 
Social Order at the Expense of Justice: Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971) 
Niebuhr was a liberal Protestant German-American theologian, ethicist, and 
public intellectual. His christian realism challenged the social gospel for being too 
idealistic and naïve; in Niebuhr’s mind human nature is implicitly selfish, prideful, and 
anxious. His realism also challenged religious conservatives who he thought were naïve 
in their view of scripture. Being a disciple of Christ in the world was more important than 
                                                            




focusing on the divinity of Christ. For Niebuhr, the sin of hubris applied more to nations 
and corporations than to individuals; and these power structures cannot be easily 
overcome. He lived in Detroit during the industrial boom, where he became acquainted 
with Henry Ford, and learned to despise him for his capitalist exploitation of his workers. 
Early in his career Niebuhr was a Marxist and a pacifist, but as the 20th century unfolded 
with Great Depression, World War I and II, the Nazi Holocaust, and the Cold War, 
Niebuhr’s perspectives changed. He turned toward American exceptionalism with 
military intervention as an increasingly acceptable possibility. While he remained against 
the atomic bomb and the Vietnam War, his nonviolent disposition and his bent toward 
justice began to morph into protectionism in the face of nuclear war. 
Early on, Niebuhr responded to many of the failures of Rauschenbusch. 
Rauschenbusch’s universal moralizing was untenable for Niebuhr, who points out a clear 
delineation of ethics of the state, privileged classes, and proletariat. Niebuhr also 
challenges the liberal democrat, who tends to be middle-class and enmeshed with ego and 
racism cloaked with a “benevolent condescension”.139 In addition, Rauschenbusch’s 
liberal democracy depends too much on science and reason, and especially pacifism, 
while remaining naïve to the real political and military threats to the mostly good 
christian democratic America. In addition, Niebuhr calls to task the national hypocrisy of 
the Spanish American War, especially the civilizing and peace-worthy justifications for 
imperialism – a war supported by Rauschenbusch. But what Niebuhr does retain is 
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Rauschenbusch’s belief in the Christianizing of America. Christianity and its virtues of 
love, humility, and justice are necessary in a sinful society. While not for quite the same 
reasons, both Niebuhr and Rauschenbusch maintain a theological stance in contrast with 
socio-political structures. 
Other classic criticisms of Niebuhr include his German (and eventually 
American) exceptionalism, his ambiguous and confused views on race, his limited class-
based view of inequality, and an eventual proclivity toward neoconservative values. 
While not always overt, Niebuhr appears to hold on to the virtuous superiority of his 
German background, despite his denunciation of Nazi German behaviors. While in 
graduate school he reveled in the Teutomania of Yale, and commented on occasions of 
the virtuous superiority of the German race.140 It is not necessarily the condemnation of 
other races that is most disturbing, as is the underlying notion of racial hierarchy with his 
race at the top. 
The leniency he affords early on to German virtue in spite of significant 
immoral proclivities is not extended to the moral character of other races. In some 
instances, Niebuhr can be found to be sensitive to the plight of “Negros”. In Moral Man 
and Immoral Society, he frames the unjust situation of the African American, saddled 
between the acceptance of superficial rights which “do not touch his political 
disfranchisement or his economic disinheritance,”141 while facing increased animosities 
and prejudices if violent revolution is pursued. And while this seems a sincere attempt to 
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address race issues, other passages can be found expounding the inferior traits of 
“Negros” and “Orientals” for a variety of reasons. For instance, in preparation for a 
revolution the African American would “need only to fuse the aggressiveness of the new 
and young Negro with the patience and forbearance of the old Negro, to rob the former of 
its vindictiveness and the latter of its lethargy”.142 And while the stereotypical 
descriptions are disturbing alone, the context of this passage implies the responsibility for 
African Americans to overcome their own oppression through the attainment of certain 
virtuous traits. Asians were also type-casted by Niebuhr during the Cold War. According 
to Traci West, Niebuhr fits Edward Said’s description of the Western male subject 
objectifying and racializing the Orient.143 In essence, the Orient must be saved from 
themselves and their “particular cultural and spiritual deficiencies” in order to save them 
from communism.144 African-Americans and Asians are caricatures for Niebuhr, echoed 
in Emilie Townes’ caricatures of black folk and in Chandra Mohanty’s white feminist 
classifications of Third World Women.145 Along these same lines, Niebuhr has been 
criticized for his dismissive idea of inevitability. As West points out, in Niebuhr’s resting 
of racism on a persistent prideful human proclivity for power over another, the race issue 
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must be approached at best as a proximate justice, one that is circumscribed by a notion 
of relative futility.146 
Later in life Niebuhr makes a turn to the maintenance of national order at the 
expense of justice. A more pronounced Anglo-Saxon imperialism spurred on by the 
threats of communism caused Niebuhr to side with Empire. In his attempts to shatter 
liberal illusions, Niebuhr may have traveled the slippery slope to the benefit of future 
neoconservatives. Michael Novak and others co-opted Niebuhr’s American 
exceptionalism claims for their own ends. This type of thinking is contrary to young 
Niebuhr who chided the privileged for “appointing themselves the apostles of law and 
order”, and for claiming that “it is dangerous to disturb a precarious equilibrium…”147 He 
wrote that 
“The human mind is so weak an instrument, and is so easily 
enslaved and prostituted by human passions, that one is never 
certain to what degree the fears of the privileged classes, of 
anarchy and revolution, are honest fears…an to what degree they 
are dishonest attempts to put the advancing classes at a 
disadvantage.”148 
When are they real threats, and when are they protecting the privileged? It is possible the 
younger Niebuhr was more optimistic than the older Niebuhr, and even more so is the 
possibility that a lifetime of witnessing the vicissitudes of war might create fear, a 
defensive stance, and the need for national stability over the moral fight for equality. 
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In sum, the reality is that for Niebuhr his arguments were limited to class, with 
very little engagement on race and gender. And the lens from which he envisioned 
racialized others was primarily as object, never as totalizing and equal subject. 
Love is Not Justice: Fletcher (1905-1991) 
Joseph Fletcher was a theological pioneer in bioethics, along with Paul Ramsey 
and Richard McCormick. Fletcher was an Episcopal priest who later turned agnostic, 
unlike Ramsey and McCormick, who remained theologians throughout their professional 
lives. But Fletcher is an interesting case because he straddled Christian and secular 
thought and attempted to accommodate the climate of justice in the 1960s and 70s during 
the rise of the discipline of bioethics. He grew up in New Jersey and worked for a coal 
company which ignited his sense of social justice and activism. His Situation Ethics was 
weakly based on the scriptures, but the theological Fletcher receded over his career. His 
ethics reflected the spirit of the 1960s, when secularism and human rights were 
bourgeoning. It also reflects an Augustinian account of the virtue of love as well as an 
Aristotelian notion of individual practical wisdom. Fletcher had a strong distaste for the 
dogmatic legalism of Protestant and Catholic ethics, while displaying a penchant for the 
postmodern. Although situation ethics was not relativistic in the total sense, his reliance 
on love as the only reigning principle over utilitarian arguments put him on the 
postmodern end of the spectrum. Agape, or a neighborly unemotional love, IS 
utilitarianism (greatest good for the greatest number), and love is also justice. His method 
of ethical decision-making was pragmatic in nature, dealing in relationships and human 




optimistic, and individualistic philosophical ethics takes a hard turn from both 
Rauschenbusch and Niebuhr, in almost every sense. 
The classical critiques of Fletcher are many. First, he retains all of the 
arguments heaped on utilitarians generally. How and who defines the good? Is the good 
defined as pleasure or human welfare (or agape for Fletcher)? How does one not fall into 
the trappings of moral relativism? How can one’s choices necessarily predict good 
consequences? Is it morally acceptable to justify good ends with unethical means? What 
are the boundaries of a situation? Does a situation include proximal persons and short or 
long time-frames? Who is thy neighbor? 
At first glance Fletcher does seem to attend to the situation of the oppressed. He 
argues that love is justice, and justice is distributive. Love is preferential, meaning it is 
thoughtful and responsible.149 Love is a moral law, which surpasses human law. Love can 
in fact be subversive and can take the form of revolution if the outcome is for the greater 
good. (Yet, it is hard to see love in his example of President Truman’s decision to drop 
the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki).150 But a good first clue of the disconnect 
between the love and justice comes from Fletcher’s quoting Sammy Davis Jr. about 
Davis’ conversion to Judaism. “As I see it, the difference is that the Christian religion 
preaches love thy neighbor, and the Jewish religion preaches justice, and I think justice is 
the big thing we need.”151 This conflation of love with justice problematic. What justice 
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is for Fletcher, or anyone else applying his method, only must be based on love. Love 
may be a non-sentimental neighborly-love, but that is all one can assume. The problem is 
revealed here. When love or justice comes from one’s social location, the definition of 
neighbor and of love will vary. One can imagine a group of physicians and nurses in a 
Western hospital making decisions, and love being defined by those who are a part of the 
dominant culture. Situation ethics still privileges the privileged, especially when working 
within a Western power dynamic. 
For sake of argument, if the community is a marginalized community operating 
with his model, we could deduce that they could choose their own brand of justice. But 
practically, if a marginalized person wants to uphold love or justice short of revolution in 
a dominant society, what are her options? Yes, love might look like revolution. But why 
should those who are marginalized be reduced on one hand to revolution, and on the 
other hand applying a basic utilitarian calculation to justify breaking the law or engaging 
in civil disobedience repeatedly in order to survive? The liberative message is lost. 
Fletcher is still operating within the power structure, despite leaving a bookmarked space 
for revolution. 
While this method for making decisions seems to be based on an objectively 
neutral process that deems all humans equal, some serious problems arise for those on the 
margins. People are not equivalent utilitarian units. While ideal in theory, utilitarianism 
does not consider the power dynamics and inequalities inherent in society. There is no 
preferential option for those who need preference within unjust structures. Another 




responsible moral system for those who are marginalized and for communities of 
color”152 Fletcher’s position on self-sacrifice sounds virtuous to the untrained christian 
ear. But to ask people who are marginalized to put other’s interests over their own 
(especially the dominant culture) is asking them to continue to prioritize the privileged 
while those who are marginalized are still fighting to survive. This idea of love is not 
“ordered by the community or engaged by the community. It is driven by christian 
narratives and individually embodied.”153 Henderson-Espinoza also points out the lack of 
intersectional analysis in situation ethics. While Fletcher has a vague idea of justice, his 
omission of power analysis is a deal-breaker for marginalized communities. 
Bioethics clearly shares a much deeper historical worldview with medicine 
proper. Medicine and bioethics are steeped in the promises of both modern liberalism, 
those of “human freedom, rational progress, and social equality,” 154 and a 2,000-year 
history of Christendom. The very aims of bioethics are thwarted by the worldview155 and 
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ideologies within which it was produced, including Western theology, philosophy, and 
medical science. The intentions borne of the discipline of bioethics are respectable; yet, 
disparities in access to health care continue to exist for people of color; overt and covert 
racism are still ubiquitous in medicine; and the health care professionals and leadership 
who dominate Western medicine are still primarily white.156 
This dissertation does not aim to dig into each contemporary bioethicist’s life 
and scholarship to prove some kind of individual proclivity for racism or personal flaw. 
On the contrary, the eurochristian worldview is one in which the Western world is 
immersed, and is often unconscious and biologically and cognitively programmed. What 
the next three chapters will explore is how a eurochristian bioethics discourse affects the 
bodies, minds, and flourishing of people of color. The cases in these chapters are meant 
to highlight and illuminate some of the profound effects that a bioethics unaware might 
be able to perceive in the future. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE EUROCHRISTIAN COLONIAL DISCOURSE: RELIGION, 
ENLIGHTENMENT, AND RACE 
Bioethics is a discipline157 based in theology, philosophy, and medicine. These 
three knowledge groupings are derivative of the eurochristian trajectory of both 
Christianity and the Enlightenment. As discussed by Linda Tuhiwai Smith in 
Decolonizing Methodologies, Western academic fields and disciplines such as 
anthropology, geography, and history share similar genealogical foundations in 
colonialism and the Enlightenment. These disciplines are grounded in the eurochristian 
worldview and “are either antagonistic to other belief systems or have no methodology 
for dealing with other knowledge systems.”158 And while they have been built upon the 
foundation of the “truth” as revealed through science, the disciplines as we know them 
were built in the laboratories called colonies.159 Bioethics as a discipline is also a 
eurochristian discourse. 
This chapter will outline the foundation bioethics shares with most Western 
academic disciplines. The purpose of this chapter is two-fold: to describe the 
eurochristian colonial foundations upon which the discipline of bioethics arose, and to 
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demarcate the categories of eurochristian colonial thought through which bioethics can be 
critiqued. First, to contextualize bioethics within the eurochristian colonial discourse I 
define colonialism and imperialism, the colonial-racial discourse, and the eurochristian 
worldview through both Christian and Enlightenment paradigms. Second, I define anti-
colonialism and its relation to postcolonial and decolonizing discourses and explain why I 
chose this framework. And third, I outline specific categories of colonialism for 
application to specific bioethics texts and cases in the following chapters. These 
categories will serve to expose the continuity of the structures of the colonial-racial 
discourse found within bioethics. 
Colonialism and Imperialism 
Colonialism160 and imperialism are major expressions of the eurochristian 
worldview. I briefly define them here before describing the colonial-racial discourse, 
which in turn will be fundamental to my argument that anti-colonialism is required to 
deal with issues of race in bioethics. Lorenzo Veracini defines colonialism as the 
“exogenous domination” of one group over another, and is defined by “an original 
displacement and unequal relations.”161 Ania Loomba puts it succinctly as “the conquest 
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and control of other people’s land and goods”.162 Settler-colonialism, the primary form of 
colonialism experienced in the Americas, is not a colonialism that maintains the 
distinction between colonizer and colonized, but actually attempts to erase those whose 
lands they have invaded.163 Patrick Wolfe wrote that “settler colonizers cone to stay: 
invasion is a structure not an event,” intimating the ongoing elimination of Indigenous 
peoples until colonization is complete.164 Although colonization and the formation of 
empires have occurred throughout history, European colonialism beginning in the 15th 
century is a particularly extreme and paradigmatic example of colonialism. The shear 
geographical extent of European colonialism is often cited as one reason for its 
distinctive type of domination. In the 1930s, 84.6 percent of the land surface of the globe 
was colonized.165 Loomba suggests as another distinguishing characteristic of European 
colonialism its ability to restructure whole economies; in short, its synergistic 
establishment alongside capitalism.166 It can also be distinguished by its use of race to 
justify conquest, profit, and progress on stolen bodies and stolen lands. 
Imperialism is “the forceful extension of a nation's authority by territorial 
conquest or by establishing economic and political domination of other nations that are 
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not its colonies.”167 Through imperialism, a nation need not travel to dominate other 
nations. Western imperialism replaced formal colonialism across the globe through a 
growing global strategy of neoliberalism.168 Western neoliberal policies include tenants 
such as less governmental regulation, a market economy, open trade, and individual 
freedoms (which often translates to market freedom). The hallmarks of this new form of 
global capitalism including multinational corporations, financial markets, global labor 
forces, and foreign direct investment changed the face of Western intervention in the 
world.169 170 Despite the formal decolonization171 of most former European colonies, 
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imperialism continues to exist through market globalism and neoliberalism which make 
up what Steger calls the modern imperial ideology.172 According to Loomba, 
“If imperialism is defined as a political system in which an 
imperial centre governs colonized countries, then the granting of 
political independence signals the end of empire, the collapse of 
imperialism. However, if imperialism is primarily an economic 
system of penetration and control of markets, then political 
changes do not basically affect it, and may even redefine the term 
as in the case of ‘American imperialism’ which wields enormous 
military and economic power across the globe but without direct 
political control [emphasis mine].”173 
Hardt and Negri go even further to assert that what they call Empire, the 
neoliberal regime, is postcolonial and postimperialist.174 Globalization has a diffuse 
power base and dynamic flowing borders and margins. For Hardt and Negri power lies in 
communications networks, in multinational corporations, and in financial markets; it does 
not belong to a single person, a despot, an emperor, or a royal representative. 
No bright line exists between acquisition of flag independence and what might 
be called the imperialism of hegemonic system of capitalism. The varied experiences of 
colonialism and imperialism in the immediate postcolonial period were, and continue to 
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be, complex and varied. As primarily bourgeoisie matter, decolonization did little for 
Indigenous, women, Blacks, and workers. As J. Klor de Alva noted, those on the margins 
in postcolonial nations would often be wiped out, micegenated, made to endure forced 
cultural change, or continue be marginalized.175 In settler-colonial states such as the 
Americas, Canada, and Australia, Indigenous people are still effectively colonized, while 
simultaneously being affected by more modern forces of imperialism in the form of 
neoliberalism. 
The Colonial-Racial Discourse: Race as a Tool for “Progress” 
The idea of race in medicine and bioethics is often considered in terms of 
individual overt racism, implicit bias, and structural racism. The colonial discourse on 
race is what underlies the latter, that which is embedded in the fabric of Western 
institutional success. European colonialism owes its success to racism.176 Colonialism is 
co-constituted with, and served by, the racialization of people, creating the colonial-racial 
discourse. According to Jodi Byrd, “racialization and colonization have worked 
simultaneously to other and abject entire peoples so they can be enslaved, excluded, 
removed, and killed in the name of progress and capitalism.”177 Western prosperity was 
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cultivated over 20 generations of slavery, genocide, and removal from land of racialized 
people in the service of the owners of mining, cotton, sugar, indigo, tobacco, and fruit 
industries. Aníbal Quijano called the idea of race the most efficient instrument of social 
domination invented in the last 500 years.178 
This discourse is important to the arguments in this project for two reasons. 
First, the colonial-racial discourse sets the stage for the arguments herein that are not 
concerned with race alone but has deeper historical implements in the colonial narrative. 
While bioethics and health care literature focusing on race and healthcare is growing, 
very little can be found that explicitly situates race within the colonial context, 
particularly in the bioethics literature. Second, it is important to note that colonialism’s 
co-constitution with racism over the last five centuries supports the fact that racialized 
groups in the U.S. still have poorer health, health care, and experience discriminatory 
treatment despite attempts to address “diversity and inclusion”.179 Race is an instrument 
of a broader and enduring discourse, not just one of skin color. It is one of Christianity, 
capitalism, empire-building, and military force that some might call progress, and others 
consider genocidal. Bioethics is a part of this continued colonial trajectory of progress. 
A Short Genealogy of Race in Colonialism 
In the 15th century, Europe was inundated with military conflict, religious 
intolerance, depressed wages, and devalued currencies. Portugal, Spain, France, and 
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England were the first to set out to acquire new resources to mitigate their impoverished 
conditions and fortify their commercial ventures. In the 16th and 17th centuries the 
European invaders began to colonize the Americas driven by their desire for land, 
simultaneously raising questions about the religion and humanity of the Native 
Americans. Early on, the justification for enslavement and genocide came from 
Christendom’s view of Native Americans as savages and Africans as degenerates, not as 
fully human or Christian. Missionaries forced Native Americans and Africans to convert 
to Christianity while engaging in torture, starvation, and forced labor. Alongside the 
missionaries, the European military used genocide, torture, removal, and disease to gain 
access to Native American land and resources. 
The 15th century Doctrine of Discovery180 which was led by European explorers 
with the appointment from papal authority led the Christian world toward enlightenment, 
eventually followed by the transformation of Christian Man into the Man of science and 
rationality.181 In Man’s shadow the “other” became defined as the irrational, taking on 
labels such as savage, barbarian, and degenerate. “With [these] population group’s 
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of said islands and mainlands prior to the said birthday of our Lord Jesus Christ, is hereby to be understood 
to be withdrawn or taking away.” This kept the Europeans from quarreling over territories in theory. But 
what seems like hypocrisy is the term discovery itself, of land already occupied by Indigenous peoples. 
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systemic stigmatization, social inferiorization, and dynamically produced material 
deprivation,” Wynter writes, this served “both to ‘verify’ the overrepresentation of Man 
as if it were the human, and to legitimate the subordination of the world and well-being 
of the latter to those of the former.” (emphasis mine)182 The designation for being fully 
human was limited to only European Christian and rational Man. Lisa Lowe, in her book 
Intimacies on Four Continents, performs a genealogy of European liberalism in which 
she demonstrates the intertwined colonial and racial connections across the Americas, 
Africa, and the East Indies and China trades.183 Lowe points out how race was one factor 
in the larger project of dividing humanity for the benefit of the colonizers. She goes on to 
point to some of the common representations of racialized others: Indigenous peoples as 
non-Christian and threatening savages, Africans as non-human property, and Asians as 
degenerates, vagrants, or prostitutes. While racialization and colonization have been 
shaped by local contexts and circumstances, amongst them the colonized/racialized share 
“intimacies” in their experiences with the colonizer.184 
The 18th century brought race, as a new technology of power, to the forefront as 
an alternative to exploitation via religious justification. The science of Enlightenment 
produced the likes of Karl Linnaeus, one of the first to categorize the human species. In 
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1740 Linnaeus divided humans into four sub-categories or varieties, considered the first 
steps toward defining race based on geographical location, physical characteristics, and 
temperament. The four divisions were: Europaeus albus (white Europeans) who were 
gentle and inventive, Americanus rubescens (red Americans) who were stubborn and 
angry, Asiaticus fuscus (yellow Asians) who were avaricious and easily distracted, and 
Africanus niger (black Africans) who were relaxed and negligent.185 The category 
“monstrosus” was delegated to wild humans. John Burke, in his essay “The Wild Man’s 
Pedigree: Scientific Method and Racial Anthropology”, he describes Linnaeus’ list of 
five levels of humans, ranging from the four-footed, mute, hairy wild man to the black, 
phlegmatic, relaxed, capricious African.186 19th Century science used phrenology and 
craniometry to perform studies on skulls, often in an attempt to “prove” the inferior 
intellectual ability and undesirable behavioral traits of non-whites.187 Science, although 
touted as objective, was (and continues to be) tethered to the racist cognitive metaphors 
of the eurochristian mind. 
Also during the 18th century Immanuel Kant put forth his theories on race, for 
which he has been credited as inventor.188 Kant divides the races into four groups as well, 
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all originating from the superior white and blonde stem-species and a climate best suited 
for progress and civilization.189 For Kant, the three other groups, Negro, Hunnish, and 
Hinuish had acquired internal and external features, particularly skin color and 
temperaments, to adapt to their migratory environments. The color of one’s skin, for 
Kant, was indicative of internal characteristics and ability to be rational, therefore human. 
The religious scholar and linguist Müller divided up languages in a similar fashion to 
Kant’s categories in the prior century.190 And while not intending to be racist, Müller’s 
classifications of languages and peoples served history as a favorite of Hitler in justifying 
the Holocaust. The 19th century solidified race as a concept, notably based on Darwin’s 
theory of evolution, which consolidated the myth of biological teleology of human beings 
on the path to civilized humanity. 
Modern continuities of race and colonialism manifested in Indian boarding 
schools which ran from the late 19th century and peaked in the 1970s, the mass 
imprisonment of people of color (a significant source of free labor), 20th century 
sterilization programs carried out on women of color, the poverty of Native Americans 
that underwrites many of the top 10 poorest counties in the United States, the 
environmental destruction of Native lands by the U.S. government and private industry, 
the current removal of Native children from their homes and subsequent adoption, the 
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imprisonment of Latinx migrant children and adults, and the racial and ethnic disparities 
in health care, both at the individual and systemic level. According to the 2002 Institute 
of Medicine’s “Committee on Understanding and Eliminating Racial and Ethnic 
Disparities in Healthcare,” 
“disparities were found across a wide range of disease areas and 
clinical services…in virtually all clinical settings…including 
cardiac care, cancer screening and treatment, diabetes 
management, end stage renal disease, treatment of HIV infection, 
pediatric care, maternal and child health, mental health, 
rehabilitative and nursing home services, and many surgical 
procedures.”191 
It is no coincidence that Native Americans, Latinx, and African Americans, those people 
whose bodies and land were exploited to “make America great,” are still suffering under 
the weight of the colonizer. Thomas McCarthy puts this into perspective writing, “five 
centuries of imperialism and racism did not disappear without a trace fifty years since the 
postwar successes of decolonization and civil rights struggles.”192 Lowe also indicates the 
continuation of the colonial-racial discourse in her observation, “race as a mark of 
colonial difference” is an enduring remainder of the processes through which the human 
is universalized and freed by liberal forms, while the peoples who created the conditions 
of possibility for that freedom are assimilated or forgotten.193 In modern times, the 
function of racism has evolved from justifying slave labor, genocide, and erasure, to 
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supporting nationalism, creating in-groups and out-groups, and for targeting (non-white) 
immigrants.194 It is still the reality that the oppression of certain groups allow for the 
flourishing of others. 
The (e)urochristian195 Worldview 
Bioethics, along with most Western institutions and the individuals therein, 
operates according to what I will refer to frequently, as the eurochristian worldview. The 
enduring nature of the eurochristian worldview has driven 500 years of colonialism, 
imperialism, and racism, and is fundamental to the argument that bioethics is also 
complicit in the colonial-racial discourse. Although worldview has various colloquial 
meanings, for the purposes of this argument I define it as a deep linguistic-conceptual 
structure of the brain. According to Mark Freeland, worldview is an “interrelated set of 
cultural logics that fundamentally orient a culture to space, time, the rest of life, and 
provides a prescription for relating to that life.”196 Worldview is partially rooted in the 
pre-cognitive, and can hold within it various communal norms, rules, and ideologies. 
Worldview is made up of one’s ontology, epistemology, and the socio-political and 
economic structures that frame one’s world. One’s worldview is resistant to change 
because it centers a person in a certain reality, likely causing cognitive dissonance if 
                                                            
194 McCarthy, Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development, 7-8. 
195 I credit George “Tink” Tinker for this concept and terminology, and graciously employ it as a 
fundamental concept in this analysis. Tinker, Tink. “The Irrelevance of Euro-Christian Dichotomies for 
Indigenous Peoples Beyond Nonviolence to a Vision of Cosmic Balance.” In Peacemaking and the 
Challenge of Violence in World Religions. 2015, 206-25. 
196 Freeland, “Conceptual Decolonization of Space: Worldview and Language in Anishinaabe Akiing,” 76. 




challenged. Persons from Western Europe and the U.S. generally share the same 
worldview which is oriented to time as linear, progressive, and redemptive; view land as 
property; engage in activities of “competitive achievement”; are individualistic; and share 
a common history based in the philosophies and religions of Western antiquity.197 
According to George Tinker, the eurochristian worldview is by nature evangelistic and 
has “inherently globalizing aspirations.” The eurochristian worldview, according to 
Tinker, contains an “up-down” schema, categorizing different species along a progressive 
hierarchy. This hierarchical schema is also responsible for arranging people as more or 
less human, valuable, and civilized. Within this eurochristian worldview are more 
conscious categories of identity such as Catholicism, Marxism, socialism, 
conservativism, and Protestantism; yet all are eurochristian. For instance, while 
ideologically Marxism critiques capitalism and wage labor, it still assumes the 
governance of the white male position, the organization of the nation-state, and the idea 
of economic progress. The consequences of this kind of progressive, hierarchical, 
evangelistic, and competitive thinking have underwritten colonialism and racism. It is 
this same worldview that centers bioethics and medicine: a linear and progressive view of 
time, a hierarchical structure, rules of logic that follow Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophy 
based on human rationality, and moral proselytizing. 
In order for eurochristians to comprehend their own worldview as one of many 
possible ways of experiencing the world, it must be compared with a differing 
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worldview. For this purpose I will compare it to an Indigenous worldview.198 According 
to George Tinker, a Native American worldview is “inherently both local and cosmic in 
orientation;” positions itself spatially rather than temporally, primarily around land; is 
community-centered; and places “cosmic/holistic harmony and balance as the ultimate 
ideal or goal of all human activity…”199 In contrast to the eurochristian anthropocentric 
up-down schema, Native Americans have what Tinker calls an “egalitarian-collateral 
image schema that results in a perception of the world that puts humans on the same 
plane as all other living nonhuman persons,” including the two-leggeds, the four-leggeds, 
the flying persons and the living-moving ones such as plants, fish, mountains, and 
rocks.200 The Indigenous worldview respects all life, strives for continual balance through 
ceremony and oral tradition, and is rooted in the place of ancestors and communal life. 
For Native Americans life is cyclical, balanced, and egalitarian where eurochristian 
worldview holds in esteem the myth of progress, human-centered individualism, and a 
Darwinian notion of competition and “natural order” rather than cooperation. 
The eurochristian thinking that has led to “progress” and “civilization” has also 
led to environmental degradation, mass genocide, racial oppression, and extreme 
economic inequality, none of which would have likely occurred based on Indigenous 
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values and worldview.201 An Indigenous worldview aporetically challenges the “reality” 
taken for granted by Westerners. The ability to perceive the eurochristian worldview is 
fundamental to understanding how thoughts and actions are driven by a much larger and 
insidious order. 
The Frenemies of Christianity and the Enlightenment 
This eurochristian worldview encompasses both Christianity and the 
Enlightenment. When these two “arch-enemies” are viewed from a distance, it becomes 
clear that, despite their differences, they have worked on colonial-racial projects in 
tandem over the last five centuries. Colonialism occurred through a synergy of the 
expansion and conquest of nation-states and the evangelizing of the Church. Sylvia 
Wynter’s work is helpful in understanding this macro-level fusion of Christianity and the 
Enlightenment, and their interrelated evolution and contribution to the eurochristian 
worldview. Wynter, in her sociogeny202 of Man in Unsettling the Coloniality of 
Being/Power/Truth/Freedom, traces the dominant schemas of Western society from 1) 
Greek ontology, to 2) Gregorian Latin Christianity, to 3) the Reformation and 
Enlightenment. The first transition in Western history saw a gradual replacement of the 
Greek supernatural celestial central organizing principle of perfection with the Gregorian 
Christian spiritual perfection. The second transition called the “intense historical rupture” 
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by Winant began with ocean navigation in 1500s which proved Copernican theories and 
positioned man as a political subject rather than a Christian subject.203 In this second 
Western transition, science, evolution, and rationality abruptly replaced the Christian God 
as central to worldview. Wynter calls these three ontologies “schemas”, all which dictate 
what humans consider truth, morality, and conscience. The newer humanist schema of 
the Enlightenment, while grounded in rational thought and dismissive of supernatural 
organizing principles, merely overlays its structure atop the Church’s Judeo-Christian 
conceptions. Pragmatically, those who were sinners become the irrational; salvation 
becomes adherence to law; monarchy becomes expanding mercantilism and commercial 
interests; and Christian Man becomes rational Man. This profound shift to rational Man 
legitimated the expropriation of the land of “savages” and of the enslavement of African 
“degenerates”, neither of them meeting the criteria of rational Man; and therefor 
comprising the secular shift from “enemies of Christ” toward a more secular racism.204 
No matter which schema, they all comprise the same general structure of defining who is 
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human (always Man) and who is not. In considering the reliability of the organizing 
principles that have placed Man as superior over the last five centuries, we can begin to 
question whether medicine and bioethics has miraculously broken from this deep-seated 
trajectory. In sum, whether identifying as a Christian or humanist, liberal or conservative 
bioethicist does not relieve one from the eurochristian worldview or its bad habits. 
Religion and Colonialism 
Christianity has historically been fundamental to the colonial apparatus, and 
foundational to both religious and secular bioethics. As the term will be used throughout 
this project, Christianity indicates a socio-political designation and a social movement 
that has been institutionalized within both the church and state; in other words, modern 
Christendom. Peter d’Errico describes “Christendom” as “consisting of alliances among 
secular princes and priestly authorities; it culminates in the doctrine of divine right of 
kings and popes.”205 Christianity in this way is both political and religious and can be 
found in churches and in court houses alike.206 What I exclude from the category of a 
church-state type Christianity is the actual life and teachings of Christ. This is not an 
attack on Christians who believe and follow Jesus’ teachings without evangelizing or 
proselytizing. But it is imperative for this project to look realistically at Christianity and 
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its generous contributions not only to doing good in the world, but to the harms it has 
done whether with noble intent or through outright violence. 
The Christian Apologetic 
Christianity has legitimized colonial activities and the exploitation of people 
and land for hundreds of years. Christianity was essential to what Steven Newcomb has 
called the conqueror model, a cognitive model pervasive in eurochristian thought that 
drives both colonialism and imperialism.207 The European conqueror’s power originated 
in the divine power of the pope in Europe through the infamous Doctrine of Discovery.208 
The Doctrine of Discovery, a collection of 15th Century papal documents became the 
impetus and justification for Portuguese and Spanish colonialism. Eventually the idea of 
discovery was adopted throughout Europe. Although not limited to these, three papal 
bulls, the Dum Diversas, Romanus Pontifex, and the Inter Caetera provided a foundation 
for the Doctrine. In 1452 Pope Nicholas V wrote the Dum Diversas, granting the 
Portuguese King Alfonso V “the … full and free power, through the Apostolic authority 
by this edict, to invade, conquer, fight, subjugate the Saracens and pagans, and other 
infidels and other enemies of Christ…” Between the Dum Diversas and Romanus 
Pontifex of 1455, the Portuguese monarchy was given permission by the Pope to seize 
any lands and possessions in West Africa with exclusive rights to trade and colonize. The 
third document, Inter Caetera, was written by Pope Alexander VI for Ferdinand and 
Isabel of Spain in order to clarify Spanish rights to land in the new world, as well as to 
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define the nature of Christian-infidel relations and the responsibility of the pope to 
protect the infidels and to convert them to Christianity. By the time of Christopher 
Columbus’ first voyage to the Americas in 1492, the content of these papal proclamations 
had become well known. Per Newcomb, the perceived “divine right” of the conqueror, 
gifted to him from God, is accompanied by the right to discover, to subdue, and to 
dominate. As Newcomb describes, the myths of domination and conquering have biblical 
roots. Newcomb breaks down the word dominion etymologically and argues that the 
word dominion shares the same meaning with the word subdue. As he points out, Lord 
“translates into the Latin term dominus, ‘he who has subdued’.”209 This language can be 
found in Genesis 1:28 which reads: “God blessed them and said to them, ‘Be fruitful and 
increase in number; fill the earth and subdue it. Rule over the fish in the sea and the birds 
in the sky and over every living creature that moves on the ground’.”210 The biblical 
language of subduing and dominating is a component of the eurochristian worldview, one 
that has driven the justification of not only the exploitation of the natural world, but also 
the justification of violence in slavery, genocide, and oppression.211 The bible serves as a 
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form of collective consciousness in the minds of eurochristians, whether self-proclaimed 
Christians or secularists, through which they continue to perform acts of subjugation. 
The story of God’s Covenant with the Israelites is another site of biblical 
seeding of the eurochristian colonial trajectory as represented by the following verses: 
 Genesis212: Abram traveled through the land as far as the site of the great tree of 
Moreh at Shechem. At that time the Canaanites were in the land. The LORD 
appeared to Abram and said, “To your offspring I will give this land.” 
 Psalms213: “Ask me, and I will make the nations your inheritance, the ends of the 
earth your possession. You will break them with a rod of iron; you will dash them 
to pieces like pottery.” 
 Deuteronomy214: When you march up to attack a city, make its people an offer of 
peace. If they accept and open their gates, all the people in it shall be subject to 
forced labor and shall work for you. If they refuse to make peace and they engage 
you in battle, lay siege to that city. When the LORD your God delivers it into your 
hand, put to the sword all the men in it. As for the women, the children, the 
livestock and everything else in the city, you may take these as plunder for 
yourselves. And you may use the plunder the LORD your God gives you from your 
enemies. This is how you are to treat all the cities that are at a distance from you 
and do not belong to the nations nearby. However, in the cities of the nations the 
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LORD your God is giving you as an inheritance, do not leave alive anything that 
breathes. Completely destroy them—the Hittites, Amorites, Canaanites, Perizzites, 
Hivites and Jebusites—as the LORD your God has commanded you. 
These biblical stories are the foundation of colonization. The Chosen Ones 
(Israelites/Christian Europeans) are divinely guided to conquer and subdue the Promised 
Land (Canaan/Indigenous lands). The deal given to the Native Americans was to 
cooperate and live in peace, or resist and be subjected to slavery or obliteration. Africans, 
on the other hand, were given no deal in relation to slavery. In drawing from Genesis 9, 
enslavement was the proper course for Black “descendants of Ham”.215 These Christian 
tropes of domination did not end with the postcolonial period. 
In the 19th century, Christian ideology continued to dominate the world, this 
time under the academic discipline of “world religions”. According to Tomoko 
Masuzawa, concept of world religions was likely invented out of Christian comparative 
theology, which saw Christianity as “the world religion,”, and “uniquely universal.”216 
The concept of world religions and its accompanying ideas of pluralism are extensions of 
European/Aryan universalism. By examining the 19th century pre-scientific texts whose 
authors framed “other” religions as deviants to the universal nature of Christianity, the 
assumption of a neutral and objective categorization of “world religions” is challenged by 
Masuzawa. The same myths of religious pluralism and diversity are only different in 
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category from the myths of racial pluralism and diversity. The World Parliament of 
Religions is a case-in-point. This organization, while instrumental in establishing 
religious categories as well as upholding pluralism is still largely Protestant in 
representation.217 This is analogous to the stance of health care institutions and 
professional codes of ethics; white and eurochristian in nature, despite the language of 
pluralism and diversity. 
Ted Vial, in his book Modern Race, Modern Religion makes the argument that 
the construction of modern race and religion are inextricably bound, and continue to 
define modern conceptual categories of identity, in large part due to the teleological and 
hierarchical ideas of several German thinkers such as Herder, Schleiermacher, Kant, and 
Müller. Because of the eurochristian worldview, religion is always a racialized category 
in the modern world.218 Hence, we can conclude that, with early bioethics foundations set 
exclusively by Christian theologians, bioethics is also inextricably bound to racism. 
Christianity is half of the eurochristian worldview. The underlying tropes of 
domination and conquest, of Christian exceptionalism and hierarchy, are threaded 
throughout the Western colonial-racial apparatus. The other half of the eurochristian 
worldview takes off during the Enlightenment, a period when Europeans were actively 
colonizing, “discovering”, and appropriating other people’s knowledge, land, and bodies. 
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The Enlightenment and Liberalism 
Humanistic Western disciplines arose out of the Enlightenment, the project of 
modernity that brought with it liberal politics, the industrial revolution, and the 
Darwinian idea of evolution and progress. Modern-day liberalism is based on the “rights 
of man” as declared by the 1789 French Revolution through the concepts of “human 
freedom, rational progress, and social equality.”219 As Lisa Lowe points out, modern 
liberalism is constituted by 
“political emancipation through citizenship in the state, the 
promise of economic freedom in the development of wage labor 
and exchange markets, and the conferring of civilization to human 
persons educated in aesthetic and national culture…”220 
What is forgotten is the simultaneous necessity of slavery, settler-colonialism, land theft, 
and capitalist imperialism in order to sustain modernity. In France in 1789, it was not 
persons of color, Indigenous persons, or even white women whose rights were being 
asserted. It was the “rights of man”. In The Intimacies of Four Continents, Lowe 
examines the separate archives of both European liberalism and colonial documents, 
exposing their co-constitution in the defining of humans along a hierarchy. She states, 
“even as it proposes inclusivity, liberal universalism effects principles of inclusion and 
exclusion,” and that 
“universalizing concepts of reason, civilization, and freedom effect 
colonial divisions of humanity, affirming liberty for modern man 
while subordinating the variously colonized and dispossessed 
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peoples whose material labor and resources were the conditions of 
possibility for that liberty.”221 
The language of liberal societies make colonialism less visible, but the schema is still in 
place. Similarly, Walter Mingolo and Catherine Walsh write, “there is no modernity 
without coloniality.”222 According to them, right-wing nationalisms such as Trump’s 
America and Britain’s Brexit are not worse than the neoliberal globalism that has spread 
a capitalist economy worldwide.223 Why? Because the nation-state and capitalism are 
both colonizing tropes of a particular worldview. Similarly, liberalism is no better than 
conservativism. While political liberals use the modern language of freedom and 
equality, they continue to uphold the political economy of the nation-state, which in-turn 
is co-constituted with the historical structures of race. Modernity orients itself toward the 
future, to some sort of “progress”. This trope of progress is based on a teleological view 
that is also wrapped up in the colonial narrative, and is inseparable from the categorizing 
of humanity through race. According to Vial, despite our best efforts as scholars and 
liberals, 
“we are led…to theorize difference by comparing groups based on 
their proximity to a historical telos. When we rank parts of the 
world by how developed or progressive or modern they are, by 
how compatible their religions are with democracy, and when we 
notice what color the people are who live there, we find that our 
categories are not so different than Kant’s and Müller’s.”224 
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Modernity, replete with the promises of science, capitalism, and the nation-state, has 
failed in many ways. It did not prevent a century of world wars and genocides, it has 
contributed greatly to the destruction of the environment, and it has not solved problems 
of inequality and racism. Modernity is constitutive of these things. To eliminate them 
would be to eliminate modernism. 
During the period of Enlightenment, both colonialism and imperialism set the 
stage for stealing valuable land and appropriating knowledge from others, while defining 
those others based on the Western worldview (and always as inferior). In Decolonizing 
Methodologies, Linda Tuhiwai Smith points out how Western disciplines, and 
particularly anthropology, “catalogued, studied, and stored” Indigenous communities as if 
their cultures were objects of study rather than subjects who existed with an equally valid 
worldview in their own right.225 The “objects” of study, Indigenous people, while 
contributing heavily in the scientific foundations of Western research, were given as 
much credit as a “variety of plant, a shard of pottery, or a ‘preserved head of a native’”.226 
Edward Said made a similar argument in Orientalism by arguing that the West reified and 
defined the East, thus disallowing those in the East to speak for themselves. This 
representation of the East by the West was possible because of the political, cultural, 
intellectual and moral power of imperial America, Britain, and France.227 
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The “globalization of knowledge and Western culture constantly reaffirms the West’s 
view of itself as the center of legitimate knowledge, the arbiter of what counts as 
knowledge and the source of ‘civilized’ knowledge.”228 And the knowledge was spread 
through both religious boarding schools or, later, public and secular schooling, which 
continues today. If Indigenous peoples were thought to be educatable, they were offered 
schooling. If they were thought to have a soul, they were offered salvation.229 
The promises from the point of view of the Enlightenment, modernity, and 
political liberalism are no better at dealing with race than those from a religious or 
conservative space. The conservative Christian bioethicist and the secular liberal 
bioethicist alike are complicit in continued racism, just as Christian trope drives 
domination and hierarchy, and liberalism touts freedom while exploiting those who do 
not count. The eurochristian worldview did not disappear. 
Postcolonialism, Anti-Colonialism, or Decolonization? 
The proposed framework for the ensuing analysis is anti-colonial. In this section 
I will define and critique postcolonialism, situate the discourse of decolonization within a 
larger anti-colonial framework, and finally make a case for an anti-colonial approach. 
Anti-colonialism as defined by Dei and Lordan is a “resistance to white 
supremacy and Eurocentric cultural organization…” that “looks for possibilities of 
resisting and transforming cultural systems of oppression and domination, or imposed 
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ways of knowing, being, and living.”230 Anticolonialism is a political praxis, adept at 
responding to the material consequences of the continued colonialism and global 
imperialism. Anti-colonial praxis centers non-eurochristian communities while making 
whiteness visible to white people.231 If there is a place for the 
“dominant/colonizer/oppressor in the anti-colonial struggle,” which some argue there is 
not, it is because “it provides [them] with an avenue for asking and insisting upon 
accountability and addressing responsibilities.”232 Herein lies the ultimate role of the 
bioethicist who is serious about dealing with race: to learn and teach the colonial-racial 
discourse, to act with marginalized patients and against colonial structures in practice, 
and to center scholars of color in the bioethics discourse. For bioethicists, anti-colonial 
deconstruction of one’s consciousness and confronting colonial practices in one’s own 
neighborhood are crucial steps toward reimagining a world where human means 
something other than Wynter’s “Man”. According to Wynter, a new definition of human 
can only be accomplished through the leadership of the external observer of the power 
structures, specifically those who experience the injustice based on their exclusion in 
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access to representation and frames of reference; in other words, those on the margins.233 
This work is incremental and without a clear endpoint (rejecting the trope of linear 
progress). The challenging of worldviews is always met with resistance, the 
transformation of culture sluggish, and the changing of power structures intransigent. But 
if bioethics resists coming to terms with its own history and complicity, if it has little to 
say about racism and inequality, how can it consider itself concerned with the morality of 
life, its namesake? 
Postcolonial Theory 
Anti-colonialism and postcolonialism have often overlapped in their meanings 
and practices and have various divergent interpretations. Both aim to understand and 
respond to the aftermath and continued violence of colonialism, albeit in different ways. 
Postcolonial theory originated in South Asia from subaltern studies, inspired by Indian 
historian Ranajit Guha. Subaltern studies, rooted in Marxist notion of class struggle, 
began in 1970s among English and Indian scholars who wanted to write history “from 
below,” from the perspective of the voiceless masses. The term subaltern was coined by 
Antonio Gramsci, and signifies those people who are oppressed and powerless, the 
masses who are left out of sociopolitical dialogue and power structures. The Calcutta-
born Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak also engaged in subaltern studies and is often 
considered one of the founders of postcolonial theory.234 According to Spivak, the 
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dominant culture can either represent the subaltern as an agent of power, or re-present as 
a signifier of historical account, both which are problematic for the subaltern.235 The 
subaltern cannot speak because they will not be heard. It is a Western epistemological 
privilege to designate the identities of, and speak for, others.236 Yet his “speaking for” 
only serves to essentialize and homogenize a diverse group of people.237 
Also considered a forerunner of postcolonialism is the Palestinian literary 
theorist Edward Said. Through textual analysis, Said reveals how the West has reified the 
“Orient”, including but not limited to the Middle East. Like Spivak, he uses the language 
of representation. He wrote that through a “re-presence”, or representation of 
Orientalism, the Occident has “excluded, displaced, made supererogatory” any such real 
thing as “the Orient.”238 Said is anti-essentialist in the tradition of postcolonial scholars, 
careful to recognize the diversity within the subaltern and to eschew the rash stereotyping 
of the Western representations of others, especially the “Orient”. 
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Homi Bhabha expanded the postcolonial anti-essentializing arguments beyond 
the colonizer/colonized binary through his concept of hybridity. In contrast to Franz 
Fanon’s search for authenticity, hybridity is derived from the multiple and heterogeneous 
sites of contact between colonizer and colonized and accounts for the intersectionality of 
identities such as gender, race, and nationality. This “in-between space” is where cultures 
are engaged in dynamic formation and serve as a site of agency for the colonized. Like 
Spivak, he considers Marxist binaries, and those contemporary tactics to elevate 
“difference” as ineffective and counterproductive to the process of moving beyond 
decolonization.239 240 
Postcolonial Realities 
Postcolonialism has had many critiques. First, the “post” in postcolonialism 
connotes its succession to colonialism, and therefore erroneously implies the conclusion 
of colonialism. Is post-colonialism only the literal successor of the formal colonialism of 
the last few centuries? Many postcolonialists, including, Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, 
and Helen Tiffin, want to start the clock of postcolonialism at the moment of the 
discovery of Hispaniola in 1492.241 Looking forward, Loomba suggests that 
postcolonialism is “more flexibly the contestation of colonial domination and the legacies 
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of colonialism.”242 Both of these approaches signify colonialism in its temporal formality, 
as something that is over, despite its continued after-effects on the colonized. Achille 
Mbembe goes even further to attach a specific time frame to postcolonialism when he 
states “the younger generation of Africans have no direct or immediate experience” of 
colonialism.243 Therefore, postcolonialism ends with the fading of memory. 
Anne McClintock’s critique of postcolonialism interrogates the 
“almost ritualistic ubiquity of “post” words in current culture 
(postcolonialism, postmodernism, poststructuralism, post-cold war, 
post-Marxism, post-Soviet, post-Ford, postfeminism, postnational, 
posthistoric, even postcontemporary),” …which “signals…a 
widespread, epochal crisis in the idea of linear, historical 
progress.”244 
Here, the prefix “post” is indicative of what is still a Eurocentric period of time to which 
all other peoples and events are affixed. The enlightenment project of colonization and 
“progress” has failed, but the West blindly continues to move along its imagined 
narrative of salvation. 
McClintock also takes issue with the “post” in postcolonialism, like Dirlik, in its 
inability to handle the transition to modern imperialism. She wonders what is “post” 
about South Africa, East Timor, Australia, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Native American 
peoples of the United States.245 In her words, postcolonialism is “prematurely 
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celebratory”.246 In addition, for McClintock the “post” in postcolonialism may not 
consider fully the variation in postcolonial-ness of different countries and cultures, asking 
whether they share enough in common to be categorized under one name. McClintock, in 
sum, recognizes not only the textual and dialogical power of imperialism, but also the 
physical and institutional violence of the state machinery as set up by colonialism. 
Second, postcolonialism has blurred the location of power, hence the target for 
praxis. The poststructuralist postmodernist approach is sometimes blamed for creating 
this distortion. Jorge Klor de Alva, despite his acknowledgement that the effects of 
colonialism continue to impress upon peoples today, is a poststructuralist who favors a 
‘multiplicity of histories’ rather than the master narrative.247 If postcolonialism becomes 
unattached to any institution or structure, including de Alva’s poststructuralist approach, 
it quickly becomes a vague condition difficult to locate, and vague enough to lose its 
usefulness. Although Foucault did not consider himself a poststructuralist, his 'discourse' 
is also consistent with the poststructural idea of insidious diffuse power. This leads to the 
hopeless state in which “power is everywhere and so ultimately nowhere.”248 Post-
colonialism is poststructural from Derrida’s point of view as well, focusing on 
multiplicity and dispersal. Shohat echoes this same critique, writing that the category 
does not lend itself to identifying the opposition, and in effect distorts the political 
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choices for resistance.249 If postcolonialism is both directly following formal colonialism 
and applies vague poststructural conditions, what is the foundation for approaching the 
present continued colonial-racial structures? Does the power lie in systems or in 
individuals? 
Third, postcolonialism is often referred to as an academic enterprise of 
intellectual elites. For instance, a criticism of Spivak is that despite her early years in 
India, her education is rooted in Western approaches, and she enjoys a privileged position 
in society.250 In addition, the subaltern cannot access her writings. Often postcolonialism 
is entangled with Western academics and epistemology; issues of individualism and 
identity; and the idea of liberal progress. Take, for example, Dirlik’s criticism of 
“postcolonial” as a marker for the elite American academy: 
“What then may be the value of a term that includes so much 
beyond and excludes so much of its own postulated premise, the 
colonial? What it leaves us with is what I have already hinted at: 
postcolonial, rather than a description of anything, is a discourse 
that seeks to constitute the world in the self-image of intellectuals 
who view themselves (or have come to view themselves) as 
postcolonial intellectuals. That is, to recall my initial statement 
concerning Third World intellectuals who have arrived in First 
World academe, postcolonial discourse is an expression not so 
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For Dirlik, the postcolonial has been decoupled from the third world, and 
postcolonialism has become primarily the discursive realm of postcolonial intellectuals. 
Postcolonialism’s attention has been distracted from global power sources such as 
capitalism, multinational corporations, and financial markets as a continuation of the 
colonial project. Dirlik advocates for indigenism as an alternative source for development 
in response and resistance to the ideology and ubiquity of capitalism.252 
Fourth, postcolonialism is an attempt to move beyond binaries of 
colonizer/colonized, to more hybrid, multicultural, and transcultural approaches. Yet, 
rejecting essentialism and binaries blurs the line between colonizer and colonized, 
erroneously assumes a post-racial society, and creates an ambiguous and depoliticized 
context.253 A critique of postcolonialism by Anne McClintock, in her book Imperial 
Leather, is that postcolonial anti-essentialism is a paradox in itself. She argues that while 
postcolonial theory imbues the deconstruction of the Manichean binaries of 
center/periphery and self/other, at the same time postcolonialism by name suggests “a 
single, binary opposition: colonial/postcolonial”.254 255 Ella Shohat has criticized 
postcolonialism for its “a-historical and universalizing deployments’, and its ‘potentially 
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depoliticizing implications’”.256 Shohat and McClintock both criticize the prefix “post” in 
postcolonial based on its implication of a case closed, a finitude. 
Fifth, postcolonialism delegitimizes Indigenous communities. Along with 
critical studies and liberation theology, it tends to ignore Indigenous thought and praxis. 
Postcolonialism is not about land, which is fundamental to Indigenous communities, 
traditions, and livelihood. In many ways postcolonialism is what Eva Tuck calls the 
“settler move to innocence,” or the metaphorization of decolonization that “attempts to 
reconcile settler guilt and complicity, and rescue settler futurity,” at the expense of true 
decolonization for Indigenous people, which equates to recovery of land.257 
And sixth, in Conscripts of Modernity David Scott asserts that postcolonialism 
is stuck in the old questions of colonial power and colonized resistance: they have 
“uncritically taken over this Fanonian image of colonialism”.258 For Scott, one of the 
problems with postcolonialism is not with its offering up of answers, but that it has co-
opted the questions of the past, which are wholly, in Scott’s estimate, irrelevant to the 
present. Scott analyzes C.R.L. James’ revolutionary romance Black Jacobins depicting a 
Haitian hero figure, and compares it to the revised edition in which James suggests that 
the story to be read as a tragedy. Tragedy, for Scott, “is troubled by the hubris of 
enlightenment and civilization, power and knowledge.”259 Thus, 
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“the tragedy of colonial enlightenment… is not to be perceived in 
terms of a flaw to be erased or to overcome, but rather in terms of a 
permanent legacy that has set the conditions in which we make of 
ourselves what we make and which therefore demands constant 
renegotiation and readjustment.”260 
There is no salvation, no romantic ending. 
In summary, postcolonialism is a postmodern, poststructural, and anti-
essentializing response to the epistemological dominance of colonialism over the 
subaltern following formal decolonization. The poststructural focus of postcolonialism on 
culture and identity leaves out the real structures and institutions of capitalism and 
globalization with the inflation of culture over politics; the focus on literary texts and art 
forms; and its heavy reliance on ideology. Postcolonialism does not deeply consider 
political and economic structures, and it does not know how to incorporate capitalism and 
the globalization of neoliberalism into its folds. 
Early Anti-Colonialism 
Early anti-colonialism began as the resistance and revolution of European 
colonies against their oppressors, taking place in the global space and time of formal 
decolonization. A fervor and revolutionary spirit can be seen throughout this time period, 
as nations and peoples hoped for free and idealistic futures. This attitude was exemplified 
by Aimé Césaire, the Martinique poet and politician, through the co-founding of the 
international Negritude movement with Léopold Sédar Senghor, a Senegalese poet and 
politician; in his optimism in regards to re-creating and reimagining selves; and through 
his surrealist and idealist expressions of a decolonized future. As Robin Kelley wrote of 
                                                            




Césaire’s writing in the introduction to Discourse, “It is full of flares, full of anger, full of 
humor.”261 
The Martinique-born Frantz Fanon was a student and later colleague of Césaire. 
Fanon studied psychiatry in France, and became concerned with the psychopathology of 
colonization and consequences of decolonization. He was also reacting to the 
revolutionary spirit of his generation, albeit in a less romanticized way. Fanon develops a 
political philosophy of decolonization starting with a focus on psychological harms on 
black men in Black Skin, White Masks.262 He shares the sentiments of Césaire on the 
objectification (or thingification as Césaire names it) of the colonized black-skinned 
person, as well as the idea that genocide of people of color was a regular colonial event 
far earlier than the holocaust in Nazi Germany. While Fanon was not as idealistic as 
Césaire, he also engaged revolution in a somewhat Marxist tradition (yet arguing that 
race was just as important as Marx’s category of class in the process of decolonization). 
Fanon was a member of the Algerian National Liberation Front during the Algerian War 
of Independence from France. It was during his time in Algeria as a practicing 
psychiatrist that he wrote Wretched of the Earth, his anti-colonial manifesto.263 In 
Wretched he critiques the decolonization of Latin American countries as a bourgeoisie 
affair and not one that benefits the masses. He also specifies the only way to avoid the 
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issues of a bourgeoisie decolonization in Latin America is for a violent revolution of the 
masses in Algeria. His reasoning and justification for violence relies on the assertion that 
“colonialism is not a machine capable of thinking, a body endowed with reason. It is 
naked violence and only gives in when confronted with greater violence.”264 
Similarly, a contemporary of Césaire and Fanon, Albert Memmi expresses this 
revolutionary passion in The Colonizer and the Colonized. His primary project is in the 
understanding of the colonial relationship between the colonizer and colonized, an 
immediate problem not only for his country but for Memmi personally as he straddles 
both worlds. In his analysis he condemns the “good colonist” not for his or her good 
intentions, but for the inability to agree ideologically to the kind of revolution that the 
colonized desire, one that contains violence and terrorism.265 According to Memmi, 
liberals only want decolonization if it is peaceful and democratic. 
In their essence, Fanon, Césaire and Memmi are squarely anti-colonial, 
struggling against a still-material and tangible enemy. But, as David Scott has written, 
they have yet to experience the tragedy of a lost era, the failure of a revolution and the 
feeling of being stranded frozen in the postrevolutionary present, particularly in the space 
and time of failed revolution.266 According to Scott, the next generation of postcolonial 
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writers will be situated in a different “present”. The landscape has changed since the 
revolutionary fervor of Fanon, Césaire, and Memmi’s world. The nature of colonialism 
has changed as well. Colonialism today is experienced not only through the continued 
settler-colonial experiences of Indigenous people, but also through racism, inequality, 
and global imperialism. If colonialism is generally the physical habitation, theft of land, 
and exploitation of people, imperialism is the control and exploitation of a peoples and 
land through globalization of a neoliberal economy. I argue that an anti-colonial critique 
is still highly relevant, despite the distance from the revolutionary fervor of global 
decolonization and nation-building.267 
A Word on Indigenous Decolonization 
Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang take anti-colonialism to be limited to recovering 
“denied privileges from the metropole,” defining subversion as a reclaiming of resources 
from within the framework of the colonizer and the nation-state. Instead, they attribute to 
decolonization what modern writers such as Dei and Corntassel consider to be 
characteristics of anti-colonialism.268 Anti-colonial theory for them focuses on 
communities, land, and resurgence. According to Dei, anti-colonialism “challenges the 
colonizer’s sense of reason, authority, and control…and seeks to theorize colonialism and 
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dominating social relations through the lenses of Indigenous knowledges and 
worldviews.”269 Yet, Tuck and Yang take the position that “the anti-colonial project 
doesn’t strive to undo colonialism but rather to remake it and subvert it.”270 Alternatively, 
they consider decolonization as a deeper undoing of colonialism from the Indigenous 
perspective, in which only a recovery of stolen land is the foundation of recovery for 
Indigenous communities. Tuck and Yang claim that the 
“postcolonial pursuit of resources is fundamentally an 
anthropocentric model, as land, water, air, animals and plants are 
never able to become postcolonial they remain objects to be 
exploited by the empowered postcolonial subject.”271 
For them, decolonization is more encompassing than anti-colonial struggles. 
Glenn Coulthard also uses the language of decolonization to indicate a much 
deeper framework for understanding the rejection of colonialism and the resurgence of 
Indigenous epistemologies and practices. He agrees with the anti-colonialist Frantz 
Fanon’s ideas of recognition as colonizing, but critiques it for not “understanding 
contemporary Indigenous struggles for self-determination.”272 Land is not property 
according to the Indigenous worldview, but is “deeply informed by what the land as 
system of reciprocal relations and obligations can teach us about living our lives in 
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relation to one another and the natural world in non-dominating and nonexploitative 
terms…”273 
Bonita Lawrence and Enakshi Dua write in their article Decolonizing Anti-
racism that Indigenous people are left out of both antiracial and postcolonial theory. They 
cite five ways Indigenous people have been failed by these theories: by erasing Native 
existence through silence; by ignoring that racism is occurring on Native lands; that 
slavery is overrepresented in the colonial stories; that decolonization politics are the same 
as antiracial politics; and by stressing theories of nationalism.274 This can be illustrated by 
an example by Lawrence and Dua, that “the same week President Lincoln signed the 
Emancipation Proclamation, he also approved the order for the largest mass hanging in 
U.S. history, of 38 Dakota men accused of participating in an uprising in Minnesota.”275 
Despite the language chosen, both an anti-colonial critique and a decolonizing 
praxis are necessary for challenging the colonial-racial discourse in bioethics. Anti-
colonialism is a discourse and praxis that is simply opposed to colonialism. 
Decolonization is a part of this larger narrative. Decolonization will be different for each 
site of contact. In general, Blacks and Latinx in the U.S. have been more fully colonized 
based on the specific nature of their colonization, from the violent and complete 
severance of Africans from their lands and cultures, to the Spanish policies of 
miscegenation. The unique nature of Native Americans in a settler-colonial state is that 
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while policies and practices of erasure have been dominant, they have not been thorough 
enough to completely expunge the Indigenous worldview. Tuck and Yang’s idea of 
decolonization is one of returning land to Indigenous people, a very particular response to 
a particular sort of ongoing colonization. 
Contemporary Anti-Colonial Theory and Praxis 
Anti-colonialism need not be relegated to the revolutionary period of 
postcolonial politics, nor must it be exclusive of white Americans. Anti-colonialism can 
be a multivalent approach including a resistance to white supremacy, a political praxis 
adept at responding to material consequences of colonialism and global imperialism, 
decolonizing practices, making whiteness276 visible and exposing racism, prioritizing the 
knowledge and worldviews of people other than eurochristians, and a reclaiming of 
traditions, stories, histories. Where postcolonialism has been accused of having a limited 
                                                            
276 If one is to take the colonial-racial discourse seriously, which this dissertation seeks to do, whiteness is 
part of that discourse. One cannot discuss race without also interrogating whiteness. On one hand, the 
human genome project has proven that race is not a valid theory. Jeffrey C. Long and Rick A. Kittles. 
“Human Genetic Diversity and the Nonexistence of Biological Races.” Human Biology 81, no. 5 (2009): 
777-798. https://muse.jhu.edu/ (accessed April 23, 2019). Yet, the social construction of race and racism 
continues to exist, causing violence to, and oppression of, millions of people. The tendency of many 
Americans to desire and project a multicultural and post-racial society are well-meaning but mislead. Race 
does not exist unless you are a person of color. Whiteness is descriptive of an historical phenomenon in 
which primarily white male eurochristian subjects drove the conquest and exploitation of people of color 
for centuries. This is a historical fact. This is not to say that some Native Americans did not hold African 
slaves, or that freed slaves did not acquire Native land, or that some African dictators rose to power in their 
countries after decolonization, only to replace the European colonial dictators; but these are not the primary 
pattern. The term “white”, while denoting the color of one's skin, can also be used to describe those who 
hold more power and privilege in society based on western eurochristian structures. Karen Anijar writes, 
“whiteness is a myriad of complex, contradictory, competing discourses and discursive practices that are 
always contested and in formation.” Karen Anijar, “Into the Heart of Whiteness,” The American Journal of 
Bioethics 3, no. 2 (2003). For the purposes of this project, it is important to distinguish between white as 
individuals and white as a system, just as it is equally important to understand the difference between 
Christian persons and Christendom. And while referring solely to skin color is to simplify and essentialize a 
complex phenomenon, the possession of white skin still holds power and privilege. In this way the strategic 





focus on the “politics of identity”, anti-colonialism is more responsive to political and 
economic aspects of colonialism.277 Where postcolonialism is often driven by elite 
academics and Western thought, anti-colonialism is based in the knowledge of the 
racialized and oppressed. And this point is the crux of a modern anti-colonial praxis: it 
must center the knowledge and experience of those outside the dominant center, those 
who hold the double consciousness that only persons of color can hold—a perspective 
enabling them to see the dominant discourse more clearly than those within and of the 
eurochristian center. Thus, the re-imagining and re-existence of those who have long 
been colonized, the reclaiming of traditions, stories, histories, cannot be directed by the 
eurochristian center, and not by eurochristian bioethicists. Through anti-colonial theory 
and praxis the bioethicist can participate in understanding the historical trajectory of 
colonialism and the implications of race, consider the profound differences between a 
eurochristian and other worldviews, and actively seek to center views other than the 
dominant narrative. Only then does the possibility of what Arturo Escobar calls radical 
interdependence make itself available.278 
Anti-Colonial Theorists 
The anti-colonial response to bioethics in this project draws heavily from 
Miguel De La Torre, George Tinker, Leanne Betasamosake Simpson, and Sylvia Wynter 
to elucidate the failures of, respectively, “Euro-American Truth,” “euro-christian 
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worldview”, “the schema of Man”, and the settler-colonial state which includes 
heteropatriarchy, white supremacy, and capitalist exploitation. First, these scholars’ 
approaches can elicit a profound disturbance for their colonized readers, an unsettling and 
persistent cognitive dissonance. This is the alterity sought to provoke the thinking of my 
bioethics and health care colleagues. Tinker’s juxtaposition of a eurochristian and a 
Native American worldview is essential to this end: providing a radical alternative to the 
eurochristian worldview brings it into full visibility, so that one can recognize one’s own 
unconsciousness to Western societal power structures. Second, all of the aforementioned 
scholars prioritize local praxis and identity, from which truth emanates. One of De La 
Torre’s projects has been to define ethical paradigms from lo cotidiano of Latinx 
communities para joder, or by “screwing with” the dominant structures.279 De La Torre 
notes that 
“truth, beyond the historical experiences and the social location 
where individuals act as social agents, cannot be ascertained, 
whether said truth exists or not. Only through justice-based praxis, 
engaged in transforming society, can individuals come closer to 
understanding the spiritual and theoretical.”280 
With this conceptualization of the truth I aim to place a moratorium on the age-old debate 
in ethics about universality vs relativism. With the bracketing of this debate, one can 
begin to appreciate how people of color in the U.S. are heaving under the weight of the 
universalization of morality. 
                                                            
279 Miguel A. De La Torre, Latina/O Social Ethics: Moving Beyond Eurocentric Moral Thinking (Waco, 
Tex.: Baylor University Press, 2010). 




Both De La Torre and Tinker painstakingly deconstruct the dominant 
eurochristian hegemony of white scholars and institutions. Among the methods De La 
Torre employs, he necessarily attempts “to deconstruct Eurocentric ethical paradigms to 
demonstrate why they are both detrimental to and irreconcilable with the Hispanic social 
location.”281 This critique borrows his method of ethical critique of Euro-American 
scholars “from the margins,” but my framework prioritizes liberation without analyzing 
biblical foundations of my arguments. Both De La Torre and Tinker also heavily critique 
Western Christianity. Yet, while De La Torre “wrestles with the Almighty”282 to clarify 
the concept of liberation, Tinker writes that a genuine liberation for Native Americans 
“may require a firm saying “no” to Jesus and Christianity.”283 The arguments herein, like 
both De La Torre and Tinker, strongly emphasize the role that Christianity (as a 
sociological adjectival category) continues to play in the colonial-racial discourse as part 
of the eurochristian worldview. Ultimately, this analysis will engage the works of both 
scholars generously and is a testament to the profundity of their teachings on my own 
scholarship. 
The third anti-colonial scholar I engage is Sylvia Wynter. Her essays on the 
overrepresentation of Man as Human speak both to the deconstructive and contextual 
analysis of colonialism in this dissertation, as well as providing a conceptual frame to 
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282 Embracing Hopelessness, xv. 
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George E. Tinker, and ProQuest, The Hope of Liberation in World Religions (Waco, Tex.: Baylor 




open up consideration for new thought schemas. The “Second Emergence” to which 
Wynter refers, points to a new transcultural reality, one that breaks down barriers 
between the sciences and the humanities, and one in which a middle course can be found 
on irreconcilable ethical issues,284 not least to dissolve what Howard Winant named the 
racial “longue durée”.285 
And last, Michi Saagiig Nishnaabeg scholar, writer, and artist Leanne 
Betasamosake Simpson is a voice for radical Indigenous resistance through grounded 
normativity, a land- and place-based ethic based on Nishnaabeg knowledge and 
intellectual practices – the “how” in living, organizing, and engaging in the world.286 Her 
work provides radically different conceptualizations of living, learning, being that 
challenge the fundamental core of the assumed normativity of eurochristian thought and 
morality. 
Elements of Critique for Modern Eurochristian Colonial Institutions 
An anti-colonial critique begins with the identification of eurochristian colonial 
themes within modern institutions. Those themes fall under the headings of ontological 
assumptions, moral epistemology, and the socio-political. These categories will be 
engaged in the following three chapters in the deconstruction of bioethics scholars, and 
                                                            
284 The case discussed by Wynter is between Western feminists and women who defend female 
circumcision. Wynter, “Genital Mutilation” or “Symbolic Birth”; Female Circumcision, Lost Origins, and 
the Aculturalism of Feminist/Western Thought. (Response to Article by L. Amede Obiora in This Issue, P. 
275)(Bridging Society, Culture, and Law: The Issue of Female Circumcision). 
285 Howard Winant, “The Dark Matter: Race and Racism in the 21st Century,” Critical Sociology 41, no. 2 
(2015): 2. 




again to illustrate the often radically different worldviews of anti-colonial scholars. In 
comparing these three categories it will hopefully become apparent the problems that 
underlie the humanitarian language of multiculturalism and cultural pluralism; and the 
truth in what Wynter calls sociogeny, the fundamental differences in our moralities and 
realities based on the impact our stories have on the neurochemical make-up of our 
brains. 
Much of one’s worldview emanates from one’s ontological positioning 
including one’s creation story, the knowledge of what exists and how it is ordered, and 
the metaphysical components of one’s worldview. For the eurochristian despite one’s 
personal belief, our thoughts and behaviors have been shaped by the binary of sinner and 
saint rooted in the creation story of Adam and Eve, of a hierarchical organization of 
living beings with humans at the zenith, and of an organizational schema prioritizing time 
and linear progress, one that assumes human life is always progressing often due to some 
attribution of human power and intervention. Whether one’s creation story is biblical or 
scientific, eurochristian thinking is organized hierarchically, linearly, and temporally. The 
ontological fallout of the eurochristian worldview is the erosion of relationship with 
community and nature based on human and individual centrism. Linear thinking creates 
an ideal of some kind of great progress, which is in reality gratifies a relatively select few 
at the expense of the majority in the frantic pursuit of fame and the fantastical. The linear 
idea of Christian salvation has led to both material pursuits and the evangelical meddling 




Moral epistemology as an element of analysis builds on one’s ontological 
frameworks and attempts to describe the basis of knowledge, including moral knowledge. 
Epistemologies can be sociological, psychological, ontological, evolutionary, 
methodological, and moral in nature.287 Moral epistemology buttresses one’s values, 
morality, sense of truth, and the content of collective knowledges. Knowledge is largely 
driven in the modern West by a scientific objectivity, empiricism, and pragmatism which 
is theorized and taught through formal and siloed disciplinary groups. Postmodernists are 
skeptical of the notion of discovering the foundations of objective knowledge, and 
similarly of the project of theory coherence as justifying moral truth. Anti-colonial 
scholars and activists are similarly skeptical of Western epistemologies, those that 
universalize, categorize, and “civilize” while hiding the logics of oppression and 
exploitation. As Walter Mignolo writes, the rhetoric of modernity including 
modernization, progress, and prosperity, hide the logic of oppression.288 
These truths are communicated and legitimized through written text and the 
English language. The eurochristian epistemology stems from both Christian and 
Enlightenment concepts of morality including human dignity, hard work, self-sufficiency, 
freedom, autonomy, and individualism. At face value, these precepts of morality appear 
innocuous. But they are the tools of a civilizing rhetoric and practice that continue to 
uphold eurochristian values at the expense of others through blame, demoralization, 
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delegitimization; those with communal and egalitarian values as well as those who do not 
have the luxury of acute “moral agency” because of violent and negligent structural 
realities. In addition, the effects of civilizing rhetoric create a legacy of historical trauma 
and the internalization of self-hatred in those deemed of lesser value based on the high 
bar of rationality, intelligence, high culture, and overall “achievement”. 
Socio-political themes of analysis draw upon how a community organizes, how 
community members relate to one another, and what forms of order are used to protect 
peaceful communities. The nation-state has been the unit of political power in the West 
since the colonial nation-building project began. And while some would argue that global 
forms of politics have replaced the centrality of the nation-state, the U.S. political system 
is still central to politics and policy.289 In the West, democracy is the supposed organizing 
ideal, however weak in practice. Security is established through police and military, and 
formal law assists in guiding order. While the economic drivers of capitalism are not 
hidden from view, Western political institutions are ensconced in concepts of justice, 
equality, and security while continuing to sustain policies that support the interests of the 
wealthy and powerful at the expense of the poor. The sociopolitical concepts of 
recognition, reconciliation, inclusion and diversity hide policies that encourage continued 
erasure, inequality, imprisonment, and discrimination. Economic themes of analysis 
include one’s view of the material forms of life. For the eurochristian, material life is 
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dictated by property ownership, the accumulation of resources, and of a capitalist and 
competitive view of consumption. The reigning worldview of material life is one of 
scarcity, driven by fear. Colonialism and imperialism are the benchmarks of eurochristian 
economics, built upon a history of conquest, land theft, resource extraction, and military 
strategy and now expressing themselves through globalization, multinational 
corporations, and financial markets. Massive wealth accumulation is driven by a deep-
seated Calvinist Protestant work ethic and the neoliberal capitalist culture. And finally, 
the U.S. maintains a massive and expensive military in order to protect its material and 
financial interests worldwide.290 Capitalism inherently creates inequality, and the 
eurochristian salve to that inequality is charity, which creates a continued dependence 
and inequality rather than structural justice. 
In the analysis that follows, these three elements of eurochristian colonial 
thought will be used to excavate colonial-racial themes within three textbooks that are 
foundational to the discipline of bioethics. The coloniality of bioethics will be rendered 
more visible. These same three elements of analysis will also be applied to the works of 
anti-colonial scholars for contrast. And ultimately three bioethics case studies will be 
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CHAPTER 4: A WHITE GOD VS A LATINX JESUS 
Of the estimated 10.7 million undocumented immigrants who live in the United 
States,291 approximately 6,500 have end-stage renal disease (ESRD).292 ESRD is the late-
stage chronic failure of the kidneys, which is caused by conditions such as diabetes, high 
blood pressure, infection, or auto-immune disease. In ESRD, the kidneys are no longer 
able to function, causing a build-up of waste and fluid in the body. The standard 
treatment for this disease is either thrice-weekly dialysis or kidney transplantation. Many 
states in the U.S. only provide emergency dialysis in the emergency department of a 
hospital once the patient is physically distressed and is approaching dangerous blood 
levels of electrolytes that can cause cardiac arrythmias and arrest. A few states such as 
California have decided to cover thrice-weekly dialysis and transplantation based on the 
standard of care through Medi-Cal. But many states only provide suboptimal and costly 
emergency care to undocumented immigrants with ESRD. On the national level, 
                                                            
291 The numbers of overall undocumented immigrants have decreased from 12.2 million in 2007 to 10.7 
million in 2016. Around half of those are Mexicans, whose numbers are declining. From 2009-2014 more 
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immigration is from El Salvador, Guatamala, and Honduras, an increase of 375,000 people from 2007 to 
2016. Pew Research Center, November 27, 2018, “U.S. Unauthorized Immigrant Total Dips to Lowest 
Level in a Decade”. 
292 Lilia Cervantes, Monica Grafals, and Rudolph A. Rodriguez, “The United States Needs a National 
Policy on Dialysis for Undocumented Immigrants with Esrd,” ed. Lilia Cervantes (2018).Cervantes, L. The 




undocumented immigrants are excluded from the Affordable Care Act, the 1972 
Medicare ESRD entitlement program, and the full Medicaid program.293 
These patients are yo-yoing between death and resuscitation on a weekly basis, 
being turned away from medical facilities if they are not close enough to death. Care 
providers are required by state policy and hospital administration to withhold treatment 
until they have elevated potassium levels, poor oxygenation due to fluid build-up in the 
lungs, confusion, nausea and vomiting, and/or severe shortness of breath. Some hospitals 
have attempted to send patients to their country of origin, despite the lack of treatment 
availability in many of those countries, and even though the patient has lived and worked 
in the U.S. for decades and has no familial support in their country of origin. For 
healthcare providers and bioethicists, the issue is one of resource distribution, fairness, 
and compassion. The decisions to exclude this population of patients from the standard of 
care is one that stems from the political climate of a eurochristian United States. Both the 
libertarian and Christian perspectives of bioethicists like Tristram Engelhardt exemplify 
the eurochristian worldview, and, I will argue, affect the lives of marginalized 
populations such as Latinx and other undocumented immigrants. An anti-colonial ethics 
such as De La Torre’s would provide bioethics with a more just and decentered praxis. 
H. Tristram Engelhardt 
H. Tristram Engelhardt was trained in philosophy at the University of Texas, 
and in 1974 was in the first group of philosophers, along with Tom Beauchamp who will 
appear later in the dissertation, who met at a seminar at Haverford College in 
                                                            




Pennsylvania to prepare philosophy faculty to teach courses in medical ethics. s In the 
mid-1970s Engelhardt and Beauchamp were part of the National Commission for the 
Protection of Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research who wrote the Belmont 
Report, the guidelines for human subjects research.294 Later, Engelhardt attended medical 
school at Tulane but never practiced medicine. Instead, he was recruited to join the 
faculty at Texas Medical Branch Galveston to teach ethics to medical students, took a 
Chair position at Georgetown in 1977, then joined the Program in Medical Humanities at 
Houston’s Rice University in 1983.295 Over the course of his career he published six 
books, edited and co-edited 25 books, and published over 300 articles and book 
chapters.296 He died of cancer in 2018 while holding the positions of Professor of History 
and Philosophy of Medicine at Rice University and Professor Emeritus at Baylor College 
of Medicine. He was the co-founder, and from 1976 to 2018 the Senior Editor, of the 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. The December 2018 issue was dedicated to 
Engelhardt.297 He was remembered by Ana Iltis and Mark Cherry as “one of the 
intellectual founders of the disciplines that would become known as bioethics and the 
philosophy of medicine.”298 He was also the senior editor of the journal Christian 
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Bioethics, and the editor of the book series Philosophy and Medicine. The Center for 
Bioethics and Human Dignity said of Engelhardt after his recent death, 
“Through his keen intellectual wit, he was an academic 
provocateur par excellence, challenging the status quo, but also 
challenging all of us, to test the rigor of our arguments and 
assumptions.299 His readiness (and even eagerness) to challenge 
the assumptions and claims of the bioethics academy and those 
closer to home in Christian bioethics will be genuinely missed.”300 
Engelhardt is known by some as the “enfant terrible” of bioethics due to his 
irreverent and provocative thinking.301 He is known best for his critique of secular 
bioethics, arguing that at best, secular bioethics could aspire to a superficial 
libertarianism but never a content-full or complete morality. Interested in questions of 
irresolvable moral plurality302, he theorized that bioethics can only be successful at the 
procedural and content-thin realm, not at the levels of particular values and beliefs. For 
Engelhardt, the loss of God and the deprofessionalization of medicine created a moral 
vacuum of which secular values filled, one in which moral decisions can only be formed 
through consent and permission between parties. While he is known for his libertarian 
stance regarding moral plurality, in a later-career text The Foundations of Christian 
Bioethics, he proposes a coherent and content-full model of morality that aims to 
                                                            
299 The Center for Bioethics and Human Dignity is a Christian bioethics research center at Trinity 
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transcend moral plurality through first millennium Orthodox Christianity. In this text he 
argues that American morality and therefore bioethics centers human life solely within 
the immanent and the rational, erroneously rejecting the metaphysical. He claims that 
traditional Christianity is the one Truth that is unique, original, and unaltered, rooting 
moral behaviors within one’s recognition of sin and salvation, ultimately based on the 
primary goal of human life: salvation.303 
Engelhardt puts forth several overarching critiques including 1) bioethics (and 
the American ethos) has become an enduring and pervasive secularism which he 
conflates with capitalism, 2) rational argument is not sufficient to solve moral dilemmas, 
3) moral consensus can only be procedural in nature within the context of a universal 
secular ethics,304 4) secular bioethics is its own “particular” that relegates certain groups 
to the margins despite its claim of pluralism (including non-ecumenical religious 
affiliations), and 5) Christian noetics, also shunned by secularism, should be prioritized in 
moral medical decision-making. In these themes anti-colonial scholars might agree in-
part, especially about the problem with the universalization of the secular-scientific-
capitalist epistemologies in eurochristian thinking and the rejection of alternative 
worldviews and beliefs. The similarities fade on further examination of Engelhardt’s 
work. What he critiques as secularism is actually the eurochristian worldview, of which 
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his thinking is a part. His polemic in the culture war is the “Christian” of eurochristian, 
even as he rejects modern “secular” Christianity in favor of a first millennial orthodox 
Christianity. In this chapter, Engelhardt’s The Foundations of Christian Bioethics will be 
critiqued by juxtaposing the anti-colonial and liberative works of Miguel De La Torre. 
The implications of theories such as Engelhardt’s on racial inequalities will be 
highlighted through the current issue of providing care to Latinx undocumented 
immigrants in the U.S. for ESRD. 
Miguel De La Torre: An Anti-Colonial Approach 
If there was ever an anti-colonial scholar who could speak back to the irreverent 
Tristram Engelhardt, it would be the equally irreverent Miguel De La Torre. De La Torre 
is a Cuban-American scholar-activist of social ethics and professor of religion at Iliff 
School of Theology in Denver, Colorado. He evangelizes from the Baptist pulpit but with 
a postmodern tongue in defense of those who are marginalized by what he calls 
EuroAmerican Christian structures. He has published more than 35 books and countless 
articles. He has served as a director for both the Society of Christian Ethics (SCE) and the 
American Academy of Religion (AAR), President of SCE, and co-chair of the Ethics 
Section at AAR. He is the recipient of a Fulbright scholarship, and has taught courses 
worldwide. He serves regularly as an expert commentator on ethical issues locally, 
nationally, and internationally.305 
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De La Torre is both a liberation ethicist and a post-modernist. Liberation 
theology is a modern phenomenon replete with paternalism and hierarchy and based in 
the eurochristian biblical history of the Exodus, which De La Torre resists.306 Liberation 
theology never rose above its modern and oppressive roots as a romanticized Western 
Christian narrative, without separating itself from the continued oppression of the 
marginalized. But the liberationist philosophy of “the preferential option for the poor”, 
and its political moves to free the oppressed are foundational to De La Torre’s Latinx 
liberation ethics. His religious relativism deviates from a eurochristian universalizing 
religion and ethics that claims to speak for everyone. He is fully Nepantla, fluidly moving 
between his identity as a Cuban and an American, owing his religious upbringing to a 
hybridity of Santeria, Catholicism, and the Baptist faith. 
For De La Torre’s ethics he turns to the people, those at the margins who are 
politically, economically, and epistemologically oppressed. Especially for Latinx, he 
encourages individuals and their communities to define their own religions and ethics. 
While there is no monolithic group, Latinx often drawn together en la lucha, through the 
realities of their everyday lives en lo cotidiano, and together en acompañado.307 De La 
Torre rejects both the promise of the poor for salvation and the idea of hope as placating 
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instruments used by the dominant white Christian narrative. Only once the marginalized 
embrace hopelessness and feel they have nothing to lose will they feel free to engage in 
resistance.308 In his book Latina/o Ethics he defines his ethics of joder, an ethics that can 
be used by the marginalized to undermine, or “screw with”, the oppressive systems of 
ethics and religion without being sanctioned or punished. Power can be too dangerous to 
confront outright. In his latest book, a manifesto titled Burying White Privilege: 
Resurrecting a Badass Christianity, De La Torre defines a new Christianity in the face of 
the current state of fascism and religious hypocrisy ushered in by Trump, but by no 
means limited to him. The oppressive colonial regimes that continue today leave the 
marginalized “no other choice but to envision new paradigms for marginalized 
communities, paradigms rooted within their context.”309 
At first glance, some similarities between the two scholars seem to exist. Both 
Engelhardt and De La Torre critique Western Christianity. For Engelhardt, modern 
Western Christianity has become secular and liberal, ceding to materialism and self-
interest. For De La Torre, Western Christianity has become nationalist and political, a 
tool to advance special interests.310 Both scholars have a history of “being saved” by the 
Church. For Engelhardt this meant embracing the personal and transcendental union with 
God and the adoption of conservative values attributed to the story of Eden—patriarchy, 
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order, homophobia, salvation. For Engelhardt, belief trumps behavior. For De La Torre, 
orthopraxis (correct action) takes precedence over orthodoxy (correct belief).311 He 
writes, “believing in Jesus is never sufficient, for even the demons believe and tremble at 
his name.”312 De La Torre’s Christianity moved him toward the biblical and theological 
liberative Jesus, expressed through Christ-like value of justice for the marginalized. For 
De La Torre, Jesus is anti-colonial. Salvation for Engelhardt is through personal union 
with God and is deeply rooted in the Christian creation story; for De La Torre it is 
through solidarity with the marginalized and rooted in the teachings of Jesus.313 To be 
saved, De La Torre reminds us, “is etymologically to be liberated from sin, in other 
words, the forces (individual and corporate) that bring oppression, enslavement, and 
death.”314 Any common ground falls out from underneath Engelhardt’s feet with De La 
Torre’s assertion that white Christians, especially evangelicals, are killing the gospel of 
Christ, “with evangelicals supplying the morphine drip.”315 Ultimately Engelhardt 
mistakes fundamentalists as the carriers of the truth, and the “heretics” of a post-Christian 
culture. Instead one could argue fundamentalists are remnants of Christian colonial 
apparatus, insiders on the fringes of the inside, thinking they are martyrs but mistaken of 
the true victims. The true victims are those who are under the power of eurochristians. As 
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Miguel De La Torre writes, “the privileged gaslight others into believing they are being 
persecuted by the secular government and the liberal media.”316 
For the discipline of bioethics to begin to address race seriously, the teaching of 
anti-colonial scholars such as De La Torre are imperative. Otherwise, the dominant 
discourses will continue to inculcate bioethics with the eurochristian, and by their nature 
hierarchical, universalized, and racialized policies and practices, despite our best 
intentions. The following critique analyzes in turn three dimensions of analysis: ontology, 
epistemology, and the sociopolitical. The critique is two-fold: to illustrate the 
eurochristian nature of Engelhardt’s philosophical and religious approach to bioethics and 
to provide a Christian anti-colonial response based on the Latinx ethics scholarship of De 
La Torre. We must keep in mind the importance of Latinx knowledge and scholarship in 
a United States where the population is approximately 18% Latinx as of 2017 and 
growing (not counting over 11 million undocumented immigrants and the population of 
Puerto Rico).317 And finally, the critique will be applied to the current situation for those 
undocumented immigrants in the U.S. who are being denied standard of care for end-
stage renal disease. 
Engelhardt’s Ontological Assumptions: Transcendence, Eden, and Sin 
The ontological basis of morality in The Foundations of Christian Bioethics is 
transcendence of the immanent through union with God as the ultimate human endeavor. 
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The biblical story of Eden is central to Engelhardt’s traditional Christian ethics in that “it 
leads from Adam and Eve’s sin to the birth of the second Adam, Christ from the second 
Eve, Mary.”318 Morality in life is secondary to the pursuit of salvation; all human 
activities must lead to union with God. In Foundations, the ontological assumptions 
come, in every sense, from a colonized mind: a Christian Church prioritizing one’s 
personal relationship with God over human life: the story of Eden as bedrock for 
justifying the hierarchy of male over female and Man over nature, the linear narrative of 
salvation as the natural order of things, and the trope of the sinner who must suffer in the 
quest for redemption; and the setting of moral rules for humanity as secondary to the 
above. 
First, the transcendent nature of the Orthodox Christian God who can be 
experienced by humans is the primary ontological assumption which underlies 
Foundations. The puzzle he sets out to address is “Can one break through immanence to 
Truth?”319 He believes bioethics and all of secular society is stuck in an empirical world 
based on human reason with no personal God who is other-worldly and authoritative. 
Without transcendence in religion, humans are trapped in the failed project of 
Enlightenment and reason. The end in itself is union with God over and above the moral 
life, virtue, or scripture. How to access union with God? He writes, “The existence of 
God is experienced as one turns from oneself, wholeheartedly to Him.”320 The Church 
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itself, dating back to the first millennium, provides what he calls a metaphysical 
“continuity of spirit” that ties all Orthodox Christians in community.321 In essence, he 
calls for a bioethics based in the personal pursuit of relationship with a transcendent God. 
And yet, his nostalgic and “heretical” ideas of noesis and mysticism does not take him 
out of the hierarchical, linear, and binary ways of arranging human thought that have 
driven racism throughout Western history. This will be revisited in the next section. The 
remaining three ontological assumptions are grounded in the biblical story of Eden. 
Second, Engelhardt justifies several major ontological assumptions of his thesis 
by grounding his ethics within the Genesis story of Eden. Hierarchy, an entrenched 
eurochristian paradigm, is a clear result of Eve’s sin and the tempting of Adam. Eve’s act 
serves an indication that Man is to be the authority over her, hence man is the head of a 
household, and Eve is the “helpmate” For Engelhardt, this justifies the hierarchy of 
authority of male husbands, bishops, and priests. One of his grievances of liberal 
cosmopolitans is their lack of respect for authority of “bishops over churches, husbands 
over wives” in the ascetic pursuit of salvation.322 This thinking is consistent with his 
concern that the individualistic and egalitarian bent of secular medicine has replaced a 
professional and autonomous physician practice and has removed the authority of 
physicians (read paternalism). He laments that secularism “abandons all hierarchies, not 
just those of kings over their subjects, imperial powers over their colonies, and men over 
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women, but also of humans over animals.”323 While this is Engelhardt’s concern, I would 
argue that hierarchical structures do exist within the secular-scientific world as well, 
although of a different nature. For example, ontological Christian linear hierarchical and 
patriarchal thinking runs through the secular-scientific world in the form of Darwinism, 
eugenics, and the justification of race as a ranking category. 
Third, and also stemming from the story of the Fall, is the belief that humans 
will eventually reach salvation through a personal relationship with God. This belief 
follows the pattern of linearity, one that underlies most of eurochristian worldview: 
Christian salvation, Darwinism, scientific progress, and the thought that humans are 
somehow on a trajectory towards advancement, perfection, or everlasting life. This linear 
thinking provides a semblance of order to eurochristian thinking. Order is of utmost 
importance in colonial thinking, despite injustices. The need to maintain civility and 
stability is a common eurochristian trope, despite those who suffer injustices within the 
dominant order. For Engelhardt, ethics is the unchanging nature of the Church, of the 
stability and “certainty” of the early teachings and of the experience of God. This kind of 
order is misleading and often harmful. The “order” of colonialism, whether called 
salvation or progress, has been a smoke screen that hides the underside of “good” laws 
and actions in the civilization of sub-humans and the saving of their souls. The 
unfortunate consequences of this worldview have played out through centuries of 
European colonialism, and more locally through manifest destiny, the westward 
expansion of Indian genocide and land theft, and the enslavement and abuse of Africans 
                                                            




in the name of progress. Modern racism is a continuation of this same narrative. 
Engelhardt does critique progress in the form of capitalism, yet he is blind to the nature 
of his own form of Christian thinking as having influenced this very mindset. 
Furthermore, the prioritization of salvation and promise of some future good does 
nothing to address the suffering of real people, often at the expense of those preaching 
salvation. 
And fourth, the story of Eden drives Engelhardt’s morality in its depiction of the 
human as sinner in need of redemption. Humans are corrupt and must pay for their sins 
through suffering and death. Engelhardt describes the condition of Adam after the Fall 
where “This sphere of lust, greed, and aggression becomes for him the self-evident 
sphere of the natural.”324 In the practice of bioethics he places significance on sin and 
redemption, devils and angels, immanence and transcendence. This ultimately serves to 
blame the victims. Those who have been oppressed, those suffering the most, must be 
repenting for their sins. 
In Engelhardt’s ontological world, the lives of those suffering from inadequate 
care of their ESRD are downplayed as mere immanence, unimportant worldly needs in 
relation to the promise of salvation awaiting in the afterlife. They should not concern 
themselves with medical technologies, as medicine has become a false God, and instead 
turn towards union with Engelhardt’s God. We must remind ourselves; this is 
Engelhardt’s ontology, not necessarily that of Latinx persons in the U.S. The Orthodox 
Christian Church has remained stable and unchanged over the last two millennia, and for 
                                                            




Engelhardt provides the order needed in society. This order resembles the universalizing 
and civilizing tactics of the colonial missionaries, who must save the heathens from 
themselves. Much like his Texan colleague Stanley Hauerwas, Engelhardt puts the 
Church first, and situates it outside the purview of social justice.325 Situating the Church 
in the realm of transcendence puts critical distance between one’s life of the mind and the 
real suffering of those who are oppressed and racialized. In fact, Engelhardt doesn’t 
address the issue of race directly, which is also problematic for an ethicist. To assume a 
colorblind stance and never acknowledge the differences in social locations and beliefs is 
to continue to colonial assault on people of color in an attempt to convert and save their 
souls. The missionaries in what is now California had no qualms in imprisoning the 
Indigenous people in encomiendas, using them as slave labor, and watching them die 
early deaths, as long as they were able to add them to their list of souls saved. And 
finally, with Engelhardt’s association of suffering with sin, in effect those Latinx persons 
suffering a treatable disease as well as the violence and poverty they have endured, might 
just be an indication of their sins and the need for repentance. 
An Anti-Colonial Response: Christ, Chaos, and Liberation 
An anti-colonial alternative to Engelhardt’s eurochristian approach starts with a 
very different ontology. Miguel De La Torre’s ethics is centered around the immanent 
life of Jesus as a representative of the marginalized and advocate of justice. Engelhardt’s 
ontological preference for a personal and transcendental savior dismisses the very life of 
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Christ himself, focusing only on his death. For Engelhardt, Christians can repent in 
isolation, while continuing to feed the engine of epistemological and material dominance 
in their lived existence and granting hope for the oppressed in death. De La Torre’s ethics 
is not rooted in the universal, neither in the Christian nor secular sense. Such universal 
narratives are used by the dominant eurochristian culture to dictate the rules and maintain 
power. His argument is that “Eurocentric ethical theory maintains that universal moral 
norms can be achieved independent of place, time, or people group.”326 Although De La 
Torre recognizes, like the libertarian Engelhardt, there are different ethical paradigms 
emanating from various milieus, he is also not a moral relativist. His problematizing of 
the universal lies in the claiming of the white eurochristian milieu to universality over all 
others. The white eurochristian dominance allows for the continued marginalization of 
non-eurochristian people and their ethical paradigms. De La Torre’s ontological norm is 
the historical Jesus and not a universal and transcendent truth. He writes, “Truth, beyond 
the historical experiences and the social location where individuals act as social agents 
cannot be ascertained, whether said truth exists or not.”327 A better ethics, for De La 
Torre, is to liberate dominant moral reality, for both the oppressed and oppressor through 
the preferential option for poor and led by the marginalized. In doing so De La Torre’s 
ethics aligns with gospel of John who wrote that Christ “came that they may have life, 
and may have it abundantly.”328 
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Second, rather than embrace Engelhardt’s authoritarian and paternalistic version 
of Christian ethics, one that places male fathers and pastors in positions of power, De La 
Torre centers “the least of these.”329 His Christian ethics emanates from those located on 
the margins instead of a white male God at the authoritative head.330 Latinx Christians, 
and all marginalized Christians, read the bible from their own social locations, not from 
the white heterosexual male perspective. Hispanics, specifically, “are a diverse and 
growing minority group that constructs its religious perspectives from locations of 
imposed marginality and disenfranchisement.”331 The paternalism of Engelhardt’s 
Christianity rejects homosexuality and demotes women to handmaidens in the spirit of 
claiming and attaining some higher status with God. In contrast, De La Torre writes, 
“Despite the hours they spend on bended knees seeking God’s face, they fall into the 
same mortal sin as their spiritual ancestors in Salem who hung independent-thinking 
women for witchcraft.”332 The liberation from this kind of thinking is freedom from what 
the feminist bell hooks calls the imperialist white-supremacist capitalist patriarchy.333 
In contrast to Engelhardt’s linear salvation narrative that puts mankind on an 
upward trajectory toward union with God, De La Torre considers this linear narrative as a 
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misguided part of the eurochristian worldview. Both theological and economic paradigms 
(salvation and capitalism) are wrapped up in this notion of linear progression. For De La 
Torre and other anti-colonialists, time is disjointed—there is no upward progression. He 
claims there is no certainty the world is moving in a positive direction, but for the 
wealthy who continue to get wealthier. He notes we are only a Supreme Court decision 
away from increased inequality and could face a backward slide toward Jim and Jane 
Crow by events such as the election of Trump.334 In contrast to Engelhardt’s need for the 
stability and unchanging order of the Church, De La Torre’s ethics is chaotic and 
revolutionary. In order to bring justice to the marginalized, the dominant order must be 
challenged and disrupted. Civil disobedience should be a part of a liberative ethic, from 
the position of the trickster who practices what De La Torre calls para joder: to screw 
with.335 The marginalized, who “stand before the vastness of neoliberalism with little 
hope for radical change in their lifetimes, have few ethical alternatives.” Through 
jodiendo the trickster, occupying the liminal position, can call out the oppressor’s greed, 
power, and privilege, and make the repugnant traits of eurochristian thought obvious. 
Engelhardt writes of Orthodox Christianity that it is the Truth, a content-full ethics that 
can answer all ethical questions. De La Torre acknowledges ambiguity in the good and 
evil binary, and cautions against the allure of “Eurocentric Christianity with its simplistic 
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solutions for life’s complexities.”336 For the marginalized, salvation resides in the chaos, 
ambiguity, and the liminal spaces around eurochristian ontological assumptions, not in 
the acceptance of suffering in this life for the promise of an afterlife. 
And fourth, the ontological triad of Satan, sin, and suffering are very different 
between Engelhardt and De La Torre. For Engelhardt, Satan lured the first humans to sin, 
setting them up for human suffering in earthly life. The sinner, all of humanity, is in need 
of the redemption from the Orthodox Christian God. For De La Torre, it is the white 
Jesus who is satanic, the one that “masquerades as servants of righteousness” while 
turning a blind eye to human injustice and suffering.337 De La Torre notes, “Hispanics 
should always be concerned when EuroAmerican ethicists tell them why their suffering, 
often caused by EuroAmericans in the first place, makes them better saved Christians.”338 
De La Torre’s trickster-based ethics also disrupts the binaries of good/evil, saint/sinner, 
God/Satan. Through the breaking all of the rules, the trickster disrupts what the dominant 
society defines as good and evil, and exposes the hypocrisies of dominant assumptions.339 
For instance, the virtue of “hope seems to be mainly claimed by those with economic 
privilege as a means of distancing themselves from the unsolvable disenfranchisement 
most of the world’s wretched are forced to face.”340 
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Living within De La Torre’s ontology, the “undocumented” persons who are 
sick are walking with the Latinx Jesus, one who is concerned with justice and suffering. 
Their beliefs are theirs, from their own social location, not the coerced beliefs of the 
Orthodox Church. A bioethics that is responsive to their suffering is willing to push the 
system’s limits, para joder, to challenge the current order and bend the scales towards 
justice so that they can live life abundantly. 
Engelhardt’s Moral Epistemology: Liturgy, Conscience, Coherence 
The epistemology of Engelhardt’s traditional Christianity, and therefore his 
bioethics, centers on the liturgy and one’s relationship to God. The foundations of 
knowledge, how one knows truth, are framed in terms of the liturgy, not in discursive 
reason. He frames the epistemology of a Christian bioethics through seven elements:  
1) one’s heart, 2) a liturgical eucharistic assembly, 3) a liturgy that comes before 
scripture, 4) a hierarchical assembly with bishops at the top to maintain integrity; 5) a 
synodal or conciliar unity of bishops and people, 6) a Spirit-established office of prophets 
or elders who intimately know God and His word, and 7) a theology that is not academic 
but an expression of an intimate relationship with God.341 Moral rules for Engelhardt, are 
only secondary to one’s pursuit of union with God. He writes, 
“Moral principles are at best chapter headings and rules of thumb. 
Too much attention to general principles can even divert attention 
from the personal character of the communion with God to which 
all theology and all bioethics should lead...Murder and abortion are 
                                                            




wrong first and foremost because they lead us away from union 
with God.”342 
As he explains sexual moral guidelines, all sex and procreative acts are moral if 
the acts “are relocated within the mutual love of husband and wife in their companionship 
in loving God.”343 In other words, homosexuality, sex outside of marriage 
(“fornication”), polygamy, and many forms of artificial reproduction are all outside the 
marriage bed, the pairing of a man and woman within the Church and leading to holiness. 
Moral guidelines, for Engelhardt, do not carry the weight of authority outside of pursuit 
of Godly union. Moral decisions ultimately are made through worship and the 
hierarchical assembly of one’s Church. 
Second, Engelhardt’s Christian bioethics epistemology is traditional (as 
opposed to post-modern) in the sense that he asserts the existence of an objective truth 
and reality as transmitted through a source of knowledge, for him a transcendent God. He 
argues for what he calls “a content-full ethics among moral friends that reconciles the 
right and the good, universals and particulars, provides motivation to be moral, and 
justifies the content of morality.”344 In other words, Orthodox Christianity can answer all 
moral questions arising within the medical context. It is his wish for a grand narrative. 
For Engelhardt, the post-modern represents the fracturing of Christianity and the failure 
of the Enlightenment’s ability to define a universal and coherent morality. In his words, 
“The babble of post-modernity besets us not simply as a de facto socio-historical 
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catastrophe, but as an epistemological condition from which secular moral reason cannot 
liberate us.”345 He strives for coherence in his model despite the discrediting of discursive 
rationality and the recognition of transcendent experience as foundational to knowing 
truth. Engelhardt uses the epistemic tools of coherentism and foundationalism (God is 
self-evident) to philosophically avoid the problem of infinite regress. And yet, his 
Christianity is steeped in the eurochristian worldview, not outside of it. While 
recognizing the plurality of beliefs, religions, and moralities in the spirit of libertarianism, 
he promotes his ahistorical Christian God and accompanying way of life, calling on 
Christian physicians to evangelize and peacefully condemn others to conform. The 
Church, for him, “has the marks of universality, antiquity, and consent.”346 He is matter-
of-fact that “fundamentalists are not open to negotiation,” and are “moralistic, 
condemnatory, and divisive on fundamental matters.”347 And yet, Engelhardt rails against 
the universalism of liberal cosmopolitanism, noting its “bond to humanity as a whole is 
stronger than bonds to family, race, religion, culture, or citizenship.”348 The anti-colonial 
scholar would agree, universalism of liberal ideal theories such as Immanuel Kant’s 
transcendental rationality and Mill’s hedonistic utilitarianism are problematic. In their 
universalizing they attempt to speak from an objective place of truth and to speak for all 
persons and communities, ultimately defining their own epistemological positions and 
hence solidifying their power and justifying the oppression of others to maintain that 
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power. But Engelhardt’s resigned acceptance of a libertarian society does not hide his 
own belief that his truth should be everyone’s truth. This quality of universalism is a 
fundamental eurochristian colonial ontology shared by secular liberals and Orthodox 
Christians alike. 
Third, for Engelhardt, conscience is what allows morality and truth to be 
known. He writes,  
“conscience is the knowing with (i.e., conscire) that discloses 
God’s law, not by learning, study, or deep analysis, but 
spontaneously within us, from our nature through faith, ascesis, 
and prayer. It is natural in giving us a knowledge we would have 
had clearly, had there not been the Fall.”349  
 
One’s conscience is strengthened by virtue, corrupted by passions, and mislead by 
reason. And while he does not dismiss rational discourse altogether, moral content is 
principally disclosed to the human heart by God. He writes, “Conscience is not just a 
human faculty, but a point of union between Creator and creature.”350 But the belief that 
an individual holds some kind of higher knowledge that is unavailable for outside 
scrutiny is problematic. The nail in the coffin of the Christian conscience is its 
partnership with evangelism. For Engelhardt, the physician is obligated to help patients 
“make medical decisions conducive to salvation,” even if this involves lying, deceit, 
manipulating proxy decision-maker choices, withholding medical options, and intrusion 
into the lives of others.351 This type of eurochristian thinking allows the Orthodox 
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Christian to justify one’s supremacy on a transcendent notion without crediting one’s 
embeddedness within a sociocultural context or considering its impact on the lives of 
others. 
A bioethics under Engelhardt would be an evangelizing and moralizing one, 
doling out the answers to all ethical issues based on the grand narrative of what 
traditional Christians believe to be a coherent truth. There is a great hubris in assuming 
one has a special relationship with God, and that one’s conscience and Church gives them 
authority over others, which parallels the nationalistic American exceptionalism that runs 
throughout eurochristian thought. This self-proclaimed authority is dangerous for Latinx 
persons. It is judging, damning, and rigid in the face of the chaos that is real life for many 
people. When a Latinx person, one who is labeled “undocumented” or “illegal,” shows up 
at an emergency room, the journey that brought them to that moment is not singular or 
simple. It isn’t because of their sins, it is not their lack of work ethic, it is not because 
they are not Orthodox Christian. Often it is the political climate of their situation, one that 
is embroiled with U.S. colonialism and its economic domination, the U.S. intervention in 
politics in Latino countries, and the fleeing of poverty and violence, that ultimately brings 
them to the dialysis center in San Diego, California or Denver, Colorado. Engelhardt’s 
quest for order, coherence, and transcendence fail in the face of reality. 
De La Torre’s Moral Epistemology: Orthopraxis, Post-Modernity, And Lo Cotidiano 
In stark contrast to Engelhardt’s personal and liturgical ways of knowing 
morality, De La Torre’s moral epistemology starts with the oppressed. His method is 




begins with observation of lo cotidiano of the marginalized, then proceeds through 
reflection, prayer, action, reassessment, and back to observation.352 His moral 
epistemology does not begin with a God-head or a grand theory, but in collaboration with 
communities. In a eurochristian world, there is “no epistemological option for the 
oppressed” without a deliberate centering of the margins. A double-consciousness makes 
clear for those on the margins what is invisible to the eurochristian center.353 This reality 
means people who must understand the cultures of two worlds, the eurochristian “center” 
and their marginalized community, also have a broader and more realistic vantage point 
to “see” the eurochristian worldview and its consequences over those who equate the 
eurochristian worldview with the singular reality. 
Second, against the backdrop of Engelhardt’s epistemological certainty, De La 
Torre’s liberative approach is post-modern, rejecting a singular history, denouncing 
neoliberalism, and “embracing hopelessness” for the powerless and disenfranchised.354 
For him, hope is a middle-class privilege.355 The oppressed will not be liberated from the 
neoliberal economic structures; there is no economic or political salvation. De La Torre’s 
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liberative ethics frees the oppressed from the false promises of hope of the messiah 
complex and the illusion of defeating the eurochristian colonial apparatus.356 When the 
truly oppressed have nothing to lose, they can aspire to radical change.357 Consistent with 
post-modern thought, De La Torre is skeptical of claims of authority and universality. 
Instead, his anti-colonial ethics follows a liberation theology grounded in the margins and 
engaged in decolonization. For De La Torre, post-modern thought renders understanding 
of oppressive social structures but does not make up a complete worldview – meaning, 
some universal truths may be shared by all, although they are difficult to ascertain.358 De 
La Torre recognizes that because deconstruction makes one suspicious of all 
metanarratives, it can lead to the current sociopolitical situation where facts are dismissed 
as fake, and everything is about agendas.359 But without some post-modern skepticism, 
we are stuck in the quest for certainty in either reason or faith; which Mignolo points out, 
there is no modernity without coloniality.360 
And finally, to address conscience. It is unclear how one’s morality based on a 
spontaneously arising truth in one’s heart from God is not colored by one’s biases and 
social location. For De La Torre, social location is everything. Even among Latinx groups 
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“there exists no such thing as one unified or monolithic Latina/o theology.”361 Possessing 
bias is unavoidable. Feminist epistemology is one that attempts to balance impartiality of 
“truth” with the partiality favoring women and other oppressed groups. De La Torre 
shares some of the feminist epistemology in his preferential option for the poor. In order 
to understand when partiality is ethical, one must be able to separate good biases from 
bad biases. We can, in fact, say that some personal biases are wrong, or at least suspect, if 
one has personal gains involved, is fearful, angry, or desires to avoid penalties. Would 
not the mere personal desire for eternal salvation or the fear of eternal damnation create 
bias in a person’s ethics? Bias will also be present in growing up in a certain ontological 
reality such as the Orthodox Church. Some feminists have argued the importance of 
understanding how partiality can increase or decrease the chances of knowing the truth 
when the truths in question concern the subordination of women to men (or any one 
group to another.)362 
A bioethics aligned with De La Torre’s work would start by talking to those 
Latinx persons who experience the phenomenon in question, the disease, the symptoms, 
the healthcare system. Bioethics would follow their lead, not try to define and dominate 
the situation. This kind of bioethics would recognize its own biases, its personal gains, 
risks, and privileges, and how that might be upholding the status quo. And it would 
challenge the current structures in order to create movement towards radical change, not 
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just assuage people’s suffering with promises of hope and salvation. A liberative and 
anti-colonial bioethics would risk something, professional acceptance, financial 
compensation, a luxurious life, failure, a job…in the service of justice. 
Engelhardt’s Political and Economic Approaches to Bioethics: Rejecting Social Justice 
Engelhardt’s work in bioethics has largely focused on understanding the 
relationship between conflicting moralities in a globalized world. He spent much of his 
career in bioethics trying to understand the intersections between plural and incompatible 
bioethics and concluded no moral common ground for all moralities exists. Ultimately, he 
rejects liberal cosmopolitanism, stomachs libertarianism as a better alternative to 
liberalism, and argues for an Orthodox Christian bioethics, which he considers the ideal. 
Germane to an anti-colonial analysis of Engelhardt’s bioethics is a distinction between 
types of liberties. The words liberal, libertarian and liberation all share the same root of 
liberty, or the quality or state of being free, according to the Merriam Webster dictionary. 
The definition of liberty takes many forms: the power to do as one pleases, freedom from 
physical restraint, freedom from arbitrary or despotic control, the positive enjoyment of 
various social, political, or economic rights and privileges, the power of choice.363 The 
type of freedom most relevant to political and economic liberals is the positive enjoyment 
of various social, political, or economic rights and privileges. Libertarians prioritize 
freedom as the power to do as one pleases with the fewest restraints on their lives. And 
liberationists align most closely with freedom from physical restraint and freedom from 
                                                            





arbitrary or despotic control. This distinction helps to provide context for Engelhardt’s 
project in critiquing liberalism, framing libertarianism, and rejecting liberation. 
First, Engelhardt rejects the liberal cosmopolitan approach to bioethics, both 
secular and Christian, which for him are about self-fulfillment and determination in 
pursuing one’s own projects rather than union with God, especially within consumer 
culture. He defines the liberal cosmopolitan ethos as immanent, egalitarian, and welfarist, 
critiquing it for its anti-Christian, anti-traditional, and anti-metaphysical ethos, 
consumerist economy, and the inability to discover any deeper meaning in life beyond the 
pursuit of liberty and equality.364 An anti-colonial practitioner would agree with some of 
his critiques. Not unlike his perception of the marginalization of Christianity by 
rationalism and secularism, so too are various other ontologies and epistemologies in the 
U.S. such as Latinx, Native American, and Muslim-American marginalized by the 
dominant narrative. The liberal idea of diversity is insincere; it only allows similar liberal 
communities at the table, shunning conservative, sectarian, and metaphysical beliefs. And 
while traditional Christianity is shunned by the liberal narrative, it is by the eurochristian 
narrative that all other forms of marginalization happens, a eurochristian discourse that 
includes Orthodox Christianity. Despite Engelhardt’s critiques of the secular, liberal, 
cosmopolitan ethos as the enemy of traditional Christianity (and traditional Christianity 
as the victim), both make up the two sides of the eurochristian coin. Traditional 
Christianity harms others though judgment of values, defamation of identities, and 
justification of oppression. 
                                                            




An anti-colonial practitioner would also critique the capitalist consumer 
economy, but unlike Engelhardt would not place the blame on liberal cosmopolitan 
thinking as much as the underlying colonial schema of conquest and competition blessed 
by 14th century Christendom. Engelhardt makes the mistake of conflating secularism and 
capitalism. This capitalist thinking, mired in the ontology of linearity and progress, is 
driven by the same type of thinking that drove the Popes in early Spain and Portugal to 
sanctify the theft, genocide, and human abuses that was European colonialism, and later 
the Calvinist work ethic and the Protestant adaption of accumulation of material goods as 
a sign of God’s chosen.365 In addition, Engelhardt’s one true Christianity is supposed to 
transcend the many factions created by splits in the Church, and within the eurochristian 
framework this is true—his Orthodox Christianity differs from many modern ecumenical 
churches. But it is similar in character to contemporary sectarian, fundamentalist, and 
charismatic Christian groups. In sum, while Engelhardt engages in certain sociological 
critiques of secular liberalism that a priori seem to share commonalities with anti-colonial 
thinking, especially its marginalizing of non-liberal epistemologies and the capital 
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economy, the similarities quickly disintegrate. What follows is an anti-colonial critique of 
both the libertarian and Orthodox Christian forms of ethics, both of which fall into the 
trappings of eurochristian thinking and ultimately have implications for those residing on 
the margins of eurochristian society. 
If a liberal cosmopolitan ethos is not the answer to moral pluralism, Engelhardt 
concludes the only way to coexist is through a libertarian approach in which we must 
tolerate the sometimes-repugnant values of others and reach consensus only through 
permission (individual autonomy). In opposition to the many problems he cites with 
liberal cosmopolitanism, Engelhardt turns to the libertarian approach as the better option 
between the two, but preferring yet a third, a content-full Orthodox Christian bioethics. 
As Engelhardt uses the term, libertarianism is both a moral freedom arranged on the basis 
of agreement between moral strangers at the personal level, and a laissez-faire capitalism 
that advocates for property rights at the societal level. Although he ultimately doesn’t 
claim a libertarian bioethics as his own, this is his argument of the best possible solution 
to the moral plurality problem. When addressing social inequalities, he cites their causes 
as either the natural lottery (the outcomes of natural forces such as illness, trauma, or 
disability) 366, or the social lottery (the outcomes of the choices of individuals and 
society) which he calls “being born rich.”367 He categorizes both causes as unfortunate, 
but not unfair.368 He talks about social lottery, that society is not responsible for bad 
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things that happen to people. Those “injured by others” are not owed restitution by 
society. “One will need an argument dependent on fairness to show others should submit 
to forceable redistribution of their resources to provide HC to those injured by others”369 
This argument lies on the premise that private property is sacred to the libertarian, and 
may not be redistributed without the property owner’s permission. In effect, secular 
moral authority doesn’t allow for taking of others things or “coercively restricting 
peaceable private choice.”370 Thus, only resources held in common such as taxes can be 
redistributed to those who have lost the natural and/or social lotteries.371 And so too, 
those who lost the social lottery will also be without health care. Libertarianism is about 
the individual’s freedom to own and control one’s property, not about liberating those 
who have been marginalized. In a libertarian world, individuals have the authority to “use 
their own resources in ways that collide with fashionable understanding of justice.”372 
Engelhardt’s libertarian type of freedom doesn’t consider the health of impoverished—it 
is freedom of property owners. What he doesn’t consider as a part of the libertarian 
calculation is when the injury is done by societal structures, not solely by individuals. 
Like Nozick, Engelhardt’s starting place for healthcare allocation is with the current 
unequal distribution of resources secured by coercive and exploitative means and the 
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requirement for permission to access other’s private resources.373 This he calls the 
principle of Healthcare Allocation.374 
Engelhardt’s discussions of libertarianism and private property lend themselves 
easily to anti-colonial critique. To give one’s permission in an exchange requires a non-
coercive relationship. If one is oppressed, can one be free to make unencumbered 
decisions? If a physician or healthcare institution retains a preponderance of power over 
patients (which is known), how can one secure healthcare according to one’s values free 
of the conscription of the systemic eurochristian biases? What recourse does the 
marginalized patient have in a libertarian society where permission is the only protection 
for humanity? Engelhardt says little that deals with the roles of power and politics in 
oppression or the historical injustices that have created the massive inequalities in the 
lives and health of people of color. Liberty is more than the procedural justice of the 
courts to protect the excesses in private property that continue to grow unchecked, the 
freedom of individuals to accumulate as much wealth as possible despite consequences 
for society. Justice is about acknowledging the fact that the majority of the wealthy in the 
West have become rich through the violent slave labor of Africans, the stealing of the 
territories of Native Americans, and the seizure of vital natural resources of the 
Mexicans, which is now considered the southwestern U.S. The categorization of this type 
of exploitation is not merely unfortunate, but is highly unfair. If, as Engelhardt states, the 
unfair “constitutes a claim on the resources of others” depending on where one draws the 
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line between unfortunate and unfair, the eurochristian colonial and postcolonial injustices 
endured by racialized people for five centuries would surely meet the criteria for 
unfair.375 Winning the natural or social lottery or the privilege of “being born rich” does 
not constitute a fair playing field where persons can compete in the marketplace and 
make “free” decisions uncoerced by the lack of basic material needs, political power or 
social capital. In light of the anti-colonial perspective, it is clear that people of color 
continue to have a claim on Western society and medical systems for the redistribution of 
resources, even the private property of some, based on fairness and restitution. And yet, 
the libertarian view is incompatible with this assertion because it prioritizes the 
unapologetic freedom of wealth accumulation without interference by others despite any 
unfortune or unfairness. Fairness for a libertarian is a game of competition rather than 
cooperation, individual insatiability over caring for community. The libertarian approach 
to bioethics gives the system the ability to exploit others based on a short-sided and one-
sided definition of freedom, the freedom to be left alone to do as one pleases. 
A libertarian bioethics cannot be responsive to the injustices and unfairness 
done to Latinx patients whose fates have been tied to Western society.376 A libertarian 
bioethics would not acknowledge the violent history that has created massive wealth 
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inequalities, but would only look at the present, where people’s private property is 
unquestionably theirs to keep or to give away as they please. For Latinx patients, they are 
at the whim of the “permission” of property owners, and without the charity they merely 
lost the social lottery for not being born rich and do not get standard healthcare. In fact, 
under Engelhardt’s libertarian schema, justice is merely a “fashionable” liberal notion, 
and to consider changing structures to benefit people’s lives are simply trends.377 
Engelhardt acknowledges problems with the libertarian approach, including the 
requirement that one must suffer “many choices that they recognize as grievously wrong” 
in the pluralistic project of peaceable libertarian co-existence.378 For Engelhardt 
toleration for the Orthodox Christian refers to arrangements such as abortion, physician-
assisted suicide, homosexuality, and euthanasia. As he would have it, Orthodox 
Christianity would be the dominant bioethics, but acknowledging this unlikely event, he 
would choose to preserve its practice within a libertarian framework acknowledging that 
Orthodox Christianity can co-exist within a libertarian approach, but not with liberal 
bioethics.379 It is in The Foundations of Christian Bioethics where he expands on his 
personal approach to bioethics, one of first millennial Orthodox Christianity. 
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To understand Engelhardt’s Christian bioethics is to ask as he does in The 
Foundations of Christian Bioethics, “Can one break through immanence to Truth?”380 
Transcending immanence is his project for bioethics. He defines the noetic experience, 
the experience of God by the person of faith, as the sufficient condition for locating truth 
and moral knowledge.381 In his estimation, the failure of secular bioethics lies in its 
reliance on human reason and empiricism for answers that only exist within the 
metaphysical realm. For Engelhardt, Orthodox Christianity can finally reconcile the right 
and the good, something for which moral philosophy and secular bioethics have failed. 
The secular mistake is to seek the good in immanence, in this world – and moreover to 
confuse the good with the ends of moral action. For Orthodox Christians, despite the 
tragedy and sacrifices one makes for the “right” on earth, eternal “goods” will be enjoyed 
posthumously, and the right and the good will be fully reconciled. The devil will be a 
stumbling block, a tempter for the bioethicist who must draw ethical decisions from 
prayer and grace first, and never from reason alone. One’s personal relationship with God 
is always sufficient, complete with “miracles, saints, angels, and devils” who “interrupt 
the immanent by their presence.”382 Moral rules are secondary. They are not legalistically 
and rationally derived, but instead serve as an indicator of the proper actions toward the 
fulfillment of the individual’s union with God. 
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The implications of this kind of thinking, minimizing the immanent, the real and 
material lives on earth, for the promise of salvation in death, is dangerous for two 
reasons. First, the attribution of sin as the cause of suffering places the blame on the 
individual, or as De La Torre says, blaming the victim.383 While some individual 
accountability for certain disease states is inevitable, the suffering of entire groups of 
people based on power inequalities is not accounted for by Engelhardt. He asserts that 
when Adam and Eve joined Satan in prideful separation, binding all humans in the 
consequences of their sin, including suffering and death. It follows that those who suffer 
greatly are more sinful related to personal choices that are evil. From an anti-colonial 
perspective, this kind of thinking upholds and justifies the continued condemnation of 
racially oppressed people as more evil, and somehow solely responsible for their own 
poverty and poor health. This is eurochristian worldview. Whether by religious dogma or 
scientific “fact”, communities of color have been scapegoated for sacrifice to white 
eurochristian well-being for five centuries. 
Second, while the anti-colonial practitioner might agree with Engelhardt 
regarding the perils of excessive materialism in the eurochristian world, the conflation of 
materialism with survival is a mistake. Engelhardt rejects social justice outright in favor 
of Christian charity, one that allows Christians to do good works so that they personally 
may experience eternal goods. To quote him, “Christ did not call us to use the coercive 
force of the state to ensure that others will be cared for by an anonymous, secular welfare 
                                                            





system.”384 For Engelhardt medicine has become an idol, distracting humanity from God. 
Because the healthcare system is anti-Christian, he attempts to clear as much space as 
possible for Christian bioethics by endorsing Christians to 1) withhold support for state-
provided healthcare; 2) critique all appeals to social justice; and 3) counteract any 
movements that enshrine social justice.385 According to Engelhardt, only an 
egalitarianism of altruism is acceptable, one that is based on appeals to the sympathy of 
others, as opposed to an egalitarianism of envy, which he defines as based on someone 
else being better off based on good fortune.386 In The Foundations of Christian Bioethics, 
he advises Christians to concern themselves not with inequality based on good fortune, 
only that some have too little for their needs. But still, this does not mean that they must 
give from their surplus or possession in order to give to those in need of healthcare.387 
Instead of social justice, he proposes a separate Christian healthcare system under the 
name Vaticare (the Roman Catholic version), or Orthocare (the Orthodox Christian 
version) that would “offer a preferential option for the poor through an internal taxing 
system based in charity that would redistribute resources” while maintaining Christian 
religious commitments and endorsing “civil recovery and criminal prosecution” for those 
providing unacceptable services such as abortion or euthanasia within the system.388 If 
Engelhardt cannot have a Christian state, he will create one within the framework of a 
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libertarian state. The secular state, for Engelhardt, should not be the arbiter of public 
morals.389 
For the Latinx patient, their poverty and suffering indicate their inferiority for 
an Orthodox Christian, intended or not. This accounting for the Latinx patient’s suffering 
is evil, which also upholds many stereotypes such as “Hispanic laziness…responsible for 
the economic privation [they] face in this country. After all, the idle hands are the devil’s 
handiwork.”390 Also, the state should have no hand in providing health care for the 
undocumented, and instead any charity should be distributed by the Church, where they 
can continue to evangelize and “save” the patients that are desperate for healthcare. 
Maintaining power over people through charity and religion (the most ubiquitous colonial 
trope) rather than serving justice maintains oppression of Latinx persons who are 
suffering. 
De La Torre: Political and Economic Liberation 
Engelhardt, while wishing for a content-full U.S. Christian bioethics, will still 
tolerate the libertarian approach to ethics despite its basis in property rights and 
unabashed freedoms. In a libertarian society, one can own animals or people if both 
parties agree to it, and anyone has the right to sell their own organs for a profit.391 The 
contracts between moral strangers can only be made in terms of an often unregulated 
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exchange of services. But the negotiations of permission and agreement of moral 
strangers in a libertarian society does not consider the power inequality of such “free and 
autonomous” persons. As De La Torre writes, “For those who do ethics on the margins, 
the issue of power becomes paramount in the development of any ethical discourse.”392 In 
Doing Ethics from the Christian Margins, De La Torre spends a lot of time damning the 
neoliberal profit-making venture, an extension of the eurochristian colonial trajectory of 
exploitation of the poor and persons of color for production, profit, and power. The new 
virtue is “maximization of wealth,” and “everything and body is reduced to a consumer 
good.”393 Globally, non-governmental organizations, the World Bank, and the 
International Monetary Fund have a history of imposing structural adjustments on 
countries receiving aid, requiring privatization, austerity, deregulation, and free trade 
while at the same time cutting of social benefits such as health, education, social 
services.394 395 De La Torre, in a chapter on life and death, points out the folly in making 
healthcare a profit-making venture. He questions the possibility of a coexistence of 
affordable healthcare and profit-making, and writes that “complaining about the 
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affordability of healthcare betrays our capitalist economic structures.”396 In terms of 
capitalism and bioethics itself, De La Torre writes, “When bioethicists focus on the 
ethical issues raised by scientific and technological advances, advances that may prolong 
or secure a richer quality of life, little attention is given to how or why those on the 
margins fail to benefit.”397 
Leaving the wake of Engelhardt’s libertarian bioethics, Engelhardt’s Christian 
bioethics is also problematic for persons and communities of color. Engelhardt minimizes 
the immanent, attributing the suffering of people on earth to the necessary punishment of 
humans related to the sins of Adam and Eve. In doing so, he blames those who suffer 
most under the domination of eurochristian economic and political structures; for their 
situation must be related to their own ungodly actions. Engelhardt critiques the systems 
of human greed in his content-full Christian ethic, especially in his critique of the liberal 
cosmopolitan ethos. He criticizes liberals for their claimed “right to be at liberty to pursue 
one’s own life projects” which can necessitate abortion, physician assisted suicide, or 
assisted reproduction for homosexual couples, but also seems to include “equality of 
opportunity and basic welfare rights…”398 In his critique of liberal cosmopolitanism, 
Engelhardt does not distinguish between the wealth-production of neoliberal materialism 
with the material needs and fair playing field for survival of those who are marginalized. 
He writes, 
                                                            
396 De La Torre, Doing Christian Ethics from the Margins, 218-19. 
397 Ibid., 220. 




“In the face of the moral vacuum that emerges in the absence of 
functioning robust moral communities, and given the attraction of 
immediate satisfaction through the market, an ethos of 
guaranteeing to each person an adequate level of satisfaction and 
fulfillment can become central, even including welfare claims of 
an equality of opportunity in the pursuit of thisworldly, immanent 
life projects.” 
He does not legitimate certain life projects of jobs, children, relationships, 
livelihoods that all require some level of material resources. This “immanence” that 
Engelhardt skims over is the tenuous lives of many Latinx who suffer in the present, the 
reality that need not be experienced by ontologically white eurochristians. He merely 
accepts the suffering of others as status quo and elevates charity because of what it does 
for the Christian in union with God: “Since the poor will always be with us (Matt 26:11), 
the goal cannot be the abolition of poverty or its results. God can always provide for 
those in need. …The focus must be on the character of the charity, the character of the 
live that motivates the giver.”399 In Burying White Privilege: Resurrecting a Badass 
Christianity, De La Torre anticipates three reasons calls for justice are rejected by white 
Christians: 1) justice is too utopian, 2) it is the antithesis of faith (this is Engelhardt), and 
3) it is a mistake made by the church in the past.400 
This begs the question, why are white Christians defining justice instead of 
those who are acutely experiencing the injustice?401 When the powerful in society make 
the rules that their private property is inviolable and that only through charity can others 
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exist, this is not justice. Counter to Engelhardt’s “egalitarianism of altruism” De La Torre 
would reply that “justice is not a response born out of pity or a duty based on 
paternalism.”402 Love, which is the soul of justice, “is an action taken regardless of how 
one feels.”403 For De La Torre’s Christian ethics, justice is following the Hispanic Christ 
who is a liberator, who takes sides with “the least among us”.404 Justice is also about 
challenging the dominant culture’s power and privilege, whether one is part of the 
dominant culture or outside of it. A bioethics that cannot look in the mirror as a critic to 
understand how it is part of the dominant culture will never serve true justice. A bioethics 
that does not take the lead of Latinx people is not true justice. Real justice is 
understanding the structural causes of poverty and racism, both historically and in the 
present. In response to Engelhardt’s idea of charity, this is the way the wealthy get to 
keep their wealth and feel good about themselves for giving some away, rather than for 
those who are oppressed to receive restorative justice which rightfully corrects the harms 
that have been done. Social justice is turning the scales toward the restorative rights of 
the oppressed over the liberty rights of the eurochristian privileged, the freedom to one’s 
moral beliefs, freedom from exploitation, and the ability to meet one’s own material 
needs. 
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A Badass Bioethics 
De La Torre calls for a “Badass Christianity” which, among other things, is a 
“survival praxis” that responds to the hopelessness of the people.405 The imminent is the 
center of De La Torre’s ethics, one that centers on lo cotidiano (the everyday experiences 
of the marginalized), and is contextualized in Nepantla (the in-between state of Latinx 
people as Indigenous and European living as borderlanders), and la lucha (the struggles 
of being on the margins of the eurochristian system.)406 A bioethicist who is not racist 
defines justice with and by those suffering oppression. And justice would be restorative, 
not just distributive. For the 6,500 people suffering from ESRD, a bioethicist would 
consider the responsibility of a society that has acted collectively and historically to bring 
Mexicans, Guatemalans, and El Salvadorians to U.S. hospitals. An anti-colonial 
bioethicist or ethics center would question and challenge the economic system of 
healthcare finance and decision-making, and would prioritize inequalities over expensive 
technologies, or would create a way to make all highly beneficial technologies available 
to everyone. An anti-colonial professor of ethics reads and teaches from the margins of 
power and exposes how faith is interpreted and used by the margins in contrast with those 
who study a eurochristian-centric academic ethics. If we think about how a Engelhardtian 
bioethics would address the current bioethical issue of inadequate treatment of 
immigrants from Latin-American countries, it does not work in their favor. It becomes 
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clear on anti-colonial analysis of Engelhardt’s bioethics that the eurochristian nature and 
its racist proclivities are abundant. 
De La Torre’s liberative ethic provides bioethics with a much more 
theologically aligned, compassionate, and just framework for patients who are excluded 
from standard treatments for ESRD based on an “undocumented” status. For Christian 
bioethicists, he makes the case that Jesus himself was an immigrant, poor, and understood 
the suffering that is experienced by Latinx patients who have found themselves on the 
margins of a world not of their own. Latinx ethics from the perspectives of various Latinx 
communities “recognize Jesus’ commitment to the marginalized.”407 A De La Torrian 
Christian bioethicist would not blame the patients’ suffering on their sins, nor on the 
stereotypes of “laziness”, “ignorance”, or “violent”; but instead would engage in the 
discourse of oppressive structures “that have intentionally created an army of low-skilled 
laborers for the benefit of commerce.”408 Many secular bioethicists think of ethics as 
taking a neutral stance, much like a libertarian world as described by Engelhardt. But a 
bioethicist influenced by De La Torre is not neutral, and takes a formal position against 
racism, not just in theory but in praxis. Praxis would include accompanying the 
undocumented ESRD patients to understand their situation-- being presente- in an effort 
to change the system in their favor.409 De La Torre writes, “physically engaging in 
consciousness-raising praxis leads to understanding the causes of oppression, from which 
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a spiritual response flows that can lead to better informed theories or doctrines.”410. For 
De La Torre, praxis comes first, and helps one to form theories grounded in the realities 
and experiences of undocumented patients. Political praxis might also be included, such 
as taking action to provide services to cover patients through the Affordable Care Act and 
the ESRD Medicare program. A bioethicist concerned with justice would do one’s 
homework and ask “why they come”.411 Much of De La Torre’s work provides an answer 
to this, which includes the U.S. involvement in many acts of dominance including 
stealing the most resource-rich land from Mexico, signing economic treaties such as 
NAFTA, and the overthrowing of many democratically elected leaders in Latino 
countries in order to protect U.S. economic interests. The U.S. has had much direct 
involvement in the poverty, joblessness, and corruption that cause people to cross the 
imaginary border between Mexico and the U.S. De La Torre is often heard saying one 
should not be surprised when Latinx people south-of-the-border follow the roads to the 
U.S., the same roads that the U.S. used to steal their resources and livelihoods. The 
discipline of bioethics has an opportunity to liberate itself from the eurochristian narrative 
in order to fully address the deep-seated issues of race. Bioethics would do well to learn 
from our colleagues of color, to move away from universalizing white eurochristian 
theories, from the white Jesus and the paternalistic God, and to understand this 
“undocumented patient” showing up in our renal clinic or emergency department is a 
person with a story of oppression that is tied directly to U.S. actions. And that we as a 
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country, including healthcare institutions and their leadership, health providers, and 
bioethicists, owe them not only distributive, but restorative and liberative justice. A 
badass bioethics calls out the system, takes action, and centers the Latinx son, 






CHAPTER 5: SINGER AND WYNTER: 
TWO EXPRESSIONS OF LIFE, DEATH, AND HUMANITY 
Sitting at a table of philosophers at the American Society of Bioethics and 
Humanities conference one year, the topic of discussion turned to whether robots with 
artificial intelligence and human qualities should be considered human. While an 
intriguing intellectual question, does it not follow that if robots are designed to have the 
emotions and ability to think like humans, in other words if we make them human, that 
they enjoy the moral status of being human? This defining of whether someone is human, 
what benefits derive from such a status, and what can be done with their bodies if they 
are not fully human is not new. Observing the philosophers in their deliberations about 
who is human and who is not is reminiscent of the defining of Native Americans as 
savage animals, and enslaved Africans as degenerates, which allowed justification for 
slavery and stealing of land. For bioethics, brain death is yet another one of these 
thresholds. The defining of death as “the irreversible loss of all functions of the brain, 
including the brainstem” has allowed physicians to unilaterally withdraw patients from 
“life-sustaining” medical treatment and to procure organs for transplant.412 This chapter 
proposes that the defining of humanity is a colonial endeavor, one that has historically 
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benefitted the colonizer. What follows is a critique of Peter Singer’s book Practical 
Ethics and an anti-colonial response through the works of Sylvia Wynter, using the case 
of Jahi McMath to illustrate the continued colonial structures of bioethics. 
The Jahi McMath Case 
Jahi McMath was a 13-year-old African -American teenager who, in 2013, 
underwent a tonsillectomy at Oakland’s Children’s Hospital in California. After surgery 
McMath began having a large amount of bleeding, which went untreated despite her 
nurses’ notifications to the physicians on service. Several hours later, McMath sustained 
a cardiac arrest and hours of attempted resuscitation ensued. According to Rachel Aviv in 
the New Yorker, two days later McMath was declared brain dead by physicians.413 Under 
current law, all states have adopted versions of the 1981 Uniform Determination of Death 
Act, which states that a diagnosis of brain death equates to actual death, allowing 
physicians to unilaterally remove the patient from life support.414 And yet, McMath’s 
mother Nailah Winkfield did not accept McMath’s state as death, despite the medical 
team’s insistence that the ventilator needed to be discontinued. McMath’s family 
consulted a personal-injury lawyer who wrote a cease and desist order to assure McMath 
would not be removed from the ventilator; then filed two motions involving the hospital’s 
conflict of interest in avoiding a higher liability if McMath did not “die”, and in the 
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infringement of the hospital on Winkfield’s right to express her religion.415 Contrary to 
medically and legally accepted practice around brain death, McMath was transported to 
New Jersey, one of only a few states that allows religious exemptions to the brain death 
laws. McMath remained on a ventilator for approximately four and a half years, 
reportedly going through puberty, moving her hands and feet, and inconsistently 
following commands from her mother. The case created contentious debates between 
neurologists, bioethicists, theologians and others. McMath’s parents had single-handedly 
thrown into question the “standard” definition of death. And they have lost their 
daughter. 
Peter Singer’s Bioethics 
In his books Rethinking Life and Death and Practical Ethics, Peter Singer 
addresses issues such as who counts as a person, when can persons (and animals) be 
killed, and whether humans are indeed superior to other forms of life. These views have 
earned Singer both praise and considerable criticism. Singer represents the secular 
utilitarian view of Western ethics. A moral philosopher from Australia and the Ira W. 
DeCamp Professor of Bioethics at Princeton University, Singer is a vocal proponent of 
animal rights as illustrated in his books Animal Liberation, Animal Factories, and In 
Defense of Animals. His non-profit organization and book of the same name, The Life 
You Can Save, signify his views on, and commitment to, obligatory altruism and 
alleviating world poverty. But it is his views on life and death that are most relevant for 
the arguments herein. 
                                                            




Singer identifies himself as a preference, rather than hedonistic, utilitarian.416 
For Singer, moral decisions should be made based on “equal consideration of interests” 
rather than solely for pleasure or happiness.417 Equal consideration of interests is a 
minimal principle of equality, in which “we give equal weight in our moral deliberations 
to the like interests of all those affected by our decisions.”418 An interest is an interest, 
despite whose interest it may be, and does not require any qualifiers such as race, 
intelligence, genetic predisposition, or other inherited or environmentally-influenced 
attribute. His work sets out to create a “Copernican revolution” in the way society defines 
life and death.419 His utilitarian views consider the traditional Christian concept of the 
sanctity of human life unable to cope with the 20th century changes in healthcare, 
especially under the weight of technologically-driven issues such as those caused by life-
sustaining medical treatments. Singer dwells in what Engelhardt called the liberal 
cosmopolitan secularist realm of Western society, the other side of the coin from 
                                                            
416 Singer is in constant dialogue with John Rawls, Henry Sidgwick, John Stuart Mill, and Jeremy Bentham, 
among others. 
417 Singer sees progress as universal utilitarian calculations of people’s interests considered such as 
“avoiding pain, in satisfying basic needs for food and shelter, in enjoying warm personal relationships, in 
being free to pursue one’s project without interference, and many others…”P. Singer, Practical Ethics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 28. 
418 Singer defines equal consideration of interests as: “We give equal weight in our moral deliberations to 
the like interests of all those affected by our actions…weighing interests impartially. True scales favour the 
side where the interest is stronger or where several interests combine to outweigh a smaller number of 
interests, but they take no account of whose interests they are weighing.” Ibid., 21-22. 
419 The subtitle on the cover of the book reads, “A new Copernican revolution is in the offing, one that 
challenges the basic precepts and code of ethics that have previously governed life and death.” Peter 
Singer, Rethinking Life & Death: The Collapse of Our Traditional Ethics/Peter Singer, Rethinking Life and 




Engelhardt’s traditional Christianity. Singer critiques Christian precepts of bioethics. But 
Singer is still eurochristian in his views. 
Sylvia Wynter: An Anti-Colonial Approach 
Sylvia Wynter also discusses issues of life and death, what it means to be 
human, and global issues affecting human life. In contrast to Singer’s humanist 
eurochristian perspective, Wynter is thoroughly post-humanist and anti-colonial. Wynter 
was born in Cuba and grew up in Jamaica in the 1940s during the anti-colonial protest 
movements. She attended college in London at University London, Kings’ College to 
study modern languages.420 After several moves, she landed back in Jamaica teaching 
Spanish literature at the University of West Indies (UWI). Wynter is a prolific writer 
spanning the disciplines and media of “fiction, physics, neurobiology, film, music, 
economics, history, cortical theory, literature, learning practices, coloniality, ritual 
narratives, and religion.”421 Wynter has put forth “more than 200 texts and presentations 
which comprise dramatic plays ,translations, essays, plenaries, symposia, and creative 
works.”422 After writing a full-length play Under the Sun and her novel The Hills of 
Hebron, she went on to teach Spanish language and Hispanic literature at The University 
of West Indies, Spanish and Third-World literature at the University of California at San 
Diego, and since 1977 has been at Stanford University as professor of Spanish and 
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Portuguese, and of African and Afro-American studies, and now is faculty emeritus.423 
Her anti-colonial intellectual project is to dismember the Western dominant concept of 
humanity and to propose a long-view of a post-humanist hybrid human as a new science 
based on both biology and mythology, or as she refers to it, bios/mythoi. She builds on 
Frantz Fanon and Aimé Césaire’s work. From Fanon she borrows his idea of sociogeny, 
proposing a new sociogenic science that transcends mere human biology and emanates 
from what she calls the Third Event. Following the coming-into-being of the universe and 
the appearance of life on earth, The Third Event marks the evolution of the human brain 
in gaining the capacity for language, symbolism, story-telling, and myth-making.424 She 
adapts Césaire’s science of Word to propose that ultimately our origin myths determine 
our nature, even on the biological and neurochemical levels. In contrast to De La Torre’s 
primarily (but not solely) political anti-colonialism, Wynter’s is primarily 
epistemological in nature. In this dissertation De La Torre is used to speak back to 
Engelhardt’s libertarianism and Orthodox Christianity. In contrast, Wynter, in relativist 
language, engages in the deconstruction of the discourse of the secular Humanities from 
the Renaissance forward. Wynter is fitting in addressing the humanist eurochristian 
philosophy of Singer, in providing a different perspective on both Singer’s context and 
the concepts of life, death, and the human in general. The anti-colonial works of Wynter 
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will provide an alternative view to Singer’s, one that accounts for the marginalized in 
ways his theories do not. 
Singer’s Ontological Assumptions: Evolution and Categorization 
Singer is an atheist and rejects both God and human nature as foundations of 
morality. He writes of the belief of heaven and hell, reward and punishment: 
“To rely on such a justification, one would first have to show that 
we do survive death, in some form, and secondly, that we will be 
rewarded and punished in accordance with the extent to which we 
have lived an ethical life. I do not know how this could be 
demonstrated.”425 
He challenges the Christian assumption of sanctity of life in its precepts that all human 
lives are equally inviolable (and all animal lives equally violable). Where Engelhardt 
credits the Church for morality, Singer turns to philosophical arguments based on 
outcomes and empiricism. Where Engelhardt sees progress as salvation, Singer sees 
progress as individuals seeking meaningful future projects. Where, for Engelhardt, Man 
is the zenith of life on earth with direct access to God, Singer discredits human 
superiority as a Christian myth originating from the Hebrew bible. Instead of 
unquestionable sanctity of human life, Singer says humans have more moral worth if they 
are persons who are self-aware and future-directed. Singer’s ontological assumptions are 
a continuation of the eurochristian worldview through the hierarchical and linear thinking 
reflected in his acceptance of a Darwinian evolutionary trajectory and his categorization 
of beings by selected traits. In Singer’s intention to expand the notion of personhood to 
animals and contract the notion of personhood of permanently unconscious humans, he is 
                                                            




nonetheless engaging in a project of categorizing and defining the other, a thoroughly 
colonial endeavor. In accord with a eurochristian worldview, Singer’s creation story is 
evolution, and his thinking is linear and categorical. These three ontological assumptions 
are reviewed in-turn. 
First, Singer’s Darwinian proclivities lead him to examine the evolutionary 
science behind human and animal traits, describing the likeness of apes, dolphins, and 
dogs to humans. He uses many examples in Practical Ethics to illustrate the similarities of 
animals and humans, such as Koko the gorilla who can use 500 signs in American sign 
language, uses signs to refer to past and future events, and recognizes himself in a mirror, 
illustrating self-consciousness. He quotes genetic science noting that apes share over 
98.5% genetics with humans. Singer also considers at some length genetic diversity 
within groups such as race and gender, looking at IQ and aggression (therefore power) 
through the lenses of evolutionary genetics and environmental influences.426 And 
although his ontological starting point is evolution, he cautions his readers to also engage 
rational choice to ascertain whether evolved traits are still meeting the needs of human 
life. He states that it would be a mistake to always follow our natural moral intuitions 
which we have inherited from our ancestors or to always refrain from doing what is 
unnatural, including the treating of disease and use of life-saving technologies.427 His 
grounding is Darwinian and is supplemented by human reason. 
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Second, Singer is a reflection of Enlightenment thinking. Consistent with 
Singer’s evolutionary eurochristian worldview, he thinks about progress in a linear 
manner (like most in the Western world). Progress, for Singer, is a universal endeavor to 
better the lives of persons globally through reproductive choices, charity, animal rights, 
and allowing the deaths of certain members of the Homo sapiens species, especially 
embryos, fetuses, severely affected infants, people wishing to end their lives, and those in 
irreversible states of unconsciousness. He also defines progress on an individual level, as 
those who have a future orientation and planned achievements. His ideas of when Homo 
sapiens can be considered persons and when they can be killed (removed from life 
support, participate in abortion or physician-assisted suicide) are ultimately defined by 
one’s desire and capability for progression. 
Enlightenment, the sibling of colonialism, has engendered a worldview of 
progress. For those on the upside of progress, benefits are both created and enjoyed. But 
the myth of progress is silent for the “wretched of the earth.”428 The eurochristian idea of 
progress drove the land-grabbing and human brutalities of manifest destiny across Turtle 
Island, now North and South America. During the Industrial Revolution, the logic of 
progress undermined “the sociocultural” conditions of individual autonomy and lock[ed] 
us up in an “iron cage of our own making.”429 The discourse of progress continues to 
define the “Other” as lazy or ineffective (the stereotype of Mexicans taking a siesta or 
Native Americans sharing their material goods freely rather than accumulating wealth). 
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And the scientific, technological, and economic revolutions have similarly created 
situations of disproportionate risk to the poor on a global scale including mass 
inequalities, climate change, and weapons of mass destruction.430 Why must the pursuit 
of progress, of personal future achievements and a universal good based on Singer’s 
ontology necessarily be the defining moral pinnacle of life? What effects might this more 
secular universal approach have on marginalized communities, despite Singer’s good 
intentions? 
Third, Singer’s ethics aims to recategorize the claim to personhood in an 
attempt to extend this moral status to sentient animals, as well as to expand the life and 
death choices humans can make around abortion, infants with severe disability, and 
people experiencing intractable pain and suffering. His utilitarian project is ultimately 
about reducing suffering and balancing the welfare of all people. He rejects the Christian 
notion that humans are superior to all other living beings by examining the shared traits 
of humans and animals in tool-making, language, emotions, and sentience, and future 
planning. He argues against the use of self-awareness as a “human” and therefore more 
valuable trait, contending that a dog may have some self-awareness and a disabled child 
may have no self-awareness.431 Overall, sentience suffices to place a being within the 
sphere of equal consideration of interests. Singer draws a line in prioritizing human 
preferences in their ability to have a “biographical sense of their life and a stronger 
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orientation towards the future.”432 The human has a personal interest in continuing to live 
based on a life story “that has chapters still to be written”, and contains “hopes for 
achievements to come.”433 Overall, Singer shifts the categories to prioritize the moral 
status of humans with future goals, then humans and animals who are sentient and can 
experience pain and joy, and at the bottom, humans and animals who have no sentience 
or awareness, therefore not commanding the same moral consideration of preferences 
(because they do not have conscious preferences). This author agrees with the idea that 
human dignity is not ‘life at all costs’, and that animals should be cared for more 
thoroughly. But his project is still one of categorization, of continuing the Enlightenment 
projects taken up by the likes of Aristotle, Carl Linnaeus, Max Mueller, and Immanuel 
Kant in the categorization of living beings. The problem is both that he categorizes and 
how he does so from his particular social location. It is understandable that a philosopher 
would attempt to find boundaries to guide the practice of medicine in its current 
quandaries. But this defining of death is from Singer’s worldview, still within the same 
eurochristian privileged space that takes for granted the current state of medicine which is 
also eurochristian. Unfortunately, what we have is, once again, the dominant voices 
making the rules for all. 
Wynter and Ontology 
Wynter’s ontology frames human life in broad context, one that starts with what 
she calls the Third Event, the evolution of language, story-telling, and myth-making over 
                                                            





100,000 years ago.434 The Third Event defines how humans are hybridly biological and 
sociological in nature, with one’s origin stories (as opposed to one’s genetics) as the 
driver for one’s beliefs and behaviors. For Wynter, reality lies in what she calls the 
sociogenic principle, which underlies all human societal orders. After biological birth, 
humans are reborn sociogenically from an encoded second set of instructions. In other 
words, “individual subjects… are all now reborn of some origin story rather than of the 
womb.”435 These codes, based on a group’s origin stories or cosmogonies, are auto-
instituted and thereby “made flesh” through the social codes’ transference into 
neurochemical reward-and-punishment mechanisms within the body. The Word, the 
mythical and symbolic second set of instructions literally drive biology (rather than the 
other way around).436 This sociogenic principle deems the human what she calls genre-
specific (or culture-specific) and kin-recognizing, with members barely able to see 
outside this autopoiesis that is “always already initiated as fictively eusocialized.”437 In 
other words, Wynter’s ontology is based on the evolution of our species as myth- and 
meaning-making beings, but beings that cannot perceive oneself as a part of this narrative 
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structure because it has become ingrained in our neurological make-up.438 These 
structures are cognitively closed systems, meaning they dictate our roles, morality, and 
beliefs without allowing alternative systems to compete. The sociogenic codes must 
remain closed to synchronize biology and myth, and to stabilize the symbolism with 
neurochemical processes. Wynter asks, why did humans hybridize? Why language, story-
telling, and myth-making? Her purpose is that in knowing this we can relativize the 
globally hegemonic worldview that dictates life and death, truth and untruth, which 
operates at the expense of the millions of marginalized. This relativist view is that each 
individual has a “truth-for”, the reality within which they live derived from the 
sociogenic principle. Her truth-for premise “already questions the assumption that there is 
a truth-for someone who can know the truth-for everyone else.”439 Singer, coming from 
the eurochristian humanist worldview, proposes his truth-for as a global truth-for. While 
his Darwinian-practical theories of life, death, and the human are contrary to 
Engelhardt’s, they are still globally hegemonic and eurochristian in nature. Wynter sees 
both creation and evolution as eurochristian origin stories, merely two sides of the same 
coin. She does not judge as to their truthfulness, but only that both are representations of 
human origin, and that they have become dominant and unquestioned genre-specific 
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codes that leave many at the margins of society.440 The shift between creation and 
evolution began, according to Wynter, with Copernicus’ revolutionary science, with the 
studia humanitatis in tow.441 With a shift from Christianity to Humanity (Man1), God 
was now for man’s sake instead of humans living for God’s sake.442 For Wynter, Singer 
falls into her Man2 category, Man for man’s sake, homo oeconomicus. 
For Wynter, the theory of evolution is indeed part-science, but is also part-myth 
in its mistaking a biocentric origin with the basis of “being human”.443 Evolution may tell 
us something of the biological aspects of being human, but cannot tell us the meaning of 
being human, and therefor “has been slotted into that same old place in our minds and 
cultures that used to be occupied by myths...our new origin beliefs…are in fact surrogate 
myths.”444 
So where does this leave Singer? Singer’s evolution is part-science, part-myth. 
He challenges the myths of Christian origins, and inserts his own, as evidenced by his 
statement concerning Christian myth of heaven and hell, “I do not know how this could 
be demonstrated.” This secular consciousness for Singer is tell-tale of his sociogenic 
code, his genre-specific neurochemically induced worldview, according to Wynter. 
Human reason, as held in esteem by Singer, is like evolution in that it may be a 
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descriptive instrument for defining what is and what “fits”, but not why something is, nor 
whether something is moral, right, or good. His mistake, according to Wynter’s 
viewpoint, is basing the meaning of being human for everyone on evolutionary and 
rational constructs. Wynter’s mythoi interrupts and decenters the biocentric human origin 
story as one of many possible origin stories based on the sociogenic principle. 
Where Singer is linear in his thinking toward the utilitarian preferences of living 
beings who individually possess or do not possess future goals and life projects (whose 
qualities decide when an individual can be killed or is replaceable), Wynter is not 
teleological. As Katherine McKittrick puts it, Wynter’s work is “but knots of ideas and 
histories and narratives,” and that Wynter’s “project mirrors the conceptual frame it 
promises.”445 Singer’s teleology is toward utility (with a secondary purpose leading to 
global welfare), while Wynter seeks emancipation in a non-linear fashion through 
“praxis”. For Wynter, emancipation, not “balancing preferences” is most important. This 
liberating focus derives from the liminal spaces, from the margins, and from “multiple 
self-inscripting, auto-instituting modalities.”446 In contrast, Singer’s utilitarian approach, 
while well-meaning and seemingly practical, comes from high theory. It is grounded in 
ideas, not the praxis of people’s diverse lives with diverse scripts. Wynter and De La 
Torre both prioritize the liminal, the gaze from below, the actual lives of (marginalized) 
people as a starting place for ethics. Attempting to fit the world into one’s theory will be 
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blinding to the actual consequences for the marginalized and is often a contributor to the 
sustaining of marginalization, even if unintentionally. 
The categorizing nature of Singer’s ideas about life and death is part of the 
ontology of the Western empirical project. Many Western philosophers in the past have 
attempted to classify humans and other living organisms, including Max Müller and Carl 
Linnaeus. The outcomes of classifying persons from a particular (hierarchical) 
perspective wreak havoc on those who do not share the dominant ideology and are 
therefore relegated to the margins. One of many examples of this Western proclivity for 
categorizing is with Max Müller, a philologist who is known for inventing the science of 
religion through classificatory and comparative methods. His dream, as described by Arie 
Molendijk, was to show that all religions have the same foundation to undermine the 
problem of religion and create global peace.447 But several passages give away an 
underlying affinity for Christianity as well as a hint at anti-Semitism. In his First Lecture 
he states, 
“Has Colebrooke, or Lassen, or Burnouf, ever suggested ‘that we 
Christians, who are Aryans, may have the satisfaction of Christ has 
not come to us from the Semites, and that it is the hymns of the 
Veda and not the Bible that we are to look for the primordial 
source of any religion…”448 
Even in his best moments there are hints of an evolutionary hierarchy of 
religions, with Christianity at the pinnacle, heathens and primitives as childlike, and 
Judaism as a history not to be claimed by Germans. David Chidester calls into question 
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Müller’s use of “classify and conquer”, although it is difficult to know what Muller 
meant by “conquer”. Chidester, through a South African postcolonial lens, shows the 
instability of the foundation of some of Müller’s work based on the fact that his theories 
were derived from distant sources, colonizers such as Calloway and Bleek, and a number 
of Christianized African informants. For Chidester, his comparative religion was based 
on an accumulation of knowledge from colonized people who are no longer free from 
outside bias and are submersed in a struggle for their own cultures and livelihoods. In 
fact, Müller apparently never traveled to India.449 In essence, Müller was part of the 
empire responsible for the oppression of Africans; and he capitalized on his access to 
them through the colonial informants on the ground. He also capitalized on his position in 
empire in his access to the Vedic texts. What Müller’s story shows us, is he is unable to 
create world peace for two reasons: one, he cannot see outside his own sociogenic genre-
specific frame of being German and Christian. And two, his theories are from colonized 
distant informants and ancient texts. He ignores those in the margins, those who were 
relatively untainted by the eurochristian-dominant worldview. Wynter’s work illuminates 
both the dominant worldview’s power to define rational/irrational, haves/have nots, 
symbolic life/death, and the grave mistake of writing from a hierarchical space rather 
than being led by those residing on the margins. The views of the likes of Müller does not 
consider worldviews of those who have a different classification system of the status of 
different entities. Singer is also making the same mistakes. He is attempting to categorize 
                                                            
449 Molendijk, A. L. Friedrich Max Muller and the Sacred Books of the East, on New Books in Religion 




human and animal lives from his sociogenic genre-specific frame using theory and logic 
rather than listening to those on the margins who will be affected by his theories. In 
contrast to Singer, Wynter is not trying to classify people differently—she is not trying to 
replace existing categories with her own. Instead, Wynter is pointing out the theorizing of 
liberal humanists is always based on sociogeny and origin stories, and just happens to be 
the dominant global narrative. 
Consider, also, the view of many Native Americans in which all living and non-
living things are respected and given moral status. A Native American worldview is also 
cyclical in nature, not progressive over one individual’s lifetime. Some Indigenous views 
are inclusive of seven generations before and seven generations after the present time. A 
Native American worldview (while not homogeneous, does have shared ontologies and 
epistemologies) is an example of a competing worldview that has been almost destroyed 
by the eurochristian ontology and epistemology. The eurochristian worldview denies the 
Native American non-linear sociogenic genres that respect all living and non-living 
entities, that are relationship focused rather than achievement focused, and that views life 
as cyclical and inclusive. How does Singer’s ontology affect the marginalized? It 
deprives them of the gut-level consciousness of their own beliefs and values, immerses 
them in a world of ideas and forced behaviors that dominate their own, and demeans their 
behaviors as inferior if not based on progress, hard work, and achievement. Singer may 
not intend this, but his eurochristian worldview keeps the order for the secular-humanist 




ratiomorphic values of the West.450 For Wynter, humans frame their ontological modes of 
reality, definitions of order and chaos, and their ideas of sameness and difference, on the 
conception of life and death. For instance, in medieval Christendom, human life 
embodied the profane and sinful, while death represented the spiritual sacred. The 
Renaissance and the birth of reason shifted the idea of life and death. With the rejection 
of the divine by humanism, life became dignified and “culturally civilized” through 
human nature and reason. Any conception of folklorish myth, of spirit, of God were 
rejected as irrational, with death eventually falling under human control. Singer is, once 
again, tinkering around the margins of the accepted definitions of life and death, based on 
this humanist-biological schema. For Singer, categorizing life is based on the utility and 
individual achievements of a person, and death is the inability to have an individual 
projection for one’s future. For someone like Winkfield, her daughter was her future. 
Singer focuses on the utility and plans of the individual from the perspective of his 
dominant origin story, not on the family unit or Winkfield’s origin story. His tinkering of 
definitions is still ontologically a part of the eurochristian trajectory of evolution, linear 
progress, and categorization. 
Singer and Moral Epistemology: Utilitarianism and Universalization 
Singer is a preference utilitarian, although in Practical Ethics he had become 
less convinced that this theory can address all moral philosophical problems. Singer’s 
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epistemology, like other utilitarians, rest on the acceptance of an intrinsic goodness of 
either an individual’s interests and preferences, or the positive balance of enjoyment of 
pleasure and welfare with avoidance of pain and suffering. The utilitarian calculation for 
Singer depends on the universalization of people’s preferences globally. Possessing the 
capacity for suffering and enjoyment entitles a person (and some animals) to equal 
consideration of their interests. These interests are weighed impartially. 
The utilitarian approach underlying Singer’s epistemology is a universal one in 
that all people’s preferences should be given equal weight based on how the action 
affects all those involved.451 His approach is based on the welfare of persons as weighed 
in a universal cosmopolitan context. Traits such as race, species, sex, disability, and even 
self-awareness, are useless in a utilitarian calculation based on interests. All sentient 
beings should have basic rights and equal weight to their preferences. In effect, his theory 
is an ideal one that assumes real people and institutions will make decisions based on the 
balancing of interests. He falls shy of arguing ethics fully from the position of an 
impartial spectator or ideal observer but does state that the universal aspect of ethics 
starts with a broad utilitarian position.452 In preference utilitarianism everyone’s 
preferences count. It does not bring about total equality but goes beyond justice based on 
merit or effort. If not the impartial spectator, who is weighing preferences and balancing 
them? The basis of his theory states “I cannot give my own preferences greater weight, 
                                                            
451 Singer, Practical Ethics, 12. 




simply because they are my own, than I give to the preferences of others.”453 Who is the 
“I” that is doing the calculations? Is it possible for a eurochristian individual or institution 
that still favors the white Christian male or the liberal secular demi-god to affect the 
consideration of other’s preferences universally? And equality, even if based on 
utilitarianism, is not necessarily the goal, if we are concerned with justice. Racism is 
colonial. It is embedded in worldview and power structures. It requires more than 
suggestions of consideration of other’s preferences, or in leaving justice in the hands of 
the “I” who is making the decisions. Providing a theory where everyone’s interests are 
considered equally does not make it so. 
Second, Singer is a liberal humanist, with a philosophical model that prioritizes 
the individual and their rights. He writes, “humans differ as individuals, not as races or 
sexes.”454 When talking about race (or gender) and inequality, he says we must judge 
people as individuals, not as averages, and that “members of different racial groups must 
be treated as individuals, irrespective of their race.”455 Individuals should stand on their 
own in regards to IQ, aggressiveness, and leadership potential. Singer downplays racism 
as a minor issue. He says the “principle that all humans are equal is now part of the 
prevailing political and ethical orthodoxy.” And while racists exist, they are less so 
publicly.456 This kind of thinking is problematic. The humanistic principle that now all 
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people are considered racially “generally” equal downplays the very real differences and 
oppression that continues. Although it is appealing to put every individual on an equal 
playing field, Singer runs into the trap of humanism and its colorblindness. An ideal 
theory does not account for the actual inequalities in society based on one’s skin color, 
gender, sexuality, or disability. He does not address past harms and the continued racial 
oppression of certain groups. Although biological theories of race are passé and have 
been replaced by socially-based theories, Singer’s utilitarianism is still willing to 
entertain new biological theories on race and skips over the social aspects of power and 
discrimination in the maintenance of race as a category. He wants to say race doesn’t 
matter, which gives coherence to his theory but ignores reality.457 In arguing this, he 
looks specifically at the “scientific” narrative of race and IQ over the last few decades. 
He argues that if researchers were to prove a genetic hypothesis that different races 
actually had differing IQs, that it would not give support for racism.458 But if the 
purported results were true, it would only deepen stereotypes of Asians as the model 
minority and Blacks as irrational or degenerate. If the results were to be different than 
suspected, this also will not necessarily decrease racism. The dominant narrative will find 
a way to justify eurochristian white superiority on other grounds. Racism is embedded in 
the eurochristian worldview. The eurochristian worldview is a narrative that is invested in 
maintaining power. Singer also argues that his theory, based on an equal consideration of 
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interests, demonstrates in spades the errors in the Nazi Holocaust.459 A theory of equal 
consideration of interests is not needed to do this. Nor would his theory have saved 
millions of Jews, persons with disabilities, and other victims of the Holocaust. Nazis did 
not subscribe to equal consideration if interests any more than they did any other moral 
principle of nonmaleficence, equality, or justice. Preference utilitarianism would not have 
stopped the Holocaust and will not stop racism. The flaw in preference utilitarianism is 
that, like any other Western moral theory, it is embedded in a colonial history, including 
the continued economic, racial, and gender oppressions. Just like an egalitarian, 
communist, or democratic system, utilitarianism requires buy-in from those who hold the 
power. In theory, skin color is irrelevant to the consideration of an individual’s interests. 
In theory, societal rules that base decisions solely on preferences and do not allow 
decisions to be made on any other grounds, including IQ, race, and disability, sounds 
faultless. In reality, who is giving all person’s interests equal weight? The physician? The 
insurance companies? The employer? The state? Along these same lines, Singer critiques 
Rawls’ contract theory, citing that contracts cannot work based on the concept of 
reciprocity; that white colonizers would not have entered into a mutually respectable 
contract with enslaved Africans. But a utilitarian set of rules would not have deterred 
white colonizers, Nazis, or the Spanish inquisition. The problem lies in the categorization 
of people, in the justification of exploitation for economic purposes, and the inherent 
worldviews of eurochristianity, not in a theory of best practices in moral decision-
making. 
                                                            




Singer also falls under the epistemological category of pragmatic naturalism. 
Although his ontological starting point for morality is evolutionary fitness, he also 
acknowledges the need for reason instead of relying solely on our evolutionary instincts 
to achieve moral progress. In other words, humans fulfill moral functions that allow 
society to adapt to new paradigms, which for Singer would be the technological 
advancement of medicine, climate change, and inequality. Singer is a functionalist, 
meaning morality is in part how one realizes societal functions for overall harmony. The 
functions do not derive from something internally or innate, but instead are valued for 
how they address societal problems. Some examples of this are Singer’s (and currently 
society’s) acceptance of recovering the organs of those who are considered brain-dead or 
neurologically devastated for transplantation based on the large number of potential 
organ recipients on the waiting list. Singer is also Malthusian in his ideas of encouraging 
the noncoercive limiting of procreation through the voluntary use of birth control and 
abortion, especially if the baby is likely to lead a miserable life. He also discusses how 
large family sizes impact the planet and homosexuality does not, leading to a change in 
the instrumentality of old pro-family anti-gay morality.460 We could also consider the 
future use of artificial persons through artificial intelligence in serving the needs of more 
“quality” human life. This author has sympathy for Singer’s intentions. Patients who have 
lived because of a new heart are deeply grateful and touched by the gift they have 
received. Families of patients who are in a persistent vegetative state or “whole brain 
death” sometimes do not think it is a “life worth living”. The weighing of the organ 
                                                            




recipient’s good over the value of the life of someone who is brain dead is purely 
functional in a utilitarian sense, and a matter of a particular kind of value which justifies 
the means. Slave labor was also functional (but obviously not preference utilitarian), 
leading to wealth, progress, and nation-building. The harms in coercive withdrawal of life 
support and requesting organ donation are not the same in degree, but are they the same 
in kind? The submission of all patients to a worldview based on functionality is 
marginalizing, especially when many patients do not share the same origin stories. Who 
gets to decide what is life and death, and how functional one’s choices should be? 
So, what does Singer’s universal and functionalist utilitarianism say about life 
and death? Singer’s book Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of Our Traditional 
Ethics is described as such: “A new Copernican revolution is in the offing, one that 
challenges the basic precepts and code of ethics that have previously governed life and 
death.”461 He describes a shift from the religious sanctity of life arguments in medicine to 
the post-technological age of life-sustaining technologies such as ventilators, feeding 
tubes, and dialysis machines. With these advances in medical technology, a secular and 
biological form of ethics has emerged. Often heard in intensive care units are the 
statements “We need to convince this family to withdraw ‘person x’ from the ventilator 
and let them go,” and “Why are we keeping a corpse alive?” This secular shift has no 
doubt happened in many circles, with more health providers jumping off the “life is 
always dignified, at all costs” ship into the sea of futility and economic concerns. Singer 
is one of the most prolific proponents of this kind of thinking, one that is foremost an 
                                                            




advocate of welfare, and one that is also secular, biological, Malthusian, and 
instrumentalist in kind. 
Defining Death 
Singer is in search of a way to justify ending the lives of those with not only a 
brain death diagnosis but all permanently unconscious beings. He discusses three levels 
of questioning about brain death: “when does a human being die, when is it permissible 
to stop trying to keep a human being alive, and when is it permissible to remove organs 
from a human being for the purpose of transplantation into another human being?” 462 He 
says the Harvard brain death committee’s work was “to avoid the nightmarish prospect of 
filling our hospitals and nursing homes with living but permanently unconscious 
beings.”463 464 Singer described the Harvard brain death criteria as “a concept so desirable 
in its consequences that it is unthinkable to give up, and so shaky on its foundations that 
it can scarcely be supported.”465 And while Singer might be opening up opportunities for 
individuals and family members to choose a peaceful and quick death in more situations, 
it alternately supports medical culture in forcing their own ideas of death on individuals 
and families. What starts as permissible for families becomes obligatory as healthcare 
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providers and institutions look to save money, create closure, provide organs, and 
diminish moral distress of nurses and physicians. The argument here is not whether the 
assistance in dying is murder, or what the legal consequences might be. It is not either a 
utilitarian argument about the costs of keeping someone on life support who will never 
regain consciousness. Nor is it about whether human life is sacred. These are the typical 
ethics arguments. The anti-colonial arguments are: can health care providers choose to 
end what others regard as continued life? What are the views of those who disagree with 
the Western notion of “brain death”, and why are their worldviews not considered in 
deciding whether one is alive or dead? Where were they when the Harvard committee of 
experts were deciding where to draw the line? The issue taken here is not whether a 
family member should be able to discontinue treatment on a loved one with severe and 
intractable pain or irreversible coma or persistent vegetative state. The true problem in 
the ethics of life and death is who defines death, and how the medicalized capitalist 
system we operate within defines the stark realities of who the system benefits and who is 
on the outside. The problem is not those who disagree or resist Western definitions of 
death, it is the Janus-face of technology itself. Healthcare workers blame those with 
alternative understandings of the world (and those who rightfully lack trust in the 
healthcare system) rather than accepting the life-saving technologies and the drive for 
progress are to blame. The problem isn’t “getting ethnic and religious families to 
understand what death really is,” but to come to terms with the system we have created as 
a whole, and as a continuation of the function of the human quest to control life and 




who “don’t get it.” We all need liberation from this trap, but those of us on the abundance 
side of eurochristianity, while these cases are distressing, they are not defining. 
Defining Human 
Making decisions regarding life and death requires the defining of the 
categories of human and person. A human, as Singer puts it, is an entity with the genetics 
of the species Homo sapiens. But being merely human for Singer does not give one the 
moral claims that being a person does.466 A person, for Singer, is someone who has self-
consciousness, a life story, and is future-directed. As he writes, “medical practice has 
become incompatible with belief in equal value of all human life.”467 Decisions to end 
life, such as abortion, physician assisted suicide, and withdrawing life support when one 
is irreversibly unconscious or brain dead all rely on questions about humanhood and 
personhood. But when healthcare staff and families disagree about withdrawing life 
support, whose definition of death reigns? When a patient is considered “brain dead”, it is 
because a physician (or two) have performed a series of tests that look for higher and 
lower brain functions. If none are detected, the patient is definitionally legally dead. But 
the patient is still on a ventilator, with a beating heart and warm skin. Brain dead patients 
have been kept “alive” for months awaiting the birth of a child. And in the case of 
McMath, she was kept on life support for over 4 years. Healthcare providers (and organ 
procurement specialists) are instructed to say she is deceased, and that her body is being 
maintained on a ventilator. Singer points out the absurdity of this. The patient still has 
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some hormonal functioning of the brain in the output of certain hormones, and often the 
patient’s heart rate and blood pressure respond when the patient is cut open in surgery. 
Brain death is not really death. And family members sense this. This is why nurses’ and 
physicians’ language and behaviors do not reflect a belief the brain-dead patient is dead 
and require coaching.468 Brain death is a convenient fiction. So, who decides how to mark 
the difference between life and death? And when is it permissible to stop trying to keep a 
human being alive? Singer’s solution is not in defining someone as dead, but in allowing 
the taking of life in situations where the patient will never again be “person”. And the 
utility of saving hospitals money and providing organs for donation justify the overriding 
of deeply held marginalized family values embedded in their worldviews. In turn, the 
system continues to oppress those who do not fit. In sum, Singer’s moral epistemology, 
including his definitions of life, death, and human, is based on a liberal humanist 
utilitarianism that focuses on practical outcomes of certain actions, determined by their 
preferences and functions. 
Wynter and Epistemic Disobedience469 
Wynter’s work is primarily epistemic. Hers is the “Afro-Caribbean epistemic 
revolution against the Eurocentric concept of ‘Man’ and its role in the construction of 
racism.”470 Wynter is a critic of dominant liberal humanist epistemology. The Western 
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bourgeois conception of Man, for Wynter, has been overrepresented as Human for 
centuries, which she traces in her essay Unsettling the Coloniality of 
Being/Power/Truth/Freedom.471 She defines man who emerged in the Renaissance as 
Man1, Homo politicus, at the time Man is rejecting the theocentric conception of human 
for man as a political subject of the state.472 Man2, Homo oeconomicus, marks the criteria 
of man from late 18th century onward with the growth of capitalism, which she refers to 
as a master of scarcity through investment and accumulation.473 Both Man1 and Man2 
still exclude marginalized “Others” despite the inclusive language of the humanities and 
the “impartial” invisible hand of capitalism. Singer is Wynter’s Man1 and Man2, 
exposing elements of both a colorblind humanist universalizing perspective, and a 
resignation to the capitalist economic structure as will be discussed later. 
Both Singer and Wynter claim their works are epistemological ruptures. Singer 
is drawing attention to a “new” secular utilitarian approach to death and dying of the 
human in healthcare. But he is always already in the category of eurochristian, or what 
Wynter calls the “neo-Liberal humanist Western-Bourgeois” Man 2, or Anglo-American 
Man.474 According to Wynter, humanism was at one time the heresy, the challenging of a 
stale and overgrown Christian-Latin paradigm for stabilizing order. But now, she says the 
humanist-biological-economic conception of Western life has become the norm, and 
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continues the Christian-Latin project of defining and excluding the “Other”. The once 
and still sometimes code of Creation has been nearly replaced by evolution. Yet both are 
origin stories from the same overall eurochristian worldview. The overall structure has 
not changed, only the furniture has been rearranged. And the “Others”, the defined 
symbolically dead, ‘degenerate’, ‘irrational’, religious Others, continue to suffer under 
the weight of this worldview. Singer is moving deck chairs around on the sinking Titanic 
by replacing the old eurochristian definitions of life and death with new ones. In contrast, 
according to Katherine McKittrick, Wynter’s project is not to replace or occupy, but to 
generally undo and unsettle, “Western conceptions of what it means to be human.”475 
The problem with humanism, as portrayed by Wynter, is a general ignorance to 
the fact that humanism is itself a hegemonic arrangement, one that is unable to 
comprehend its part in the continued oppression of people of color. In fact, the rise of 
Man would not have happened without the oppression of Africans, Indigenous, and 
Asians.476 Walter Mignolo says of humanism, “decolonial thinking and living are not to 
assimilate but to deny the universal pretense of humanitas.”477 
Wynter asserts a new justice over the humanist is needed. Humans, since the 
acquisition of language, have been relying on their origin stories for autopoiesis. The 
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dark side of autopoiesis is in its creation of I and Other, us, and them, symbolic life and 
death. This pattern will be repeated until what Wynter calls the “second emergence”, 
which, through the “outsider” perspectives of the liminal, will inform the 
unconsciousness of neo-Liberal humanist Western bourgeois “paradigms of justice” such 
as human rights478. As Wynter points out, the Rastafari movement is such a “counter-
cosmogenic”, “liminally deviant” gaze from below. Rastafarians were the poor whose 
lived existence and aspirations were not served by the “world-system’s ostensibly 
universally applicable” ‘paradigm of justice’ and so-called universal human rights.479 
Singer, both a humanist and evolutionist, cannot separate himself from both the absence 
of the liminal in his theories except as objectified groups of the world’s poor to be saved 
by the eurochristian rich through development work, and to conflate material 
fairness/equality with ontological and epistemological justice. He takes a colorblind 
universal humanist stance, proclaiming the unimportance of race for the functioning of 
his preference utilitarianism. 
Counter to a universal utilitarianism, Wynter would respond with a more 
relativistic view of “multiple self-inscripting, auto-instituting modalities,” or the 
existence of many ethno-knowledges. There can be no impartiality from a universal 
point-of-view, because that so-called “universal” point-of-view comes from one group’s 
particular (dominating) autopoiesis. The current state of affairs is the inability to accept 
other’s ethno-knowledges, their epistemic structures, and thereby creating binaries and 
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divisions. Wynter’s new science of sociogenics is transcultural and transcendent of the 
universal. The universal leaves out history, racial harms, and ignores liminal 
epistemology.480 The applications of this new epistemology have yet to be imagined. 
Life and Death: An Anti-Colonial Interpretation 
While Singer is asking whether Jahi McMath is a corpse or a living child, 
Wynter is thinking about life and death symbolically. Singer wants to “find another way 
of responding to human beings who can never be conscious.”481 The reason for the 
predicament to which Singer is responding is the technological big-picture. Medicine has 
gotten itself into a bind, between keeping patients alive “too long” and setting up the 
pressure at the back-end of life with high hospitalization costs and organ procurement 
organizations. As Wynter intimates, our generation is overly defined by a purely 
biological and medicalized conception of life and death, and simultaneously clings to the 
symbolic binaries of life and death as perfectibility vs. degeneracy, of the rational vs. 
irrational/emotional, of the scientific vs. the religious/myth-making. Recall Wynter’s 
epistemic shift happens through Fanon’s sociogenesis, the origin and development of a 
society through its stories and foundational myths. A human’s second birth is of fictively 
instituted and their biological birth “dies”; we are reborn as symbolic life (like Christian 
baptism) that is opiate rewarded and becomes living flesh. Cultures, life/death, good/evil 
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are defined by these second set of instructions.482 These second set of instructions make 
us human, the mythoi of Wynter’s hybrid bios/mythoi human. Humans “cannot/do not 
pre-exist our cosmogonies, our representations of our origins – even though it is we 
ourselves who invent those cosmogonies and then retroactively project them onto a 
past.”483 Humans are always already mythically chartered. Life and death are no longer 
about biological death, but about sociogenic life and death. The dark side of the 
autopoiesis of humans is in its creation of symbolic life and death, in other words I and 
Other, Us and Them.484 Compared with the symbolic life of Man as Breadwinner and 
accumulator, the symbolically dead began as the “peripheral slave labor 
‘Negros’/’Negress’ together with the semi-peripheral ‘Indian’/’Indian Squaw’ neo-serf 
labor” and in contemporary times have transformed into the “now institutionalized 
Welfare Mom/Ghetto ‘Black’ Others (including their Trailer Park Trash, Wigger "White" 
counterparts) as the extreme expression of the category of the non-Breadwinning ‘planet 
of the slums’ Jobless Poor, and at the world-systemic level, of the category of the 
‘Underdeveloped’ all ostensibly as naturally dysselected Others allegedly mastered by 
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the Malthusian origin-mythic trope of “Natural Scarcity”. …”485 This pattern will be 
repeated until what Wynter calls the “second emergence”, which, through the “outsider” 
perspectives of the liminal, will inform the unconsciousness of neo-Liberal humanist 
Western bourgeois “paradigms of justice” especially in human rights.486 From the liminal 
comes concepts such as double consciousness and border epistemology, those flesh and 
geography spaces where disparate sociogenies are comprehended.487 Wynter’s science of 
sociogeny is most easily grasped at the borders (territorial, linguistic, subjective, 
epistemic, ontological).488 Her overarching questions are how to find a ceremony to free 
biological reality from order-stabilizing symbolic life/death codes? How can we finally 
know our social reality outside the codes of symbolic life/death which is synchronized 
with our biochemical and opiate reward/punishment system of the brain?489 
Singer admits that those diagnosed with brain death have been excluded from 
the moral community.490 But in utilitarian terms, there seems to be little resistance from 
the healthcare community. The brain-dead patient no longer can pursue future goals, their 
organs could “save” other patients, and the long-term care is expensive and wasteful. In 
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our eurochristian world we have created these conditions and have decided they are true. 
We have also continued to fault “Others”, those with non-secular origin stories and 
therefore differing concepts of life and death, and of different familial organizational 
principles, for resisting. The system is working. It keeps the symbolic life/death codes, 
and with it the dominant narrative, intact. For Jahi McMath, she was doubly cursed. She 
was no longer a “person” in Singer’s sense (although is still genetically human), and she 
was always already symbolically dead based on the color of her skin. There was 
widespread confusion and annoyance from medical and bioethics professions when her 
mother resisted withdrawal of life support. In essence, she was being “ignorant”, “non-
rational”, and “uncooperative”, and was potentially going to drive up unnecessary costs 
(because we assume she is also poor, perhaps even on welfare) to keep McMath alive. 
Why is Winkfield at fault? What she experienced likely felt like a violent act in the face 
of power. Instead, what if the problem in this conflict is the dominant secular-
technological-progress-oriented system, challenging the deeply held worldviews of 
persons globally? 
For Wynter, to be human is to have a biographical sense of self which would 
include relationships. Singer also mentions this biographical sense of self as being 
human, in other words having self-consciousness and conceptualizing a future and 
past.491 At first Singer seems to share a point with Wynter, that being human is 
biographical, the telling of stories. Important here is to note two differences. Singer 
focuses on the capacity of the individual, for instance, the person with a diagnosis of 
                                                            




brain death or persistent vegetative state, who does not have future goals, and therefore 
possessing only biological human status, not personhood. Singer is focusing on an 
individual’s ability to tell stories and to live with the possibility of future achievements. 
Wynter’s story-telling honors the communal and does not necessarily rely on the 
biological criteria as does Singer’s. And two, Singer has defined the moral status for 
those who share his secular liberal genre but may not resonate with the worldviews of 
patients and families. His defining of human is meant to be universal, in contrast to 
Wynter’s idea that people come from different worlds and therefore, they have a very 
specific biographical sense of self that is not tied merely to biological life and includes 
shared understandings of morality through autopoiesis. Being human for Wynter is a 
verb, open to those on the margins to think about being human anew. It is relational and 
ecumenical. Being human is not about the “empiricism of the unfittest”, but instead the 
“realization of the living”492 While Singer talks about the biological-empirical Homo 
sapiens, Wynter talks about the sociogenic-scientific Homo narrans. For Wynter, the 
hybrid bios-mythoi human and the process of autopoiesis must “no longer be allowed to 
function outside our awareness.”493 
“Man’s history-for is therefore now put forward as if it were 
transcreedal, supracultural, universal. And my point here is that if 
we are able to reimagine the human in terms of a new history 
whose narrative will enable us to co-identify ourselves each with 
the other, whatever our local ethnos/ethnoi, we would have to 
being by taking our present history, as narrated by historians, as 
empirical data…” 
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to understand how we got here, Man as human.494 No ethno-class, for instance Singer’s, 
“can embody the truth of what Human is and means.”495 These meanings, these 
sociogenic codes, affect matter. That matter is people.496 
Singer and Socioeconomics: Obligation to Assist, Exceptionalism, and Democracy 
One of Singer’s strongest arguments for addressing the lives of the marginalized 
is his “obligation to assist.” He notes, “helping is not, as conventionally thought, a 
charitable act that is praiseworthy to do but not wrong to omit. It is something that 
everyone ought to do.”497 We owe because of the utilitarian principle, because people 
should not be treated differently depending on their circumstances or luck. Singer is a 
proponent of the affluent in Western countries donating 5% of their wealth to aid 
organizations from their private funds. He is also a proponent of fair trade, the end of 
agricultural subsidies that affect farmers who cannot compete with the prices, political 
action, and more official government development assistance.498 He does not hold private 
property sacred as do libertarians, and states utilitarians are game to override property 
rights when a calculation of interests estimates its necessity. His ideas are based on 
addressing the welfare of people globally. He believes it is better for children to be born 
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in a developed world where they have a higher standard of living and better chances to 
“lead enjoyable lives”.499 And yet, he prioritizes those in “developing” countries 
(although a colonial term) for funding assistance because of their absolute poverty, 
compared with the relative poverty of the U.S.500 Development organizations can help to 
alleviate the immediate needs of people such as providing water, food, shelter, and 
education. This is undisputable. 
About capitalism, Singer assumes it cannot be challenged, that private 
enterprise will never be abolished, and that black markets will always emerge. He says 
“we might as well accept that financial rewards will go to those with inherited abilities, 
rather than those who have the greatest needs.”501 Instead, “we should try to create a 
climate of opinion that will lead to a reduction in excessive payments to senior 
management and an increase in payments to those whose income barely meets their 
needs”502 He also locates some ability to redistribute wealth within the taxation schemes 
and through increased equity in salary (with a margin before brain drain happens). 
He identifies affirmative action as the best hope for reducing long-standing 
inequalities, especially in education and employment.503 He is most concerned with 
reducing the inequalities “within” certain racial or ethnic groups rather than between 
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racial and gender groups, which he thinks may have a more divisive effect.504 For 
instance, in selecting candidates for jobs or higher education, affirmative action, for 
Singer, is not “contrary to sound principle of equality and does not violate any rights of 
those excluded by it.”505 In the U.S., he notes that managing admissions to achieve 
diversity is permissible, but not by using racial or ethnic quotas. But if a school wanted to 
increase diversity, they could do so based on potential student “interests” rather than IQ, 
race, or some other criteria alone. 
In a chapter called Civil Disobedience, Violence, and Terrorism, he asserts that 
civil disobedience may be necessary to restore democracy. He believes the state is more 
sophisticated than “tribal societies that kill with impunity.”506 And he recognizes that 
democracy is not perfect, but having some kind of agreed-on procedure is “the firmest 
possible basis for a peaceful method of settling disputes.”507 In contrast to civil 
disobedience, violence is only justified perhaps in the cases of dealing with a murderous 
dictator or protecting people from a mass killing or genocide.508 And he concludes that 
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Wynter’s “We the Underdeveloped” 
An anti-colonial critique of Singer’s “obligation to assist” reveals more 
eurochristian assumptions, entailing harms to the marginalized. First, while absolute 
poverty is not disputed, Singer minimizes the poverty in the U.S. by using the terms 
“relative” and “absolute” poverty, and by citing the life expectancy in the U.S. as 78 
years.509 He does not cite the inequalities of life expectancy and health within the U.S.510 
Also, Singer as Homo oeconomicus takes for granted the rich/poor divide and calls for 
giving 5% of one’s wealth to development organizations. Wynter would consider these 
givers Malthusian jobholders and breadwinners, masters of the ill of “Natural Scarcity” 
and “‘curable’ therefore, only in economic terms.”511 Development work has largely been 
criticized for its cooptation of the world into the eurochristian global schema, into 
neoliberal economic (and thereby already oppressive) institutions. This “help”, the 
transfer of wealth from the affluent to development organizations, largely funds Western 
aid organizations with eurochristian epistemic models. In addition, the helping doesn’t 
address the root causes of inequality, such as a neoliberal economic system, politics, 
corruption, and greed. Helping is often (but not always) a band-aid. If development 
organizations are led by the marginalized from their own sociogenic schemas and 
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epistemologies and are sustainable, this kind of organization would benefit from some 
initial funding aimed at anti-colonial welfare. Unfortunately, Singer notes he would 
encourage Western governments to withhold funding countries who restrict 
contraceptives for religious or nationalistic reasons, or who disallow women from 
receiving education.512 While many secular bioethicists may agree with this tactic for 
utilitarian (or human rights) reasons, it is still the impression of eurochristian values on 
an autonomous society. The outcome is not the point here. The “white men saving brown 
women from brown men” in Gayatri Spivak’s essay Can the Subaltern Speak points to 
the British as being an intruder, not a white savior, in the practice of sati for widowed 
Indian women.513 Wynter would attribute this alterity experienced by the British to the 
fundamentally different origin stories and socigenesis of Indians from the British. 
Singer’s “obligation to help” is altruistic, but fundamentally flawed from an anti-colonial 
perspective, especially in colonized and marginalized people’s ability to be autonomous 
in the development of their own ontological and epistemological well-being and to 
imagine their own futures uncoerced by eurochristian dominance. 
But Wynter goes beyond the empirical and proposes to “get rid of the concept 
of development altogether.”514 Development and economic growth “lay down the 
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prescriptive behavioral pathways instituting our present world system.”515 In other words, 
the idea of development itself is the eurochristian remaking of other societies. I think 
Wynter would say that Singer is focused on “material redemption”, at the cost of Africa 
losing its own soul, and at the same time strengthening stereotypes of Africa as 
underdeveloped, backwards, and impoverished.516 Wynter writes, it is 
“this ‘sense of right’ that, as the [eurochristian] ethico-behavioral 
code based on a new ‘reasons-of-the-economy’ (a code that is itself 
fundamentally culture-systemic rather than purely economic as it 
represents itself to be), is the cause of the trap in which Africa—
and the Black world—now finds itself today.” 
Singer believes living in a “developed” country is superior and wants to save who Wynter 
calls “we the underdeveloped” through a Western economic scheme, namely 
development organizations. Unfortunately, Singer focuses on the giving of the affluent 
rather than listening to and engaging with “We the Underdeveloped”. 
While a redistribution of the wealth from sources of low-lying fruit is not 
disputed here, the overall thought process behind redistribution is that capitalism, the 
partner of the scarcity myth, cannot be disturbed. In effect, the system that creates 
inequalities persists, while a few regulations redistribute here and there. Wynter calls 
Man2 the alleged “masterer of natural scarcity (investor or capital accumulator)”, 
defining the “jobless, the homeless, the Poor, systemically made jobless and 
criminalized—of the underdeveloped—all as the category of the economically 
                                                            





damnes.”517 The “ill” of the present is natural scarcity which is also a common trope in 
medicine, and can only be cured in economic terms within the current eurochristian 
economic structures of capitalism and neoliberalism, through constantly increasing 
economic growth and accumulation. “Capital is projected as indispensable, empirical, 
and metaphysical source of all human life, thus semantically activating the 
neurochemistry of our brain” and driving the desire for accumulation.518 She notes that 
humans are stuck in a “teleological economic script that governs our global well-
being/ill-being…”519 But this secular-capitalist human is not the whole of the human 
species. It is Man2, it is “us”, the “Western and mimetically Westernized middle classes”, 
the only means of production and needs repression of all other alternative modes of 
material provisioning. The narratives of race, scarcity, and progress are not naturally 
determined as eurochristians like to believe. They are systematically kept in place by a 
destructive worldview. 
Like Singer’s desire to redistribute wealth, healthcare and bioethics do good 
within its eurochristian walls and according to its eurochristian logic, but the structures 
are oppressive or only superficially helpful to many.520 A common example of the good 
being done is the push for addressing the social determinants of health such as housing, 
access to health care, healthy foods, safe neighborhoods. These are important resources. 
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Singer wants to alleviate world poverty with altruistic monetary donations to well-
meaning non-profit and government organizations. But the level of transformation 
required by many liminal groups of society transcends this kind of naïve material view of 
social justice. The liberal eurochristian worldview, while seemingly more altruistic and 
helpful (and does attend to the immediate physical needs of many humans worldwide), is 
still steeped in not only medieval Christianity, but also the Humanism of/as Man, the 
narrative of Malthusian scarcity and capital accumulation, and the continued 
categorization of people hierarchically, if not always as overtly. The worldview solidifies 
racial stereotypes and racial exploitation; which is why race cannot be the sole and final 
category for targeting inequality. It must be colonialism and its ontological, 
epistemological, economic, political, and psychosocial components. 
On affirmative action, Wynter is also instructive to the attempts of liberal 
humanists to improve the lives of others. Wynter notes the contradiction between 
individual equality and group hierarchy in the “category structure of the representational 
system ‘America’.”521 In her telling of this contradiction, she discusses David Bradley 
who is a black man in the early 1980s who, based on affirmative action, is admitted into a 
liberal university, which seems like a move toward equality. The illusion of his equality 
as an individual within the system evaporated with the shouts of “Nigger!”, the bomb 
threats, and the relegation of Blacks on campus to a dilapidated and underfunded “Black 
Cultural Center” on the margins of campus. The group identity associated with black skin 
is retained and contained through a process of homeostasis, that according to Wynter, 
                                                            




holds Blacks in the position of Chaos to the Euro Order.522 Wynter realizes that Blacks 
will always be relegated to some subjective and marginalized space in the current order 
of things, despite well-meaning attempts to “help”. Wynter calls for an epistemological 
break, a new heresy, to contradict the “first planetarily extended system in human 
history.”523 The argument for Wynter is not whether affirmative action is helpful or 
harmful, but how can the orthodoxy of the secular humanistic and still-racist paradigm be 
restructured so that people of color are no longer the reflection of chaos/evil to 
eurochristian order/good. 
Singer puts faith in the state and law to create stability within society, for the 
peaceful settling of disputes. The “sophistication” of the state provides a good minimum 
level of justice and equality. But Western categories of “normally American and 
normally human” do not include the racialized, impoverished, and underdeveloped.524 
What we find is that Homo politicus and Homo humanitas often have overriding drives to 
create security and order at the expense of those on the margins. The state and legal 
systems are not tuned to serving the symbolically dead/inferior/irrational of society. Ania 
Loomba echoes this pointing out “the ‘fraternity’” of the nations claims to represent them 
even as it does not include them as equals. Nations were originally forged on the 
inclusion of some to the exclusion of others, while the power and appeal of nationalism 
and its myth of belonging still draws many under its spell. In the U.S., despite the 
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autochthony of Indigenous nations, the true God-given owners of the Americas are white 
settlers based on the Doctrine of Discovery, written by a handful of Popes in the 15th 
century. And despite the spread of nation-building during postcolonial period, most often 
the nations were still a eurochristianized racialized version of themselves because of what 
Wynter calls mimesis. Singer, in taking for granted the nation (and Western nations and 
law more specifically), is the bee unaware of his beehive. Then he allows for civil 
disobedience as long as it is in service of national order and democracy. But he stops at 
violence—this is Singer’s white privilege. While this author does not condone violence, 
this luxury of avoiding violence is both racial and class privilege. Racialized situations 
including Native American genocide, the stripping of Mexicans of their northern-most 
territories in the 19th century, the devastating policies of overthrowing elected leaders and 
neoliberalism for regular Latin-American families due to political and economic U.S. 
intervention, the loss of lives and the imprisonment of Latinx children often leave people 
desperate and without options. But as Loomba puts it, nations are not transhistorical, and 
can be continually reimagined.525 
Returning to Jahi McMath 
For Peter Singer, McMath was a human, but not a person. Her continued life 
had no meaning for McMath as an individual, for she was, as far as science could tell, 
irreversibly non-sentient, and therefore had no possible future achievements. There is no 
empirical proof of a God, so any religious beliefs would be irrelevant to the decision to 
withdraw McMath from life support. Nor is there the potential for miracles. He would not 
                                                            




have agreed with the UDDA that said she was actually dead, because for him brain death 
is a legal fiction, but he might press to withdraw life support for utilitarian reasons, such 
as avoiding economic burdens on the hospital or health care system, providing organs for 
persons on the waiting list, and avoiding the moral distress of healthcare providers. 
Winkfield would have agreed with Singer, that McMath did not look dead; her heart was 
beating, she was warm, and moved her extremities on occasion. Singer does say, in 
talking about babies with bleak prospects, the decision to keep a baby should be up to 
family that will care for it; but that the family should also have the right to allow death if 
they cannot. What this author is unsure about is whether Singer agrees with a unilateral 
withdrawal of life support by physicians in situations such as brain death. But the vocal 
public bioethicist Arthur Caplan, from the Division of Medical Ethics at New York 
University Langone Medical Center, adamantly responded that “the legal right to stop is 
on the doctors’ side,” in an interview with CNN. “We don't treat the dead. Sadly, she has 
died.”526 
The fact that McMath and her family are black should not theoretically be a 
factor in Singer’s calculations, because each person must be taken as an individual, not as 
part of a group. The situation is merely a scientific-functionalist question. The heresy in 
this case by the bioethics community was the fact that someone had challenged the 
“accepted” dead donor rule of brain death. This was the scandal that upset the apple cart. 
Singer says nothing about implicit bias, the general poorer health and access to healthcare 
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for racialized persons in the U.S., nothing about the power differentials around race in 
healthcare. The likelihood that McMath may not have had all of her social determinants 
of health met prior to her surgery does not enter into the discussion of whether or not she 
is alive or dead, a person or a human. The inequalities in the U.S. which stem from both a 
colonial history and the current capitalist and neoliberal policies are inevitable, but at 
least we have a minimum level of peace and equality due to an imperfect democracy and 
affirmative action, all according to Singer. And in fact, the real problem is not with 
inequality in the U.S., but overseas in underdeveloped countries. So according to Singer’s 
Practical Ethics, Jahi McMath was not about race at all, but merely a biological-
functionalist view of brain death, with empathy toward families who are the bearers of 
the suffering. 
Sylvia Wynter and Jahi McMath 
Sylvia Wynter provides us with a different view. She moves the conversation of 
inequality from a secular-liberal biological view to the conception of ontological 
sovereignty: “we would have to move completely outside our present conception of what 
it is to be human, and therefore outside the ground of the orthodox body of knowledge 
which institutes and reproduces such a conception.”527 Wynter struggles to think outside 
the limits of the biocenetric order of consciousness of homo oeconomicus. But, she 
admits that Darwin pulls hard so this is difficult thinking.528 But what is obvious is that 
large scale injustices are indispensable to a overrepresented narrative of homo 
                                                            





oeconomicus’ s bio-origin narrative which act as if isomorphic with now emergent-
referent-we “in the horizon of humanity”. In other words, Man2’s dominant narrative acts 
as if it speaks for all people, but instead continues to oppress. Wynter acknowledges that 
science does bring some knowledge but leaves out mythoi.529 She describes that the 
1960’s was the first big eruption in Man's episteme, the same era of the birth of bioethics. 
But quickly the gains were subsumed by Man in the recapturing of power. The cost, for 
Wynter, is the subordination of racialized groups’ genre-specific story-telling codes of 
symbolic life/death. In sum, a neoliberal society and a clinging to the old Man1’s 
colorblind humanities continues to deny its own and others’ origin stories and sociogenic 
truths. 
In applying Wynter’s work to the case of McMath, different ways of bioethical 
thinking emerge. First, bioethicists and healthcare providers would be able to 
comprehend the big-picture. What led up to the trauma experienced by McMath and her 
family from an anti-colonial perspective? Ontologically, what was Nailah Winkfield’s 
origin story?530 What was the meaning of life and death for her? We know what 
mainstream secular doctors and hospital ethicists believe. Singer and Engelhardt are two 
well-known bioethicists with competing claims to morality in healthcare. After an 
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analysis of both, we might be compelled to ask why their worldviews, and not the family 
of Jahi McMath’s, are considered to take precedent in cases such as McMath’s. Does 
some special authority exist in either Engelhardt’s religion or Singer’s philosophy? 
Neither mainstream secular nor Christian ethicists have the “truth-for” everyone. 
Winkfield’s hybrid bios/mythoi self is no more or less than the bios/mythoi of any 
physician or bioethicist. Each group’s origin stories or cosmogonies are reality, “made 
flesh,” through the social codes’ transference into neurochemical reward-and-punishment 
mechanisms within their bodies. The latter just happens to dominate through the 
eurochristian narrative. The discrimination the family felt was the product of a long (and 
continued) history of eurochristian scientists and philosophers categorizing people by 
skin color, rationality, and intelligence, defining a hierarchy of humanity. Bioethicists 
and healthcare providers, like Kant, Muller, and Linnaeus, cannot see outside their (our) 
own sociogenic genre-specific frame, which we mistake for the higher truth, for 
everyone’s truth. Wynter’s connection of our social codes with neurochemical opiate 
reward systems provides insight, as we intuit the right thing for our patients and are 
indignant when someone’s choices or behaviors do not align. Our colleagues and patients 
all define morality based on their origin stories. 
In addition, bioethics rests on a long history from the views of privileged white 
men, Man1 and Man2, from the exercise of high theory, without co-creating theories with 
those on the margins, those with differing worldviews and religions. From Wynter (and 
De La Torre) we can take as prescriptive that a bioethics interested in dealing with race 




faced when one’s own worldview (and origin story) is questioned. Winkfield said, “No 
one was listening to us, and I can’t prove it, but I really feel in my heart: if McMath was a 
little white girl, I feel we would have gotten a little more help and attention.”531 
McMath’s family should have been deferred to, without assuming ignorance, 
superstition, inferiority, or resistance. This is almost blasphemous to say in the world of 
medicine, where we have “standards” and legal definitions of death. But until bioethics 
realizes its mainstream taken-for-granted systems are upholding racism, nothing will 
change. Intellectuals, even when acting oppositional, most often maintain a eurochristian 
narrative and reinscribe dominance over those who have historically been marginalized. 
Wynter cautions, “the trap for us…is to choose whether your allegiance will be to the 
dominant world of the “men” or to the subordinated world of the “natives”.”532 For 
bioethics this will often mean acting first to reduce racism even if something feels askew, 
even if it challenges one’s own neurochemical receptors. 
The epistemology of Homo humanitas is one of colorblindness. The ethical and 
scientific flurry of excitement by neurologists and bioethicists around McMath’s case 
hardly mentioned race. Wynter is generous in pointing out that the functional rhetoric of 
the Liberal Creed is beyond the limits of conscious intentionalities.533 And yet, brain 
death, the holy grail of intensive care, was being questioned, as was the physician’s 
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authority to make the calls. Experts were brought in to detect any signs of life, and like 
Singer, some questioned the label “death” a legal fiction…that McMath, although 
neurologically devastated, was not dead. Others, such as Bob Veatch, said it makes sense 
to let families decide based on their own definitions of death.534 And then there is Arthur 
Kaplan, who, in agreement with many others, insisted on following the legal definition: 
dead is dead.535 In Aviv’s article, McMath's family claims that one of the doctors at 
Oakland Children's Hospital “pounded his fist on the table, saying, ‘She’s dead, dead, 
dead.’”536 But while questions arose regarding the biological-technical aspects of brain 
death, mainstream bioethics ignored the elephant in the room, dismissing the patient and 
family’s racial and cultural identities as unimportant. The legal and biological universal 
“agreements” around brain death were being threatened. 
While McMath was no longer either a person in Singer’s sense, or alive based 
on mainstream bioethics and law, for Winkfield she was still very much alive and part of 
the moral community and her family. Winkfield was having to contest those who said 
McMath was not biologically human/alive, but also that she was never symbolically alive 
in a eurochristian world. McMath was born into a world that equates black with chaos, 
evil, poverty, and ignorance. For Winkfield, the world outside considered her beloved 
daughter doubly dead. Winkfield said she lost all of her trust when a black physician 
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attempted to empathize with her about how African-Americans lose their children at 
higher rates than other groups. According to Aviv’s article, when the physician said “You 
know how we are,” Winkfield said 
“Who’s we? We African Americans? I felt so belittled. Yes, a lot 
of black children die in Oakland and people do have funerals for 
their children – but that don’t mean all of us are like that. Do you 
think we’re supposed to be used to our children dying, that this is 
just what black people normally go through?”537 
Wynter would advise bioethics to engage in the perspectives of the liminal, those of 
Jahi’s family. As described in the Aviv article, the highly respected neurologist Alan 
Shewmon did just this. After years of research on brain death, he abandoned his 
mainstream colleagues. He said that “dissenters from the ‘brain death’ concept are 
typically dismissed condescendingly as simpletons, religious zealots or pro-life fanatics,” 
and as Aviv said, “he announced that he was joining their ranks.”538 The perspectives of 
those with a double consciousness, those living in the borderlands, can be instructive to 
those who are still trapped in the liberal humanist “paradigms of justice” of their own 
creation, without knowing what justice is to those experiencing injustice.539 
Another touchpoint of brain death, and a factor in Jahi’s case, is economics. 
Wynter writes of economists as the “secular priesthood” of the U.S. nation-state's 
economic system, now operating at a global neoliberal level. Economics now functions as 
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theology did in the past. The Christian original sin morphed into the evil of natural 
scarcity, and the cure is “ever-increasing economic growth.”540 Wynter’s 
“overrepresented narrative of Homo oeconomicus’ s bio-origin narrative” acts “as if 
isomorphic” with now emergent-referent-we “in the horizon of humanity”. Economics 
are often one of the strongest arguments against keeping people on life support in 
permanent non-sentient states, although many are uncomfortable in admitting to this. 
Homo oeconomicus is overrepresented, and is used in cases like Jahi’s to moralize from 
the point of view of experts—the “symbolic life of Man as Breadwinner and 
accumulator, making decisions for the symbolically dead Welfare Mom/Ghetto ‘Black’ 
Others (including their Trailer Park Trash, Wigger “White” counterparts).”541 And 
economics is the reason many of the poor, undocumented, and people of color have 
worse health based on poor access to health services and unmet social determinants of 
health.542 Deep health disparities continue despite decades of research.543 Yolanda Wilson 
points out a series of reasons for the health disparities, including lower quality healthcare 
                                                            
540 Katherine McKittrick, Sylvia Wynter : On Being Human as Praxis / Katherine Mckittrick, Ed (Durham : 
Duke University Press, 2015), 26. 
541 Underlining mine for emphasis. Wynter, “The Ceremony Found: Towards the Autopoetic 
Turn/Overturn, Its Autonomy of Human Agency and Extraterritoriality of (Self-) Cognition,” 216. 
542 M. van Ryn and S. S. Fu, “Paved with Good Intentions: Do Public Health and Human Service Providers 
Contribute to Race/ Ethnic Disparities in Health,” American Journal of Public Health 93, no. 2 (2003): 
248–55; Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, “Black-White Disparities in Health Care,” Journal of the 
American Medical Association 263 (1990): 2344-46; see Institute of Medicine, Unequal Treatment: 
Confronting Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health Care (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 
2003). 
543 Centers for Disease Control, “Heart Disease Death Rates among Blacks and Whites Aged > 35 Years—
United States, 1968-2015,” March 30, 2018, at https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/67/ss/ss6705a1.html; 
N. Martin, “Black Mothers Keep Dying after Giving Birth. Shalon Irving's Story Explains Why,” National 




compared with white counterparts, and a greater dissatisfaction of care they receive, 
especially related to perception of racial discrimination.544 This translates to increased 
anxiety and lower levels of engagement with the healthcare system. Other factors that 
disproportionately affect the poor are lack of transportation, geographic distance, and 
limited insurance status.545 Mistrust also runs deep since the middle passage onward, 
including an ongoing string of vile experiments and medical mistreatment.546 The 
assumptions of health providers regarding the poor and stereotypes of black female 
welfare-seekers are closely tied to the biases, even if implicit, of eurochristian healthcare 
workers and hospital administrators. Winkfield’s lawyer, Dolan, said to Rachel Aviv in 
her New Yorker article, “They think she’s just some black lady sucking down social 
resources.”547 
Walter Mignolo recognizes one of the goals of Wynter’s decolonial scientia (a 
Renaissance-style science) is to generate 
“knowledge to build communities in which life (in general) has 
priority over economic gains, economic growth, and economic 
development. This is knowledge that will subject economic growth 
to human needs rather than submit human needs to economic 
growth and development.”548 
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The decentering of economics and a recentering of the marginalized are vital, for Wynter, 
in the reimagining of, and liberation for, the human. How this would be accomplished is 
yet to be imagined. Wynter says social uprisings have tremendous links to the 
transformation of knowledge.549 
Stuart Hall suggests the mere continued presence of the subaltern is “a kind of 
passé historical-cultural force, has constantly interrupted, limited, and disrupted 
everything else”.550 Existence is important without necessarily being agents of one’s own 
histories. Winkfield is still there interrupting, limiting, disrupting; colonialism did not 
erase her. Perhaps Jahi set this uprising in motion on her insistence on existing, on living, 
and Winkfield as the trickster, pointing out the hypocrisies within, and the mask of, 
eurochristian morality within bioethics.551 
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CHAPTER 6: THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS IS STILL 
COLONIAL 
The 2010 case Arizona Board of Regents v. Havasupai Tribe has been of great 
interest to bioethicists. The Havasupai nation are a group of approximately 600 
Indigenous people living in a remote part of the Grand Canyon in the state of Arizona. In 
1989, researchers at Arizona State University created the Diabetes Project to study the 
genetic markers for the risk of type 2 diabetes in members of the Havasupai people. In 
general, Native American adults have 2-3 times the rate of diabetes than whites, and more 
than any other race or ethnicity in the United States, with the Havasupai being no 
exception. The researchers secured broad (general) informed consent but allegedly did 
not inform the participants that the remaining blood samples might be used to study 
topics such as schizophrenia, migration, and genetic homogeneity (can imply inbreeding). 
In addition, the DNA was shared with the University of Arizona and subsequently used in 
3-4 student dissertations, and approximately 20 publications. These research projects 
were never disclosed to the tribe but stumbled upon at a lecture attended by a Havasupai 
tribe member. Two lawsuits followed. The second lawsuit, reinstated by the Arizona 
Court of Appeals, lead to a settlement in 2010 of $700,000, funds for a clinic and school, 
and return of the DNA samples. In what follows, I will mine the foundational ethics book 




eurochristian colonial themes in light of the case Arizona Board of Regents v. Havasupai 
Tribe in order to specify how bioethics misses the forest for the trees in relation to 
communities of color. Beauchamp’s ontological assumptions, moral epistemology, and 
socio-economic framing within bioethics will be explored in this chapter and will be 
compared with Leanne Betasamosake Simpson’s Indigenous perspectives of the same 
three categories. And finally, Simpson’s work will be used to elucidate a different 
approach to thinking about the Havasupai case. 
Beauchamp and Childress’ Principles of Biomedical Ethics 
Tom Beauchamp’s and James Childress’ book Principles of Biomedical Ethics 
has been a cornerstone of bioethics since the 1980s. The concepts within the book are 
easily accessible and have practical applicability for teaching healthcare students, for 
ethics consultation within healthcare institutions, and for framing both basic and clinical 
research guidelines. Now in its seventh iteration, the first edition was published in 1979. 
This systematic analysis has grown up alongside the nascent discipline of bioethics itself. 
The authors have fastidiously addressed each proposed concept in light of the highest 
praise and the most vicious critiques alike. The basis of Principles is that certain mid-
level principles can, with further specification, represent a common morality for all 
persons, particularly in reference to bioethics. Beauchamp has written that although 
autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice are stable and deeply resistant to 




enduring list that is unchallengeable.552 The principles stand in as accessible moral 
currency to the high theory of moral philosophy of which Beauchamp questions its utility 
for the practice of bioethics at the bedside.553 
Both Beauchamp and Childress are philosophers with training in Christian 
theology, each holding a degree from Yale Divinity School. Despite their training in 
religion and Childress’ role as a theologian, their approach to bioethics is flexibly secular 
with practical applicability (but not necessarily sufficient) for religious healthcare 
institutions as well. Both authors also serve as fellows of the Hastings Center, which is 
“the oldest independent, nonpartisan, interdisciplinary research institute of its kind in the 
world,” that “addresses fundamental ethical and social issues in health care, science, and 
technology.”554 The influence of these two men is significant on the formation of the 
discipline of bioethics. In this chapter I will focus on Tom Beauchamp, especially 
because of his foundational and ongoing participation in research on human subjects 
through his drafting of the Belmont Report and his work on informed consent in addition 
to co-authoring Principles.555 
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Beauchamp completed graduate school at Yale Divinity School and earned a 
PhD in Philosophy at Johns Hopkins where he studied in depth the works of David 
Hume. He is a retired Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University and Senior 
Research Scholar at the University's Kennedy Institute of Ethics where he spent the 
duration of his career. In his early days at Georgetown he was appointed to the National 
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research to write the Belmont Report at the same time he was drafting the first edition of 
Principles with Childress, in the late 1970s.556 The Belmont Report and Principles 
materialized simultaneously, and as Beauchamp describes, the projects overlapped in 
many ways.557 The well-known bioethics approach of Principlism was borne out of these 
two works. The Belmont Report named beneficence, respect for persons, and justice as its 
three guiding concepts, and Principles added nonmaleficence as the fourth. Beauchamp 
reveals in his article “My Path to Bioethics” his lifelong concern with inequality, racial 
segregation, and other practical public issues such as war, civil disobedience, and 
affirmative action, which propelled him into the profession he chose.558 His professional 
works have focused on David Hume, informed consent/research ethics, moral 
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philosophy, right to die, and animal ethics. Beauchamp ultimately wanted bioethics to be 
multidisciplinary and practical, neither of which philosophy was.559 
While many critiques of Principles have been executed, they will not be 
covered in this dissertation. This analysis does not set out to create a new theory, to settle 
the universalism/relativism debate, nor to discredit the good that has come from 
Beauchamp’s (or Childress’) work. The purpose of this analysis is to move beyond their 
work by framing some of the fundamental concepts within in terms of anti-colonial 
scholarship. Despite the passage of time and of the attempts over the last decades to 
address racism, the United States continues to boast a culture of economic extremes, 
material disparities, and entrenched racism. The intention of this chapter is to uncover the 
insidious way the eurochristian worldview continues to influence and undermine the 
efforts of bioethicists and healthcare providers from within. 
In Principles, Beauchamp and Childress locate the Havasupai case under the 
title of group harm. They deal with issues such as the unethical use of broad consents, the 
risk of stigmatization, threat to identity and land rights, and that researchers may have 
taken advantage of a vulnerable population. All of this is true. But if we, as bioethicists, 
were to analyze this case from an anti-colonial perspective, this is not just a story about 
harms. It is about power and privilege. The fact that genetic research is required at all on 
a population with a severe disease load is, itself, due to the dispossession of the 
Havasupai people from their land, bodies, and minds. The fact that the Western world 






and material progress that defines the massive medical research agendas of academic 
institutions is the same system that is the root of Native American health problems 
including high death rates, diabetes, cardiac and renal disease, substance abuse, and high 
rates of suicide and mental illness. This colonial system of progress and wealth 
accumulation continues to colonize Indigenous people through land control, consumption 
of natural resources, and pollution on reservation land, putting Native Americans at 
increased environmental health risk. The building of massive research centers, the fueling 
of those centers, and the intense competition for research grants and publications all 
radiate from the eurochristian linear evolutionary trajectory while upholding underlying 
harms of resource extraction, pollution, and capitalism-induced inequalities. And on 
stolen Native American land. The very system that wants to “help” the Havasupai are 
part of the system that continues to dispossess them. Bioethics is not outside of the 
eurochristian system, nor is research ethics, despite the intent to “protect”. 
Leanne Simpson 
Simpson is Michi Saagiig Nishnaabeg from the area around the Great Lakes that 
is now called the Northwest Territories, Canada. She is a writer, poet, song writer, 
storyteller, activist, and faculty member at the Dechinta Centre for Research and 
Learning in Denendeh.560 She received her PhD from the University of Manitoba and is a 
member of Alderville First Nation. She has spent most of her adult life learning and 
living Nishnaabeg from the Elders, breathing Nishnaabeg into revival for new 
                                                            





generations. Simpson has written several books, including Dancing on Our Turtle’s Back 
and As We Have Always Done. Simpson has been teaching land-based education for 
twenty years. She was awarded Best Subsequent Book by the Native American and 
Indigenous Studies Association for her book As We Have Always Done, and the 
Outstanding Indigenous Artist at the Peterborough Arts Awards in 2018 for her song 
writing and musical performance.561 
Grounded normativity is the basis of an Indigenous ethic that is rooted in the 
relationship with the land and all living things, is inseparable from these things. Simpson 
knows the recovery of an ethic of grounded normativity is only possible through radical 
resurgence which can be conceptualized through three objectives. One, it sets out to look 
critically at the settler colonialism of the present including capitalism, white supremacy, 
heteropatriarchy, and anti-Blackness. Second, it is an Indigenous refusal of dispossession. 
And third, it is for Indigenous peoples, particularly Nishnaabeg for Simpson, to become 
deeply re-embedded and enmeshed in their own grounded normativity. Her idea of 
resurgence is political, not just cultural. It is a full recovery of Indigenous bodies, minds, 
and land. Understanding the Havasupai case from within an Indigenous framework as 
described by Simpson provides a critical lens for identifying both the deficiencies of 
eurochristian research ethics and for a very different kind of ethic to emerge. 
Beauchamp’s Ontology 
Unlike the Christian metaphysical ontology of Engelhardt and the Darwinian-
Malthusian ontology of Singer, Beauchamp does not wear his ontological assumptions on 
                                                            




his sleeve. What is Beauchamp’s origin story? His empathy toward the oppressed aligns 
with a humanistic approach, while his attendance at Yale School of Divinity is a clue to a 
Christian worldview. In an interview he remarked that as a graduate student he was 
interested in religious studies because his understanding of ethics had come from this 
discipline.562 His academic focus is on philosophical argument including conceptual 
analysis, argumentation, and rational justification, but without reference to the origins of 
rationality (metaphysical, human nature, a priori). The difficulty in pinpointing 
Beauchamp’s worldview is an underlying point of this dissertation – that the 
eurochristian worldview is anonymous and invisible for those of us within it. Whether 
practicing Christians, self-proclaimed humanists, or rational pragmatists, all of these 
traits are eurochristian, and seemingly normal and benign to eurochristians; but not 
necessarily to others. The underlying traits of the eurochristian worldview are 
fundamentally about hierarchy, progress, and temporal, rather than spatial, arrangements. 
One’s orientation to the world is like breathing; we move a certain way in the world 
unconsciously. While Beauchamp does not display as overt and obvious an expression of 
the eurochristian worldview as Engelhardt and Singer, he is eurochristian in his 
theorizing. This is demonstrated in an absence of substantive discourse in the worldviews 
of others, relegating “particular” content-full ethics to the margins of Principlism. The 
overriding project for Beauchamp is to prove the likenesses in people’s moralities, rather 
than to dwell in the differences. His is a matter of intentional focus on shared morality 
                                                            
562 Elizabeth Galt. “An interview with Tom Beauchamp, early bioethics innovator. Voices in Bioethics.” 
http://www.voicesinbioethics.net/voices-in-bioethics/2016/10/11/an-interview-with-tom-beauchamp-early-




rather than the incompatible and worthwhile differences in moralities based on inherent 
ontological thinking.563 Principlism centralizes liberal, rational, and secular thinking over 
differing ontologically driven moralities. What will become clear when it comes to 
research, is that while certain issues such as adequate review boards and informed 
consent promise to adjudicate and prevent many harms to research subjects, they are 
framed within a fundamentally limited eurochristian worldview. From an Indigenous 
perspective, these safeguards only scratch the surface when an Indigenous worldview 
comes in contact with Western institutions. 
Simpson’s Indigenous Ontological Grounding 
The ontology from all Indigenous peoples’ origin stories cannot be represented 
by one person or one nation. What is described here is Simpson’s account of 
Nishnaabeg’s creation stories, which she describes as layered in kinetics, lessons 
embedded in stories, and theory. In her telling, Gzhwe Manidoo is the Creator, “the one 
who loves us unconditionally”.564 But many creation stories exist, from the sky, the 
water, and the ground. Each story connects the past and future with the present 
generations. In her telling, constellations are not only doorways where spirits are 
transported between sky and earth, but they are also symbolically coded mappings that 
remind one of the time for certain ceremonies and story-tellings, through which come 
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enduring theories of Nishnaabeg intelligence.565 Unlike the Christian creation story in 
which everything was made in seven days and handed to humans, in Nishnaabeg creation 
all worlds “were created, collectively, out of struggle, and the process of creating and 
creation was given to [them], not the results of that.”566 This idea of collective struggle is 
the heart of Nishnaabeg origin stories. For example, as Simpson describes, the story of 
what Westerners call the big dipper is one of misadventure and struggle for Ojiig the 
fisher, wolverine, lynx, and otter. It is a story about their “mistakes, struggle, 
mobilization, sacrifice, love, negotiation, and sharing” on their way to gain more sunlight 
from the sky, and is told every year during certain constellational arrangements. This 
kind of origin story, of which there are many, forms the basis of grounded normativity, or 
a place-based system of thinking in which time is circular and everything is in 
relationship with everything else. The land and all of its gifts, the animals and non-living 
things, one’s ancestors and future generations all form a web of reality, informing one’s 
ethics and knowledge systems. The system is what Tink Tinker calls an egalitarian-
collateral image schema, in which mutual respect and reciprocity replaces the hierarchical 
structure of the eurochristian world.567 A spatial orientation replaces the eurochristian 
orientation to time. This is why land is vitally important to Indigenous peoples – it is how 
one orients oneself to the world in relationship and interconnectivity while providing 
what is necessary for life. Land is not a resource to be owned and exploited, but to be 
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respected. Simpson notes that for Indigenous people it is easier to rely on liberal Western 
theories than to struggle for land. But for many Indigenous people the only true 
decolonization is for a return of Indigenous land from the hands of colonizers and their 
heirs.568 
In reflecting on the Havasupai case, the worldview which defines their existence 
relies on their relationship to their land, to a collateral egalitarian organization of the 
world, and to the origin stories that have sustained them for thousands of years. In the 
origin studies performed on their DNA, genetic science challenged the tribe’s identity 
and ontological organization of the world as they view it. Beauchamp and Childress do 
account for the harms of genetic information to a nation’s identity when they write, “to be 
told that the tribe was instead of Asian origin” instead of originating in the Grand Canyon 
was “disorienting and abhorrent.”569 Despite this recognition, they are still imposing a 
universalizing eurochristian ontology on the Havasupai community. They do not dispute 
that genetics is the final word on truth, nor do they allow for other possible origin stories 
as ways of organizing truth. And yet, there are still many Indigenous communities who 
continue to exist in their fullness alongside the colonial world, alongside a colonial 
reality.570 Indigenous communities define their cosmogonies through their origin stories, 
such as the Nishnaabeg creation stories. These stories orient individuals and communities 
not only to the value of respecting all life, but are intrinsic in the way they move through 
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the world. To repeat Sylvia Wynter’s quote, humans cannot pre-exist their origin stories 
any more than a bee, at a purely biological level, can pre-exist its beehive.571 Even the 
origin myth of evolution, according to Wynter, is “part-science, part-myth” in its 
mistaking a biocentric origin with the basis of being human.572 So, ultimately, studying 
only biological origins of a community serves to dehumanize and delegitimize that 
community’s claim to exist how and where they do. Many traditional Native American 
tribes continue to struggle to recover their traditional civilizations. And while many 
participate in Western constructs, the fact remains that oral histories and origin stories are 
fundamental to Indigenous ethics and a resurgence of traditional life and identity. So to 
engage in the repudiation of, for instance, the Bering Strait theory, is an insistence on 
disproving a merely biological ontology, which says nothing about Wynter’s sociogeny, 
the relational narratives that bind human communities and define reality and morality. 
The hypothesis only serves to classify Native Americans as immigrants, potentially 
delegitimizing their connections to territory and furthering the justifications of 
colonialism. Fundamentally, despite science, an oral history of stories that create 
structure, meaning, and relevance for a community should be no more in question than a 
reliance on science to do the same thing. Even so, the Bering Strait theory is heavily 
disputed and is still distant from the “truth”.573 
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Even though the eurochristian narrative is based on scientific fact, it cannot 
explain the how and why, the meaning of life. In the end, what may be more significant is 
how one’s origin stories frame one’s ethics. A eurochristian origin story based on both 
science and the biblical justification of human exploitation of all living things as deep 
ontology even in non-Christians, has little interest overall in the respect and protection of 
all life. Instead, it is destroying the planet and maintaining racial hierarchies. Like 
Wynter, Simpson talks about how human neuropathways are changed by how we live, 
organize, and engage the world. The challenge of the eurochristian is to realize our 
neuropathways form what is believed to be the truth, to be moral; and may differ from 
other societies. An Indigenous worldview of creation as a collaborative struggle and of 
learning from mistakes within a nurturing community sets up a very different kind of 
morality than from a eurochristian creation story that requires us to think of ourselves as 
individual sinners, and at the same time gives us, humans, the charge to subdue the earth 
for our purposes. The stories we live by define who we are. 
Beauchamp’s Moral Epistemology: Inclusion, Common Morality, and Protection from 
Harm 
In exploring Beauchamp’s epistemology, three themes will be examined: 
common morality, virtue ethics, and research ethics. First, the basis of Beauchamp and 
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Childress’ ethical construct begins with a common morality, defined as “a set of universal 
norms shared by all persons committed to morality. It is not merely a morality, in 
contrast to other moralities.”574 For Beauchamp and Childress, “the common morality is 
applicable to all persons in all places, and we rightly judge all human conduct by its 
standards.”575 In its essence, their common morality is universal and rests upon four 
general principles: autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. The authors 
admit that little empirical data support this assertion, but a common morality is the 
foundational assumption upon which they rely. They do allow for consideration of 
“particular” ethics, but these cannot challenge or replace the common morality.576 The 
common morality, for Beauchamp, is always in pursuit of human flourishing and to 
“ameliorate or counteract the tendency for the quality of people’s lives to worsen or for 
social relationships to disintegrate.”577 Beauchamp writes, ”In every well-functioning 
society norms are in place to prohibit lying, breaking promises, causing bodily harm, 
stealing, fraud, the taking of life, the neglect of children, and failures to keep 
contracts.”578 
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Beauchamp is a positivist in his assertion that all persons who are dedicated to 
the objectives of morality share the same fundamental values. He proposes that with a 
well-designed study this could be demonstrated. He is also a constructivist in his 
recognition of the capacity of particular moralities, such as Talmudic norms, Catholic 
casuistry, and professional values, to be legitimately different and still loyal to the 
objectives of morality. Beauchamp is a pragmatist in his justification of common 
morality. His four principles are practical in their usefulness at the bedside through 
specification of their meanings. Specification is the narrowing down of a norm into the 
who, when, why, and how. In other words, specification adds content to the principles. 
Yet, despite agreement on the general level of principles, specification will bring about 
genuine incongruities between worldviews. If particular moralities differently specify the 
common morality, is it still common? Who breaks the tie? For the Havasupai research 
protocol, the subjects consented to research based on an idea of beneficence for the health 
of the community. The researchers may have agreed with this, but also may have defined 
beneficence as something different such as to further science. 
From an anti-colonial perspective, several problems arise with common 
morality. First, how are the parameters of human flourishing and social order 
conceptually defined? And by whom? The power to define lies in the hands of health care 
institutions, beside practitioners, and bioethicists (along with law and public policy) and 
to deem whether the patient, family member, or research subject does indeed have human 
flourishing or societal order in mind. Second, when bioethicists talk about a well-




lying, breaking promises, causing bodily harm, neglecting children, and failing to keep 
contracts, these are things that continue to be endured by the Indigenous peoples of Turtle 
Island. How well a society is functioning depends on who you ask within that society. 
Beauchamp does recognize this. He writes, “the common morality does not now, and has 
never in fact, included such a provision of equal moral consideration for all individuals – 
although this scope change could become part of the common morality.”579 Yet, the 
problem with increasing the scope of equal consideration is the goal of subsuming all 
persons under a broader common morality causes another issue. For Indigenous peoples, 
inclusion is erasure. The Native American civilizing project of the last several centuries 
has been an exercise in their erasure through the coercive measures of “inclusion” in 
eurochristian economics, education, health care, and political systems. Civilization has 
been an attempt to destroy Indigenous life. And third, social order, or as Beauchamp 
defines it the norms necessary “to ameliorate or counteract the tendency for the quality of 
people’s lives to worsen or for social relationships to disintegrate,” unless in an 
egalitarian society, always subjugates some people at the expense of others. Without 
defining who we mean by society, a norm that keeps safe some of society at the expense 
of others should not be an objective of common morality. 
Moral character is a second epistemological concept that is highlighted in 
Principles. It is written, “all persons with normal moral capacities can cultivate the 
character traits of chief importance to morality.”580 The virtues and vices spelled out by 
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Aristotle and expanded upon by Thomas Aquinas are Western epistemology. Virtue 
ethics are derived from Aristotle, who philosophized at length about excesses and deficits 
of human virtues only a select few could cultivate.581 Aristotle knew that “happiness 
obviously needs the presence of external goods as well, since it is impossible, or at least 
no easy matter, to perform noble actions without resources.”582 He also notes the 
condition of luck in prosperity which provides for more opportunities to be virtuous. The 
healthcare professional and the bioethicist are privileged to have the luxury of creating 
moral standards that are “reasonable and fair-minded,” “sufficiently advanced morally,” 
and with a “renewable sense of progress and achievement.”583 And while no one would 
argue against a virtuous physician or nurse, the prioritizing of “good behavior” causes a 
moral hierarchy where those with resources and power uphold the very values they have 
defined, while blaming those who are structurally oppressed and impoverished for their 
own suffering. The problem is with the eurochristian choices of priority and focus. 
Survival and morality are only attainable together by the strongest of wills.584 
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Consider the words of a Nazi concentration camp survivor, Viktor Frankl, who 
wrote that those who survived the camps were not necessarily the most moral. 
“On the average, only those prisoners could keep alive who, after 
years of trekking from camp to camp, had lost all scruples in their 
fight for existence; they were prepared to use every means, honest 
and otherwise, even brutal force, theft, and betrayal of their 
friends, in order to save themselves. We who have come back, by 
the aid of many lucky chances or miracles – whatever one may 
choose to call them—we know: the best of us did not return.”585 
While this is an extreme example of the pressures upon a person’s morality, values 
change depending on one’s circumstances. Virtue is easy when one has plentiful 
resources and feels safe. The issues with setting up a common morality lie in its 
exclusivity, its detachment from many persons’ realities, and most importantly, the 
reasons for the depressed realities of many racialized and ethnic groups. 
Perhaps a common morality exists, but it does not seem that appeals to virtue 
confronts racism and disparity. The common morality includes both standards for action 
and recognition of desired characteristics. It holds everyone equally accountable for a 
eurochristian morality, while the forces of colonialism, racism, and the epistemological 
erasure continue to situate groups of people in survival and resistance modes. What is 
eurochristian morality to people who are racialized, impoverished, and live with the 
stories of slavery and genocide passed down from their grandparents and great 
grandparents? And then those victims of a racist and colonial system are called evil, lazy, 
self-destructive, criminal, and irresponsible by their oppressors. Virtue ethics is not about 
giving the oppressed a bar to reach. Instead, it keeps them marginalized and labeled 
                                                            




negatively in the continuation of colonial power. This is not Beauchamp’s intention, nor 
is it any of us who are eurochristian. Yet, the insidious nature of colonialism continues on 
within us. My critique of Beauchamp is not that universals do not exist, but refocusing on 
the particulars, the moral differences in worldviews, would be a more fruitful way to 
address racism and racial inequality. 
Third, research on human subjects has required a moral response by bioethics. 
Research is a human endeavor. For the West it has become a site of not only hope and 
cure, but of individual profit, of capitalist ventures, of competition, and of exploitation of 
human subjects. Since the 1970s Beauchamp has been involved in the ethical response to 
such egregious research protocols as the Tuskegee syphilis study, as well as the 
awareness that research policies at the NIH were “morally and legally inadequate.”586 He 
has been a strong voice for research subjects since his writing of The Belmont Report in 
1978, and over the last decades his work has continued to attempt to clarify and improve 
informed consent in both research and clinical practice. He has lamented the lack of 
movement of informed consent toward a more autonomous and educated permission by a 
patient rather than the legal and institutional policies that continue to drive a diminished 
utility of the concept. 
Human subjects are protected by institutional review boards, consisting of a 
group of professionals who review every research proposal within their institution. 
Subjects are also protected through the process of consent and required to give their 
                                                            





permission to engage in the trial once they have been given adequate information 
regarding the risks, benefits, and details of the trial. Special groups of potential human 
subjects are considered vulnerable such as prisoners, pregnant women, children, the 
cognitively impaired, and those who have situational vulnerability and are more 
susceptible to undue influence or coercion. Issues of intrinsic vulnerability such as 
ethnicity, income, education, literacy, housing, and legal status were all factors in the 
Havasupai nation. These factors and the poorer health status of the Havasupai have 
largely been caused by colonialism, past and present. Do eurochristians have special 
duties to groups that are vulnerable because of colonialism? But defining the Havasupai 
as vulnerable is only part of the equation. How can Native Americans be seen as 
sovereign and vulnerable at the same time? 
Beauchamp also deals with the ethical problems of the Havasupai case, listing it 
(with Childress) under the title of group harm in Principles, and as an inappropriate use 
of broad consent in his article Informed Consent: Its History, Meaning, and Present 
Challenges.587 His discussions deal with some of the problems associated with the case 
such as the abuse/miscommunications with broad consents, the investigation of highly 
sensitive and potentially discriminatory personal and group knowledge, and that 
researchers may have taken advantage of a vulnerable population. All of this is true. But 
what Beauchamp and Childress do not deal with is the WHY. Why does a high rate of 
diabetes exist in Native American communities? Why have the Havasupai acquired the 
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status of “vulnerable”? Also, the description that they are uneducated and require 
simplified consent, while well-intentioned based on the concept of true informed consent, 
compares the knowledge traditions of the Havasupai with Western education. This 
assumption of the Havasupai as “uneducated” harkens back to the descriptions of the 
missionaries’ need to educate Native American children in boarding schools in order to 
civilize and assimilate them. To illustrate this point, at a recent conference, the Lakota 
activist Robert Cross refused a Western education by running away in the 6th grade from 
the boarding school where he was treated poorly. He refused to lose his Indigenous 
knowledge, and instead “educated the hell out of myself about you all.”588 Many 
traditional Native American communities still exist, and struggle to recover their 
traditional knowledges and seek self-rule and freedom from colonial constructs. Often 
what is perceived as uneducated is a resistance to eurochristian epistemologies. But 
Beauchamp does not identify this tension, between being “uneducated” or having 
different epistemologies altogether. In sum, while Arizona State University did harm the 
Havasupai in multiple ways, the bioethical framing of this case as only one of harming a 
vulnerable population is limited in its view. The respect for Havasupai epistemology is 
absent from the conversation. Despite Beauchamp’s sensitive review of the case, research 
ethics focuses on vulnerability (which is colonial in its cause) and refrains from meeting 
the Havasupai on non-stigmatized and equally valid epistemological ground. It does not 
stop the cycle of oppression, erasure, and assimilation. The harm that Beauchamp left out 
                                                            





in his analysis is the complete dispossession of Indigenous people from their sovereignty, 
particularly in the handling of the research protocol. An anti-colonial perspective of 
Indigenous epistemology provides a different approach to research ethics. 
Nishnaabeg Epistemology: Grounded Normativity 
Simpson explains the Nishnaabeg intelligence system as “a series of 
interconnected and overlapping algorithms—stories, ceremonies, and the land itself are 
procedures for solving the problems of life.”589 “Living is a creative act, with self-
determined making or producing at its core.” Ethics and values are not a set of protocols 
or laws or series of teachings as they are in Western thought. They are more fluid, “a 
series of complex interconnected cycling processes that make up a nonlinear, overlapping 
emergent and responsive network of relationships of deep reciprocity, intimate and global 
interconnection and interdependence, that spirals across time and space.”590 What has 
been lost is not just land, but the intelligence from which morality arises from Indigenous 
grounded normativity that colonialism, including neoliberalism, land acquisition, and 
settlement, has tried to eliminate. Being Nishnaabeg is not just a “quaint cultural 
difference that makes one interesting”, but a different way of being in the world.591 
Simpson, along with other Indigenous scholars, talk about an ethics of grounded 
normativity. Glen Coulthard, in Red Skins White Masks, defines grounded normativity as 
“the modalities of Indigenous land-connected practices and longstanding experiential 
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knowledge that inform and structure our ethical engagements with the world and our 
relationships with human and nonhuman others over time.”592 The foundation of place on 
interrelated practices, knowledge, and ethics are what, for Simpson, “construct the 
Nishnaabeg world”, and is the “closest thing to Coulthard’s grounded normativity”.593 
She cites the seven grandmother teachings of the Seven Fires, which include “ethics of 
noninterference and the practice of self-determination, the practice of consent, the art of 
honesty, empathy, caring, sharing , and self-sufficiency…”594 She describes the grounded 
normativity of Nishnaabeg people like this: 
“our economy, fully integrated with spirituality and politics, was 
intensely local within a network of Indigenous internationalism 
that included plant and animal nations, the Great Lakes, the St. 
Lawrence River, and nonhuman beings and other Indigenous 
nations.”595 
Compared to the categorical confines of common morality, Nishnaabeg values are of 
profound freedom and acceptance of individual self-determination within a network of 
respect. The Nishnaabeg world and knowledge system continues alongside the colonial 
world, and within it there is no room for seeking the colonizer’s acknowledgement or 
approval.596 Yet, the colonial world continues to work to minimize the complexity of, and 
overall shrink, Indigenous knowledge systems.597 In Beauchamp’s work on common 
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morality, the “particulars,” often fall under the rubric of “culture”. This designation is 
problematic for people and communities of color. As Simpson explains, culture is 
compatible with the dominant eurochristian world; it can be subsumed within it and co-
opted by liberal recognition. What she, as an Indigenous scholar is interested in, is not 
compatibility with, recognition by, or reconciliation with eurochristians; this would 
signify continued assimilation and erasure. Nor is she interested in a replication of 
eurochristian anti-queerness or anti-Blackness. What she is interested in is full political 
resurgence of Indigenous communities and the recovery of land.598 A common morality, 
like the notions of multiculturalism and inclusivity, tend to minimize the very real 
differences in people’s values and behaviors based on fundamentally different 
worldviews. Beauchamp and Childress say are looking for the most consistent truth, or 
coherence.599 But what they are actually discussing are eurochristian values. 
Simpson also has an Indigenous perspective on research. She tells of the story 
of the first Nishnaabeg intellectual, Nanabush, as also being the first researcher. 
Nanabush traveled the world twice, not to gain natural resources or to “help those less 
fortunate,” but to understand Nishnaabeg’s place in the world.600 His research 
methodology, which is Nishnaabeg research methodology, is “through doing or making, 
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relationship, visiting, singing, dancing, storytelling, experimenting, observing, reflecting, 
mentoring, ceremony, dreaming, and visioning as ways of generating knowledge.” 
Nishnaabeg research ethics centers around “consent, reciprocity, respect, renewal, 
relationship.”601 As she describes, Nanabush is accompanied his second trip around the 
world by wolf, who brought a different lens, formed different relationships, and 
experienced the world differently than Nanabush would have done alone. Their travels 
demonstrate a contextual learning of internationalism through which there is sharing of 
technology, stories, and relationship to the earth, not just relationship to other humans. 
Their story stresses the importance of acknowledging one's presence and respect when on 
another's land. Their focus is on creating relationship through reciprocity, not on gaining 
academic knowledge through a minimized consent process for the appropriation of 
Native American knowledge and bodies. Where in the process of IRBs are Native 
Americans protected from appropriation of ideas and material possessions of people of 
color by the colonizer? The appropriation of Havasupai genetic material for purposes of 
research agendas and researcher advancement is one-sided appropriation. There is a 
Western assumption that joining the medical and wider world of progress and 
consumption is more desirable for people of color than their current situation. If “we” 
could only get “them” to trust us. Native Americans and other persons of color have been 
hearing empty promises from white people for centuries. Trust is the white person’s 
problem, only to be earned through anti-racist and anti-colonial praxis. Where is the 






Indigenous communities can assess outside ideas, contracts, and technology from within 
one’s worldview and values. She has a practice of asking a series of critical questions 
before adopting an outside theory including “Where does this theory come from? What is 
the context?…What is their relationship to community and the dominant power 
structures?...How is it useful within the context of my own people?”602 Simpson’s 
Indigenous radical resurgence includes “a rebellious transformation in how we conduct 
research, whom we cite as experts, and how our thinking is framed and ultimately takes 
place.”603 
To perform research under the values of autonomy, justice, nonmaleficence, and 
beneficence will look very different from those conducted through Nishnaabeg values of 
reciprocity, respect, renewal, and relationship.604 For Native Americans, seeking some 
scientific universal truth gets in the way of the more fluid Indigenous maintenance of 
harmony and balance.605 For instance, in Indigenous peacemaking practices, the primary 
goal is not to investigate the facts of the case and punish perpetrators of crimes; it is to 
engage the wrongdoer with the community and the victim, to collectively address the 
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imbalances the act created in the community.606 It is about maintaining relationship, 
reciprocity, and harmony, not discovering the latest universal theory or scientific finding. 
It is not up to Western bioethicists to assume a common morality for everyone. 
It is up to particular communities, such as the Havasupai, to decide whether to engage 
with these Western theories, by asking whether and how these theories are relevant or 
helpful to one’s own practices. De La Torre instructs that 
“We must reject any ethical framework or analysis that either 
insists on speaking for the marginalized, while refusing to 
understand our social location or, worse paternalistically believes 
that its so-called universal truths or worldview construction 
automatically includes us.607And for De La Torre, truth, beyond 
the historical experiences and the social location where individuals 
act as social agents, cannot be ascertained, whether said truth exists 
or not.”608 
Western research ethics arose in response to egregious studies being carried out on bodies 
of color, setting out to balance the benefits and harms to individuals with future benefits 
for society. It was a start. 
Socioeconomics of Beauchamp: The Social Lottery and Justice as Redistribution 
Within Beauchamp and Childress’ Principles, three socioeconomic 
manifestations of eurochristian thinking are present: their particular framing of justice, 
the trope of scarcity, and the relegation of racism to the past. First, a tendency exists in 
medicine and bioethics to downplay the reason for the fundamental inequality and 
                                                            
606 For more on Indigenous peacemaking, see Wanda D McCaslin, Justice as Healing: Indigenous Ways 
(Living Justice Press St. Paul, MN, 2005). And Kay Pranis, Barry Stuart, and Mark Wedge, Peacemaking 
Circles: From Crime to Community (Living Justice Press, 2003). 
607 De La Torre, Latina/O Social Ethics: Moving Beyond Eurocentric Moral Thinking, 62. 




consider justice in terms of redistribution. Much of Beauchamp and Childress’ chapter on 
justice focuses on the models of distributive justice, such as egalitarianism and 
utilitarianism. These are models that depend on the nation-state, also a colonial 
enterprise, to redistribute the resources in an unfair capitalist system against the influence 
of the rich and powerful. From within this essentially hierarchical system, Beauchamp 
and Childress argue for the right to health care based on collective social protection and 
fair opportunity for “those with unpredictable misfortune.”609 Rearranging healthcare 
resources might be helpful to a point, but it does not challenge the overall neoliberal 
structure and its fundamental inequalities. This is engaging in the pragmatic heuristic of 
inequality, the liberal interest in justice from the eurochristian standpoint. Well-meaning 
liberals actually pull more Indigenous peoples into the nation-state. For Simpson, 
Western liberal theories can only be useful if considered within grounded normativity. 
The provision of welfare through social determinants of health are not bad 
goals. But from an anti-colonial view, this misses the forest for the trees. For Indigenous 
people especially, it is not a meager monthly check in the mail or an underfunded Indian 
Health System, “gifts” from one’s genocidal colonizers, that is ultimately desired. The 
current state of Native American health with the high prevalence of diabetes, drug and 
alcohol addiction, and shorter life spans reflects how seriously (or not) the federal 
                                                            




government is taking their fiduciary duty based on the Supreme Court trust relationship 
within a colonial system.610 
A second problem with Beauchamp and Childress’ ideas of justice is that they 
use the language of a human lottery, and of the concepts of unfortunate and unfair in their 
analysis of justice. They identify the problematic nature of these concepts, and state that 
“fair opportunity without reference to welfare makes for an inadequate account of 
justice.”611 But this discussion is void of the elements of power and oppression that create 
the need for fair opportunity and welfare in the first place. Beauchamp and Childress 
define the lotteries as both biological and social.612 One’s genetics, varying abilities and 
disabilities, may be truly about chance. But the social aspects of one’s life are not a role 
of the dice; they are about how society organizes itself. 
Third, Beauchamp and Childress assert that justice is the most important 
principle in the book.613 They mention in the chapter on justice that inequalities “are 
often distributed by social institutions that can be structured to explicitly to reduce 
inequalities.”614 How this is to be accomplished, especially when healthcare has become a 
business, is not addressed. Unfortunately, their discussion on racial disparities accounts 
for only two pages of the entire justice chapter, and the percentage of scholars of color 
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cited in the same chapter are roughly 7% of the citations. While institutions have the 
power to make decisions to prioritize the poor, it is those very institutions that have 
joined the ranks of Western capitalism and succumbed to Adam Smith’s invisible 
hand.615 
And a finally, justice is framed by Beauchamp and Childress in Principles as 
one of the four main principles of common morality. Why is the suffering of black, 
brown, and red bodies and minds “balanced” with autonomy and beneficence? Why does 
bioethics not hold a preferential option for the marginalized? Beauchamp and Childress 
describe the tradeoffs between autonomy and the public good, asserting that autonomous 
choices can be overridden by public health concerns—those that harm innocent others—
such as the dumping of toxins in the water supply or the quarantining of persons with 
infectious diseases, and those that require scarce resources. Are not the health disparities 
among people of color based on their history of and continued oppression considered the 
harming of innocent others? Working from a position of scarcity, would not the 
continued harm of people of color justify their care over expensive cancer drugs and 
cardiac transplants? People of color, including Native Americans, African Americans, 
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and Latinx find themselves clawing their way back to health against the pressures of 
continued racism and the colonial project. 
The idea of scarcity is also part of the worldview of eurochristian America. The 
mythical “limited resources” argument undergirds the need for efficiencies, cost-
effectiveness, rationing, budgeting, and prioritizing. Beauchamp and Childress explain 
about these constraints that “it seems unfair and unacceptable to allow forms of cost-
effective rationing that adversely affect or ignore levels of health among the most 
disadvantaged populations, in effect worsening their condition.” If there was a scarcity, 
this author would be in agreement. But, how does one confirm scarcity exists outside of 
the fact that the top 10% of people in the U.S. own 72% of America’s wealth?616 
Inherited wealth and the exponential accumulation of capital, in addition to what Thomas 
Picketty calls “hypermeritocracy” by supermanagers who make a fortune out of high 
incomes, are large contributors to the increasing inequalities in the United States. 617 The 
Malthusian trope of scarcity is a myth. While many feel a scarcity, there is no real 
scarcity, only a perverse economy. Rationing and efficiency measures in the face of 
extreme wealth inequality is a poor strategy. As Wynter has opined, Homo economicus is 
overrepresented in eurochristian society, and economists have become the “secular 
priesthood”.618 In Native American worldview, the values of harmony, balance, and 
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generosity protect communities from scarcity. Tinker highlights a Native American value 
of generosity as the common community-building ceremony in which everyone gives 
away their possessions to others. Compared to societies who value those with the most 
material wealth, Native American communities value those who give the most away.619 
But for those living on reservations such as the Havasupai, the loss of arable land and 
water sources and the erasure of Indigenous knowledge for self-sufficiency through 
genocide and boarding schools inhibit their ability to exist in harmony and abundance 
with the living world around them. 
A third example of eurochristian thinking in Principles is the relegation of 
oppression and racism to the past. In a discussion concerning the moral status of persons, 
Beauchamp and Childress recognize the perils of using moral status to define classes of 
individuals. They also argue that without norms around moral status, practices of slavery 
and human research subject exploitation would continue to thrive. Yet, they subtly locate 
the substandard treatment of racial groups in the past, for instance, “…some racial groups 
were treated in the United States as if they had little or no moral status by some of the 
finest centers of biomedical research in the world, and by sponsors of the research.”620 
The hazard with framing the “lack” of moral status of African-Americans as a thing of 
the past (as if the passing of law solves for this) blinds the reader to the continued reality 
that despite attaining “moral status,” people of color are not treated equally with white 
counterparts. It could easily be argued that in the Havasupai studies, the research 
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participants were treated as if possessing an inferior moral status by a fine center of 
research. To be sure, Beauchamp and Childress are concerned with the inequalities in 
healthcare today, but their language obscures the continued colonial penchant for 
assigning moral status based on skin color. Beauchamp is thoroughly entangled in a 
liberal eurochristian socioeconomic world, where justice is at best a limited redistribution 
of resources based on a capitalist state, driven by an economics of scarcity, and unaware 
of the depth of continued racism and colonialism within bioethics. 
Socioeconomics of an Indigenous Community 
For Simpson, Indigenous freedom is something very different than living in the 
capitalistic fear-based scarcity of the eurochristian world. She explains freedom this way: 
What does it mean for me, as an Nishnaabekewe , to live in 
freedom? I want my great-grandchildren to be able to fall in love 
with every piece of our territory. I want their bodies to carry with 
them every story, every song, ever piece of poetry hidden in our 
Nishnaabeg language. I want them to be able to dance through 
their lives with joy. I want them to live without fear because they 
know respect, because the know in their bones what respect feels 
like. I want them to live without fear because they have a pristine 
environment with clean waterways that will provide them with the 
physical and emotional sustenance to uphold their responsibilities 
to the land, their families, their communities, and their nations. I 
want them to be valued, heard, and cherished by our 
communities.621 
As Simpson tells it, her people were travelers. Their system of government was 
intermittent and changing, like “breathing – a rhythm of contract and release.”622 Leaders 
chosen by the people would be appointed for a period of time or an important decision, 
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and then would disengage when finished. Children were full citizens, and everyone’s 
self-determination was respected. For her, the prime minister (or president) and the 
nation-state are inconsequential to the full life of Nishnaabeg people.623 No matter 
whether the government is democratic or republican, for Indigenous people it is still an 
oppressive settler-colonial nation-state. Justice for many Indigenous peoples is about 
sovereignty and freedom from colonial oppression. 
Capitalism is a driving force for this oppression. The history of America is one 
of the removal of Native Americans from their land, resource extractivism, and 
accumulation of capital. The dispossession of Indigenous peoples was necessary for 
colonizers to profit and the Americas to thrive. This dispossession is described by 
Simpson as the removal of bodies from the land, yes. But also the destruction of their 
ethics of grounded normativity, and with that followed the current state of poverty, 
murder, addiction, mental illness, and Christianization of Indigenous spirits. But this is 
not about gaining land back for resource extraction or profit. She describes that “the 
opposite of dispossession is not possession, it is deep, reciprocal, consensual 
attachment.”624 She explains how her ancestors “accumulated networks of meaningful, 
deep, fluid, intimate collective and individual relationships of trust,” not capital. 
Resources were shared. Everyone was cared for through these relationships and through 
gift giving and regular redistribution. In fact, excess, greed, private property, and 
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disproportionate profits were considered mistakes in this economy.625 Capitalism and 
global “neoliberalism provide just enough ill-conceived programming and “funding” to 
keep us in a constant state of crisis, which inevitably they market as our fault.”626 She 
notes that Canada would like to put aside the past and “start a new relationship on 
Canada's unchallenged jurisdiction over the land.”627 She worries that if Indigenous 
peoples do not claim and revitalize their own intelligence systems and grounded 
normativity, they will continue to be victimized by dispossession of the state. From an 
Indigenous perspective, Beauchamp and Childress’ chapter on justice outlining state-led 
distributive justice within the confines of a capitalistic healthcare system will not affect 
the dispossession of Indigenous peoples overall. It is a band-aid on a gaping wound. 
In comparison to the eurochristian trope of scarcity, Indigenous worlds focus on 
abundance. Considering the vast wealth in the Americas, it makes one question this fear-
based thinking. Simpson explains how “Our knowledge system, the education system, the 
economic system, and the political system of the Mihi Saagiig Nishnaabeg were designed 
to promote more life…to generate life of all living things.”628 Besides an abundance of 
life, the idea of abundance is reflected in “the idea that the earth gives and sustains all 
life, that “natural resources” are not “natural resources” at all, but gifts from Aki, the 
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land.”629 If one respects the earth, it will reciprocate with abundance. Rules of economy 
can be seen in the guidelines of the Honorable Harvest as explained by Robin Wall 
Kimmerer in Braiding Sweetgrass: “Never take the first. Never take the last. Take only 
what you need. Take only that which is given. Never take more than half. Leave some for 
others. Harvest in a way that minimizes harm. Use it respectfully. Never waste what you 
have taken. Share.”630 
The downplay of racism in the present by eurochristians, Beauchamp included, 
probably affects Indigenous peoples most acutely. But as Simpson points out, it is 
dispossession more than discrimination alone that has attempted to destroy Indigenous 
communities. The goal of colonialism has always been their erasure, whether through 
genocide or assimilation. The Western myth is that the colonizers were successful. But as 
Audra Simpson said in Mohawk Interruptus, the fact that colonialism still survives in 
settler-colonial form indicates it “fails at what it is supposed to do: eliminate Indigenous 
people; take all their land; absorb them into a white, property-owning body politic.”631 
Many Westerners believe Wounded Knee was the final downfall of Native Americans. 
But in The Heartbeat of Wounded Knee: Native America from 1890 to the Present, David 
Treuer outlines the rich and resilient histories of the Native Americans since the 
Massacre of Wounded Knee. This resilience can be seen in Simpson’s methodology 
which she calls “kwe”, which is to be unapologetically herself, including her refusal of 
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colonial domination, heteropatriarchy, and pressure to be tamed by whiteness in the 
academy; in essence, a refusal to disappear.632 
An Indigenous Approach to the Havasupai Research Case 
When viewed through the lens of Leanne Simpson, the deficiencies of research 
ethics stand out. The Havasupai trusted a research center and its faculty, and the “treaty” 
was broken yet again.633 The ethics system broke down. But even so, the system at its 
best only requires a signed consent form, and, in theory, a certain level of understanding 
by research subjects. What if the Indigenous ontologies, epistemologies, and 
socioeconomic factors had all been accounted for when entering into the contract? What 
if an Indigenous research methodology had been used? What if the research was carried 
out with reciprocity, respect, renewal, and relationship? Most eurochristian researchers 
would find this painful, to build relationships over time and to do research the Indigenous 
way, in part because of their Western ontological orientation to time rather than place and 
relationship. Eurochristians tend to be rushed, goal-oriented, and impatient because of 
this frantic pursuit of progress and profit. As for reciprocity, how can the assault of 
colonialism be redeemed through an Indigenous research ethics? Should the research 
centers have given more back than they took? Despite the errors made by the Institutional 
Review Board and the lax use of a broad consent form, had the researchers slowed down, 
formed relationships with the Havasupai, and partnered with them, the errors would 
likely have never been made. 
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Research institutes are largely unfamiliar with Indigenous research 
methodologies such as those in Decolonizing Methodologies by Linda Tuhiwai Smith, 
and are driven by largely eurochristian Western-educated people and institutions.634 For 
research ethics to cease being colonial and racist, it must start with reading and learning 
from the epistemologies of different communities. What would bioethics look like if it 
were about reciprocity, balance, and gratitude, not just for humans, but for all living 
beings? 
As for Beauchamp, he is on the liberal side of eurochristian thought. This 
thought is still limited to a certain construct that continues to discriminate against people 
of color and dispossess Native Americans through a hierarchical and linear ontology, a 
universalizing epistemology, and a capitalist and extractivist economy. The relegation of 
an Indigenous worldview to a “particular” or a “culture” serves to subsume them under a 
eurochristian banner that means inclusion and “multiculturalism” instead of sovereignty 
and respect for self-determination. The idea of sovereignty is difficult to shore up with 
the Havasupai as “ignorant and uneducated” for Westerners. The idea of vulnerabilities, 
while true in some sense, is a product of colonialism; but this accountability is rarely 
acknowledged. 
A different approach for research ethics would be to either stop using Native 
American and other groups for research altogether, or to drastically change one’s 
thinking. This change would require collaborative struggles with study subjects, of 
forming relationships, and of offering significant reciprocity in the form of land. It would 
                                                            




be turning the mirror back on oneself to recognize complicity with the eurochristian 
system and its continued oppressions, and perhaps changing fundamentally one’s 
methodology for living and working in this world. It would be an acknowledgement that 
science does not address the stories that frame communal organization and ethics. And it 
would be to stop trying to fit Indigenous peoples into Western conceptions of justice, 
virtue, beneficence, and non-maleficence. Instead, bioethics must listen to Indigenous 






CHAPTER 7: BIOETHICS INTERRUPTED 
In this dissertation I interrogate eurochristian bioethics through anti-colonial 
critique and the engagement of anti-colonial scholars and activists who provide rich, 
contextual, historical, and practical ethical counter-perspectives. I emphasize that, in 
general, we, as bioethicists (and medical practitioners), take for granted the paradigms of 
Western morality without questioning the deeper impressions of the unconscious but 
ubiquitous eurochristian worldview, including racism. My project opens up the 
discussion between mainstream bioethicists and anti-colonial scholars and activists in 
order to envision robust anti-colonial bioethics practice, scholarship, and policy. This 
marriage between bioethics and anti-colonialism is imperative if bioethicists, as agents of 
medical morality, take issues of race, justice, and equity seriously. How bioethicists 
grapple with the eurochristian tropes of scarcity, inequity, and the pursuit of progress and 
profit both conceptually and practically will require fundamental challenges to deeply 
held “truths,” to the centers of authority, and to business as usual. Partnering with, and 
often taking the lead from, anti-colonial scholars and activists, would fuel a joint 
enterprise in imagining a bioethics that prioritizes abundance, collective struggle, 
reciprocity, life, emancipatory praxis, and self-determination. 
The ontological assumptions, the moral epistemology, and the socioeconomic 




and Beauchamp’s bioethics. While their writings are neither as overtly violent as Kant’s 
description of how to whip a slave, or as obviously complicit in colonialism as was Mill 
in his job as an administrator for the East India Company, they do share the traits of a 
Christian or secular exceptionalism, a disregard of their own positionality within their 
works (with the exception of Engelhardt), an idealistic view of ethics that may consider 
race only peripherally, and ultimately an active participation in the economic and power 
privileges that comes with being middle-class white male scholars (this includes myself, 
minus the male gender). Rather than a personal attack, this assertion means they hold a 
particular point of view that is attached to a long history of racism, genocide, and 
exploitation. To revisit Foucault, the errors of some of the first bioethicists are not merely 
conceptual or theoretical. The effects of these errors imprint onto the bodies and minds of 
humans, such as Jahi McMath and her family, 6,500 undocumented Latinx immigrants 
with ESRD, and the Havasupai Nation. Engelhardt, Singer, and Beauchamp, like their 
precursors Kant, Mill, Rauschenbusch, Niebuhr, and Fletcher, are also highly influential 
in continuing the colonial-racial discourse despite the quality of their scholarship and the 
moral fibers of their beings. 
For bioethicists with a eurochristian worldview (which is most of us), the 
concepts of virtue, reason, universalization, utility, and social justice are seductive. They 
conform to embedded worldviews and confirm one’s identity. They can serve to either 
solidify one’s Christian roots, or appeal to one’s secular proclivities. Who can argue 
against Hippocrates’ “First do no harm?” What kind of person would feel no compassion 




whose picture went viral on social media? Who would be against fighting for the 
economic justice in and of “developing nations?” But underlying eurochristian morality 
is an insidious worldview that directs the Western world unconsciously and insidiously, 
even in the ostensibly most moral of places. My work demonstrates a method for 
unpacking colonial concepts such as Aristotelian virtue, Rawlsian fairness, Kant’s reason, 
Mill’s utilitarianism, and Beauchamp and Childress’ universal Principlism using anti-
colonial scholarship and activism. Examining the categories of ontological assumptions, 
moral epistemology, and socioeconomic factors of the foundational text books of three 
influential bioethics scholars has put into relief the eurochristian nature of this 
scholarship. The main eurochristian/colonial themes exposed include the ontological 
assumptions of biblical and Darwinian origin stories including linear thinking, a temporal 
orientation, pursuit of progress, and the impulse to categorize living things along a 
hierarchy; the moral epistemologies of science, rationality, modernity, universalization, 
utility, and humanism; and the socioeconomic organization of society including a scarcity 
mentality, justice only as redistribution, charity, capitalism, state-centered 
exceptionalism, and libertarianism. The worldviews and works of anti-colonial scholars 
provide contrast to, and put into perspective, the eurochristian colonial themes of Western 
bioethics. Great harms underlying the mask of eurochristian morality is the continued 
marginalization of communities of color, ethnicities, genders, sexual orientations, and 
socioeconomic backgrounds. 
On the margins of mainstream academic bioethics scholarship and public ethics 




sometimes solidarity. This body of Latinx, Indigenous, Black diaspora, and other 
communities’ knowledges, including that of Miguel De La Torre, Sylvia Wynter, and 
Leanne Simpson, recognizes the limits to classical Western ethics through many lenses 
including postcolonialism, anti-colonialism, feminism, womanism, queer ethics, 
liberative ethics, anti-capitalism, and anti-globalism. My dissertation underscores the 
significance of their works for bioethics and healthcare in general, especially in 
addressing the dearth of praxis and scholarship on the continued issues of racism and 
racial inequality in healthcare. Bioethics as a discipline is stuck in its own colonial-racial 
discourse, and this dissertation provides a transformative way forward. I have exposed 
the discipline to the concept of anti-colonialism and to three specific anti-colonial 
scholars of color as the infrastructure for envisioning a just bioethics. 
From De La Torre, Wynter, and Simpson, I have proposed new ways of 
perceiving and approaching recent bioethics issues including inadequate care for 
undocumented patients with ESRD, the resistance of Jahi McMath’s mother to the 
diagnosis of brain death, and the harm caused to the Havasupai from a research protocol. 
First, from De La Torre’s scholarship, my research reveals a future bioethics that rejects 
universals and starts any theorizing with individuals and communities embedded in their 
social locations, especially those who are on the margins. Imagine the impact of this kind 
of bioethics for the Latinx undocumented ESRD patients whose health varies from 
discomfort to near death on a weekly basis. A good example of this is a study by 




Experience of Undocumented Immigrants with End-Stage Renal Disease.”635 This article 
clearly demonstrates the suffering of undocumented immigrants who receive less than 
standard of care for their ESRD, the disabling symptom load, and the argument for better 
access for these patients. My analysis is explicit about how the U.S. healthcare system, 
according to Foucault’s “technologies of power,” cause suffering and early death of 
Latinx bodies. These technologies of power, such as state Medicaid policies, the 
Affordable Care Act, hospital budgets, healthcare provider acceptance, and lack of 
bioethics scholarship, fueled by overt and covert racism, a belief in the scarcity myth, and 
the colonial mindset of “protecting the nation-state from bad people” all work to keep 
suffering Latinx persons from access to the standard of care. The praxis of De La Torre’s 
liberative ethics is also informative to bioethics. Accompanying those who are 
marginalized, asking them why they come to the U.S., partnering with them, and getting 
involved in relational and participatory political action is at the heart of justice.636 Justice 
is not pity or charity; it is an actual placing of one’s white body in the spaces of those 
who have come to the U.S. seeking a better life. A De La Torrian-influenced bioethics 
would also denounce neoliberalism and would challenge the commodification of 
medicine, including how bioethicists, as individuals, can begin to seek out ways to divest 
ourselves from the dominant economic system. This is difficult; almost no one can escape 
it completely. De La Torre’s work would be particularly instructive for both bioethicists, 
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healthcare leaders, and healthcare workers who are caring for people who are 
marginalized, which includes those in the public realm and in hospitals. This would 
require political work, for bioethicists to take a stand, rather than to continue to foster 
“neutrality,” another myth of the eurochristian colonial mindset. To echo De La Torre, 
“no ethical perspective is value-free.”637 His work is also instructive for providing a 
deeper understanding and context of Latinx histories, ethics, and current experiences. 
Only through relationship, a deep and meaningful solidarity with Latinx en la lucha, can 
bioethicists be taken seriously. I would suggest that embedding De La Torre’s work in 
ethics and medical education would benefit the disciplines by debunking the myth of 
neutrality, promoting understanding of one’s complicity in the continued marginalization 
of Latinx people, and requiring the social, academic, and political work that supports 
Latinx liberation, including those who are undocumented. 
In my analysis of Wynter’s work and its impact on patients like Jahi McMath, I 
consider many possible contributions to the discourse of an anti-colonial bioethics. 
Wynter’s attention to the “schema of Man” would instruct the discourse of bioethics to 
challenge its own narrative, its “truth-for”, that defines its worldviews – there is no 
impartial point-of-view. Her rejection of Man as representative of Human is instructive 
for understanding how the eurochristian worldview is only one of a number of potential 
ontologies/epistemologies possible in our encounters with each other within a diverse 
population. Her history of race through the last millennium provides the long-view of 
racism and the depth to which it is entrenched in eurochristian worldview. For families 
                                                            




such as McMath’s, Wynter instills the need to respect the neurologically grounded 
fundamental truths of others’ definitions of life and death based on their own worldviews 
and origin stories. The violence imparted on the black bodies of Winkfield and McMath 
to withdraw McMath from the ventilator was yet another imposition of the eurochristian 
worldview. This insistence of following “the rules” within bioethics and medicine is 
another example of how the Foucauldian technologies of power, the power that is built 
into the structures of eurochristian institutions, continue to work in favor of maintaining 
the dominant system. The technologies that marginalized the Black bodies of McMath 
and Winkfield include the brain death laws created by an ad hoc Harvard committee, 
mostly white male physicians and scholars in 1968, and then by the President’s 
Commission for the study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research, the latter with a few women involved. These discussions were 
fueled by the utilitarian-economic pressures to account for the cost of life support and for 
the accumulating number of potential organ recipients, at the expense of what Wynter 
would call the sociogenic reality of McMath’s family, one that still sees her as a member 
of their family, as human, and as alive. Wynter teaches that the utilitarian-economic 
schema of efficiency has been prioritized over the respect of non-eurochristian 
worldviews and ontologies, and the transparency of care providers in helping patients 
understand the dilemmas (which builds trust), rather than selling people like Winkfield 
on the legal fiction of brain death while she watches McMath’s heart beat on the screen 
and holds her warm pink hand. Like De La Torre, Wynter also prioritizes the “gaze from 




a new paradigm for Human that is richer and more just because of their ability to live in 
two worlds at once, straddling two worlds. In healthcare, eurochristians find themselves 
straddling worldviews regularly, but can default to the eurochristian “rules” rather than 
being required to feel the tension of living in a world in constant negotiation, tolerance, 
and humility. This, I argue, is ontological and epistemological privilege. As bioethicists 
we have the choice to defer to the rules when negotiation gets difficult. In a bioethics 
following the lead of Wynter, a border bioethics would emerge from a relational and 
ecumenical Homo narrans, one that respects the physical manifestation of individual and 
communal stories; the ontologies and epistemologies become living flesh. Wynter’s work 
is also persuasive for raising awareness of the racism imparted by the eurochristian 
worldview through her discourse on symbolic life and death. She argues the liminal, such 
as people of color and the socioeconomically disadvantaged, are continually defined as 
the negative pole of binaries such as rational/irrational, productive/lazy, good/evil, 
Christian/heathen, symbolic life/death. The binary structure remains through time; only 
the words change. The Black diaspora continue to be relegated to an inferior space both 
physically and in the Western imagination despite individual good intentions, because it 
is the systemic worldview that creates racial harms. Finally, Wynter, like De La Torre, 
notes how the economics of capitalism defines the whole of humanity as a master of 
scarcity through investment and accumulation. Our behavioral codes are primarily 
“reasons of the economy” that drive eurochristian ethics. More important than honoring 
Winkfield’s wishes, it was important not to waste money in keeping McMath’s body 




Winkfield’s own good. This is not to say economics is irrelevant to decision-making in 
medicine, but it has become the final word. Again, my analysis uncovers how the trope of 
scarcity and the priority of progress and profit in the West both contribute to the 
overemphasis of economics over respecting people’s relational values. Towards an anti-
colonial bioethics, my dissertation demonstrates how Wynter’s work would be especially 
helpful in framing bioethics, healthcare worker, and healthcare administration education 
in reframing values differences as ontological/epistemological and in challenging 
economic models and their supremacy. 
In my analysis of Simpson’s work I demonstrate how Simpson would move 
bioethics into the realm of Indigenous values, including the values that are being lost to 
progress. The philosopher Jacques Ellul wrote in 1963, “the fact is that, viewed 
objectively, technological progress produces values of unimpeachable merit, while 
simultaneously destroying values no less important.”638 Simpson reasserts the values of 
respect, renewal, relationship, and reciprocity. These values have the potential to 
transform research ethics. Such a transformation would be disruptive to the pace of 
“progress,” but I project they are necessary to salvage the values important to planetary 
well-being and the future of human life. When applying Simpson’s work to the 
Havasupai case, it becomes clear that if these values had been intact as part of research 
ethics, the breaching of issues of consent and the harms done to the study subjects would 
have been unlikely. Consent falls short if not embedded in real respect of the study 
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subjects, in a commitment to renewal of community, and of a deep and reciprocal 
relationship between study subjects and researchers. Like Wynter’s Homo narrans, 
Simpson also values the origin stories and oral histories of individuals and communities 
as a fundamental trait of human life, not as a “particular” that can be tossed to the side of 
biological and theoretical universalism. The grounded normativity of Indigenous life 
prioritizes the relationship of humans with the earth and all living things, placing 
communities in a collective struggle to maintain balance and to maximize all life. The 
Indigenous life is a content-full ethics, as Engelhardt would call it, much like his 
Orthodox Christian ethics, and like many other ethnic and religiously derived ethics. 
Towards an anti-colonial bioethics, Indigenous scholars bring attention to the mutual 
respect of self-determining and content-full communities toward each other, despite 
disagreement. The prioritizing of Indigenous self-determination (as Indigenous nations 
have granted one another for millennia) is also instructive for those who evangelize their 
own morality. Simpson also provides a clear description of a worldview that is a contrast 
to the eurochristian worldview, enabling Westerners to envision radically different 
paradigms for moving in the world and relating to others. My dissertation demonstrates 
how Simpson’s views, and those of other Indigenous scholars, have the power to 
transform research, health policy, and the provision of care in ways that recover life-
sustaining values. 
The works of De La Torre, Wynter, and Simpson are paradigmatic examples of 
a rich discourse happening outside mainstream bioethics. Anti-colonial voices such as 




They also matter to those unaware they are imprisoned by the eurochristian worldview, of 
which ignorance not only affects social justice, but the health of the planet. The 
scholarship and praxis of anti-colonial scholars unearth the racial harms hidden in 
eurochristian structures, including the discipline of bioethics. Anti-colonial scholarship is 
also explicit that, while eurochristian allies may have a role in anti-colonial praxis, it is 
primarily the work of communities of color who have been marginalized and their 
counterparts in academia, politics, and healthcare practice who have the fundamental task 
of resisting eurochristian structures and reimagining and reclaiming their ontologies, 
epistemologies, and socioeconomic models that have been nearly (but not wholly) lost 
through appropriation, land theft, the slave trade, and genocide. This resurgence is not the 
work of eurochristians but can be supported through the challenging of eurochristian 
structures of capitalism, evangelism, racism, and blind pursuit of progress. Bioethics can 
be engaged through the literal joining of people in la lucha, the fight of those on the 
underside of colonialism against the systems that oppresses. Anti-colonialism is not about 
charity, assimilation, multiculturalism, or inclusion. It is about radical diversity, 
difference, and self-determination. I am proposing the bioethical prioritization of issues 
of race by transforming its education, practice, and policies through the use of anti-
colonial scholarship and praxis. 
In sum, I contend that an anti-colonial bioethics questions the aims and 
outcomes of bioethics in general. It takes the lead to address issues of racism, inequality, 
and oppression in healthcare. An anti-colonial bioethics must be led by those at the 




differences, not similarities. It demands the co-existence of multiple epistemologies; the 
differences that come from people’s core truths. Anti-colonial bioethicists do the difficult 
and ongoing internal work of staying epistemologically open to an individual’s or 
community’s ethical self-determination and sovereignty. Future pursuits in this area 
might include a study to assess the state of bioethics education on race; introducing anti-
colonial concepts and scholars in ethics education; building deeper relationships with 
communities who are marginalized by bioethics/healthcare systems to understand diverse 
worldviews and moral epistemologies; and to partner with both anti-colonial scholars and 
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